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resumo 
 
 
A presente dissertação analisa algumas das Técnicas de Propaganda mais 
comuns usadas no Discurso Político.  
 
O caso da “Guerra ao Terrorismo”, tal como foi definida  por  George W. Bush 
Presidente dos Estados Unidos da América, foi escolhido para ilustrar as 
mesmas. Os discursos serão examinados qualitativa e quantitativamente 
através de técnicas de Corpora Linguísticos Informatizados e uma comparação 
com Hitler será feita. 
 
A Dissertação apresenta o contexto de ocorrência dos discursos, uma 
enumeração de algumas das Técnicas de Propagandas mais recorrentes e 
uma análise detalhada dos factos mencionados anteriormente. Pretendo 
demonstrar com “casos reais e análises detalhadas” alguns dos aspectos mais 
ocultos dos Discursos Políticos e as sua intenções “manipuladoras”. 
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abstract 
 
The following dissertation analyzes some of the most common Propaganda 
Devices used in political speech.  
 
The example of the War on Terrorism was chosen to illustrate these as defined 
by George W. Bush, President of the United States of America’s administration. 
The speeches will be examined both qualitatively and quantitatively through 
examining computer corpora and a comparison will be made with the speeches 
of Hitler. 
 
The dissertation presents the context in which those speeches happened, an 
enumeration of some of the most common propaganda techniques and a 
detailed analysis of the facts previously mentioned. I want to show with real 
cases and detailed analyses, some of the most hidden aspects of political 
speech and its “manipulative” intentions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The first casualty when war comes is Truth! 
— U.S. Senator Hiram Johnson, 1917 
In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies. 
— Winston Churchill 
  
During the Masters in English Studies we had a number of disciplines and a 
number of projects to complete in the areas of Discourse Analysis, Text Analysis and 
Corpus Linguistics, this led me to examine the means by which politicians can persuade 
the public. This analysis involves not only qualitative analysis but also quantitative 
analysis through corpus linguistics to highlight what devices are used to persuade. 
Initially in the Masters I focused on the speeches of Hitler but for this dissertation I 
wanted to move on to a more modern analysis of a very powerful nation, the United States 
of America and the speeches of President Bush. The period leading up to the War in Iraq is 
focused on particularly and President Bush’s attitude to Saddam Hussein as seen through 
his speeches and the ‘war on terror’. Nevertheless, a comparison can be made between the 
speeches of Hitler and Bush using corpora to examine what is the same and what is 
different over an interval of almost eighty years. The speeches analysed are from the years 
1922 to 2002. Various theoretical frameworks have been suggested and these will be 
examined in Chapter 2 of this dissertation. Chapter 3 examines the methodological 
framework and the corpora used. Chapter 4 presents the results of the analyses carried out 
and discussion of those results. Finally, conclusions are drawn from this research.  
In order to analyse the propaganda used by President Bush we need to take into 
consideration the media and the role that this plays in disseminating the Presidential 
position. In a recent New York Times editorial (April 26, 2008) entitled “The Tarnished 
Brass” the activities of the team assembled by President Bush’s administration are 
described thus: 
As it prepared to invade Iraq five years ago, the Bush administration called up retired military officers 
to help sell the war. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and his propaganda team courted as many as 
75 retired military officers who could best market the Pentagon line, particularly on television. As 
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detailed in The Times on Sunday, many of these officers used their access to Pentagon bigwigs to 
promote their private businesses.  
The deal was simple: Offer good news on Iraq, even when the news is bad. 
This ‘marketing’ of the war needs to be examined to see how bad news is turned 
into good as a deliberate device. This will be discussed below in relation to both Hitler and 
Bush. 
The contemporary study of American Presidential rhetoric is of great importance. 
The application of power is often legitimized through rhetorical persuasion; and, in the 
case of American Presidents, such power, and its associated rhetoric, becomes the pivot 
upon which many global issues turn. Regardless of the oratorical ability of the individual 
President, the language, tone, style and substance of messages delivered by American Chief 
Executives in a world reduced to the scale of a global village are more often not incisively 
scrutinized by the numerous and often disparate audiences according to their own 
perspectives, and often for their own ends. The motivation for such inspection is the 
omnipresent effect that policy decisions made in the United States can potentially have on 
the rest of the world. Such potential is, of course, based upon the unprecedented power 
that the United States possesses at this point in history, and is distinctly predicated upon 
an American President’s ability to enact many aspects of policy expeditiously.  
 It has been noted that the United States of America bestrides the globe like a 
colossus ever since the collapse of the Soviet Bloc. Based upon a President’s very words, 
leaders of sovereign nations are at times compelled to make decisions in reaction to 
American desires, rather than as a result of their own proactive motivations.   
 Given that the significance of the study of American Presidential rhetoric, beyond 
historical value, lies in the ubiquity of American hegemony, which influences every facet of 
the culture of the globalized world, it stands to reason that, beyond the immediate 
implications of the rhetoric, the long-term consequences of the chosen rhetorical 
stratagems must be given careful consideration. The determinants that formulate 
American foreign policy strategy are numerous, and Presidential rhetoric emanates from 
the carefully constructed messages that foretell future American action, which, in turn, 
directly affect international reactions.  
  For instance, in the case of President George W. Bush’s persuasive attempt to 
gather both domestic and especially international support for the war against Saddam 
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Hussein’s despotic regime in Iraq, a significant difference between the perspective of the 
United States and many in the world community could be seen.  
The question that must be asked here is whether this difference resulted from the 
policy alone, whether it was a consequence of the manner in which the message was 
delivered to the world, or whether it was a combination of the two. This gives way to the 
purpose of this study, which aims to analyse, to a certain extent, the public political 
rhetoric of President George W. Bush towards the prosecution of the War in Iraq. The 
goal of this endeavour is to: (1) explicate the strategies he utilized to achieve maximum 
persuasion and (2) make an empirical study of the linguistic terminology used in his 
speeches. 
That “propaganda” is a disputed and controversial term makes it even more 
important to work with it, and to strive for greater consensus about its content and core. 
After the Second-World War, propaganda has largely had a negative connotation in 
everyday language and this dissertation will try to see why this is so.  
Politics is a multifaceted phenomenon that involves a quest for power and 
influence. It is also a decision-making process that determines the distribution of social 
goods and establishes laws, rights and prohibitions. This is the case whether decisions are 
made by an arbitrary dictator or by a representative body of elected delegates. For a better 
understanding of politics in society, we need to understand communication in its various 
forms. Politics without communication is like having blood without veins and arteries: it’s 
not really going anywhere. 
1.1. Media – a Powerful Instrument 
 
 When analyzing Propaganda, we must distinguish between two kinds of 
propaganda: “overt propaganda” and “subsumed propaganda”. “Overt propaganda” uses 
lies, myths, disinformation of various kinds and resorts to violent and emotive language. 
Here is one example: 
  “The henchmen of colonial racism and of imperial propaganda have tried to cast 
a curtain of pretences, fallacies, calumnies, scurrility, adulterations and vile 
accusations to disguise their machinations, their felonies, their knavery, their infamy, 
their crime and their irresponsibility.”1  
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 On the other hand, “subsumed propaganda” mixes values and the common 
terminology of society. The more a doctrine is verbally influenced by the values of a 
society, the more hidden it becomes: “criminal actions endanger law and order”. This 
sentence assumes that “law and order” are the protectors of a society. This assumption is 
unacceptable to some radical groups, however the ideology is transmitted. In this case 
values and terminology are inseparable. Strictly connected to language are some “clichés” 
that have emerged from general fears or policies. “The yellow peril”, “the red threat”, “the 
communist menace”, “macaroni”, “Yankee”, “Jap”, “Frenchy” are terms spawned over the years and 
that are now used with such frequency that people are not aware that they are being 
victims of their own values (their own culture). As these examples show this often 
happens when we are dealing with foreigners (the other) and which these days would be 
seen as racist or not politically correct language in a multicultural world. 
 The Bush Administration has come under fire for allegedly producing and 
disseminating “subsumed propaganda” in the form of television programs, aired in the 
United States. What appeared to be legitimate news broadcasts did not really include any 
unbiased information. This means that the programs were not generated by an 
independent private-sector news source. Military ‘consultants’ were often the sources of 
information and these ‘consultants’ had been briefed directly to give a positive view of the 
situation as was mentioned above in the New York Times article. 
  When programs like these are aired, if the average member of the audience does 
not have the indication that what they are about to see and hear is “biased information”, 
they will be inclined to think the program is in fact a news story (which are by definition 
characterized by balanced inclusion of relevant facts). That kind of program has now 
become a source of subsumed propaganda. 
 Both the overt and the subsumed or hidden propaganda can have amazing success. 
When joined together they can produce monsters and lead crowds to back them up. The 
example that best illustrates this combination is Hitler and his Nazi ideology. Hitler could 
not be described as having the appearance of an Aryan, however he was able to control an 
entire nation and emerge as “The” Aryan Leader.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
1 Minister of foreign affairs of Cuba in the United Nations 
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He used both “overt and subsumed propaganda” and in order to reinforce his 
position he also used false information to reinforce the mindsets of people who already 
believed in him. He assumed that, if people believe something false, they would constantly 
be assailed by doubts. Since these doubts may be unpleasant, people would be eager to 
have them extinguished, and are therefore receptive to the reassurances of those in power. 
Hitler was able to extinguish those doubts and in this way control huge crowds. 
  For this reason propaganda is usually addressed to people who are already 
sympathetic to the agenda. This process of reinforcement uses an individual's 
predisposition to self-select "agreeable" information sources as a mechanism for 
maintaining control. Once again people’s anxieties and values are used against them.  
 The secret to making a successful propaganda campaign is to align it with that 
society’s perceptions, sociological assumptions, spontaneous myths and ideologies (that is 
to say the culture of that society). Any campaigns that ignore these factors will not be 
successful. A successful propaganda campaign must also take into consideration the 
timings of events in that society and speak about contemporary events if it is to retain the 
audience’s interest. We may claim that if a propaganda campaign did not have an effect, 
then it was not propaganda at all, however the manipulative interest was there and that is 
what distinguishes propaganda speeches from any other kind of speech, if in fact there are 
any other kinds … 
1.1.1. Media Propaganda and Speech Media 
 
Freedom of the press is offered as one of the most important elements in a free 
society because only by having journalists not under government control can corruption 
be investigated, wrongdoing exposed, and information provided which the general public 
must possess if it is to responsibly exercise its fundamental rights. Journalists themselves 
proudly point to such events in American history as Watergate, the Pentagon Papers, Iran-
Contra, and many others, as examples of the way the American free press works in the 
interest of the common citizen. These exposures are considered so important that books 
and films have been made about them. 
One of the key justifications for society’s need for an unfettered press is the need of 
the people to know, a need which must be met in a society which is democratic. Without 
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adequate knowledge, people would be unable to take responsible action, either in their 
own interests or in the interests of society in general. In other words, it is essential that 
the people be provided with accurate information for them to take up a moral position. 
Moral agency, always a troublesome concept, is basically the idea that people, as 
individuals, are, and ought to be, held accountable for the “rightness” or “wrongness” of 
their actions. Moral agency has something to do with the relationship between means and 
ends – actions, intentions, and consequences.  
A society which does not provide adequate information to its citizens challenges 
their effectiveness as citizens, and it challenges their ability to make informed choices at 
all. In short, it challenges their ability to hold themselves and others responsible for all of 
their actions: it challenges their moral agency. 
The approach of governments to public information has changed from a rather 
traditional press release policy - based on interpersonal exchanges between politicians and 
journalists - to a professionalized and specialized process of strategic communication 
controlling the flow of news. In the light of this general development, news management is 
one practical solution for governments to strategically communicate their messages and 
use the media to further their political and policy goals. This has led to journalists being 
“embedded” with military units and provided with a list of their duties and the 
prohibitions on what they can and cannot report during war. This shows that there is an 
underlying assumption that in order to govern successfully, the administration must 
proactively determine the public agenda by controlling the media agenda. In this context, 
news management appears as one of the practical solutions for governments and other 
political actors to strategically communicate their messages and use the media to further 
their political and policy goals. These days the public is aware that a certain “spin” will be 
put on the news by the ruling political party. 
News management has different functions and appears in different forms and 
action repertoires in different countries. As to the general types of strategic 
communication, we draw a distinction between media centred news management versus 
political news management. The particular shaping of news management depends on the 
institutional, political and media context of each country. 
Today, the proliferation of new technologies has transformed the potential of the 
news media to provide a constant flow of constant real-time news. One very obvious 
example of this is watching the Gulf war as it happened with ‘strategic weapons’ (bombs) 
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flying down the streets of Baghdad which was the case first in the war on Iraq after it had 
invaded Kuwait in 1990. 
With the growth of communication tools like the Internet, the flow of persuasive 
messages has been significantly accelerated. For the first time ever, citizens around the 
world are participating in uncensored conversations about their collective future. This is 
wonderful, but it has its costs and some countries try very hard to ensure that their 
citizens do not have unrestricted access to the internet as is the case with Cuba, China 
and several other countries. 
 Tiananmen Square, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the Iraq War, the Western 
“interventions” in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Rwanda became Media events covered 
with real time footage. By the end of the decade the question being asked was to what 
extent had the Media power influenced policy-makers2 to respond to whatever issue 
journalists focused on.  
After the Cold war, journalists were presumed freer to cover the stories they 
wanted to and that this led them to question all policies. Media technologies development 
helped to make the World a Global Village in which the Media are forming a global 
consciousness. The use of propaganda as a “weapon” in war is almost a basic part of 
human history. Some authors like Harold D. Lasswell (1951)3 defend that “The basic idea is 
that the best success in war is achieved by the destruction of the enemy’s will to resist, and with a minimum 
annihilation of fighting capacity”.   
 To explain this situation let’s focus on the word War and its semantic field.  
Nowadays War is being replaced by ameliorated locutions such as: armed aggression, 
intervention and military operations, armies have been renamed Defence Forces, Campaigns are 
called operations, warzones are called operational areas, battles are now military engagements, 
bombs are explosive devices if they are small and  strategic devices if they cause large-scale 
destruction. In a similar way, as long as the enemy is not a threat, its activities are 
described as pockets of resistance, should the enemy score more significant victories, these are 
either subjected to a news blackout or are made out to be insignificant, temporary gains of the 
enemy. In case of a more blatant defeat, it is turned into a savage atrocity or  genocide.   
                                                           
2 By using the phrase “policy-maker”, I am referring to someone who has responsibilities, is part of or in some way can 
influence the Government or the process of decision making in his respective country, organism or state community. 
3 Lasswell, H.D (1951), Political and psychological warfare, New York: George Stewart 
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 The vocabulary of death also attracts lots of euphemisms: make away with, put an end 
to, dispatch, and knock off do not exhaust the list. In a similar way, Enemy has also undergone a 
similar change. Since the Second World War, formal declarations of war have ceased. The 
tactical advantage of surprise attack is too important to be set apart because of moral 
values. The Enemies and their armies are now called, liberation movements, freedom fighters, 
Guerillas or terrorists.  This terminology is used according to the more or less favourable tone 
we want to put on the other army: for a more favourable tone one can use the first two 
terms and for a less favourable tone the second two terms will be the chosen ones.  
 Let’s use the Gulf War as an example. The coalition of countries first attacked Iraq on 
January 17 1991 and finished 43 days later on February 23, 1991. These 43 days of war 
provided lots of propaganda material to be used as examples. 
In fact the Gulf War began 5 months before on January 17, when Iraq invaded 
Kuwait and assumed control of that country. During those 5 months the world was 
subjected to massive propaganda campaigns from both sides of the conflict. 
 At times of war, or build up for war, messages of extremities and hate, combined 
with emotions of honour and righteousness interplay to provide powerful propaganda for 
a cause. 
The main objective of these propaganda campaigns was to transmit the ideology of 
the countries making the propaganda, both in internal and external contexts. The 
Coalition of Countries, with the U.S.A at the helm, based their ideals on the idea of a free 
democratic capitalist structure. In this context the key word was freedom. Thus, all 
propaganda campaigns implied the notion that the coalition was dealing with an enemy 
that denied the basic democratic rights to its own citizens. During the pre- Gulf War 
period, the Coalition of Countries tried to transmit the idea that the “totalitarian Iraqi 
dictatorship” had invaded and attempted to destroy the “freely elected and democratic” nation of 
Kuwait. These countries never said a word about the lack of democracy or women’s rights 
in Kuwait, although this was the main argument of those who opposed the war.  
Those who promote the negative image of the “enemy” may often reinforce it with 
rhetoric about the righteousness of themselves; the attempt is to propagate the belief that 
what is to be done is in the positive and beneficial interest of everyone. Often, the 
principles used to demonize the other, are not used to judge the self, leading to 
accusations of double standards and hypocrisy. 
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“Next the statesmen will invent cheap lies, putting the blame upon the nation that is attacked, 
and every man will be glad of those conscience-soothing falsities, and will diligently study them, and 
refuse to examine any refutations of them; and thus he will <by and by convince himself that the war is 
just, and will thank God for the better sleep he enjoys after this process of grotesque self-deception.”4 
The Gulf War generated a lot of PR5 work in action. Founder of the Washington 
PR firm, The Rendon Group, John Rendon6 told the cadets at the U.S. Air Force Academy 
in 1996: 
“I am not a national security strategist or a military tactician. I am a politician, and a 
person who uses communication to meet public policy or corporate policy objectives. In fact, I am an 
information warrior and a perception manager.” 
In order to reinforce his position Rendon reminded the Air Force cadets that when 
the victorious coalition troops entered Kuwait City after defeating the Iraqi forces, they 
were greeted by hundreds of Kuwaitis waving small American flags. This scene appeared 
all around the world on television screens and sent the message that the U.S. Marines 
were being welcomed in Kuwait as liberating heroes. He then continued by asking “ Have 
you ever stopped to wonder how the people of Kuwait City, after being held hostage for seven long and 
painful months, were able to get those little American flags, and for that matter, the flags of other coalition 
countries?” He paused for effect. “Well, you now know the answer. That was one of my jobs then.”7 
Probably every conflict is fought on at least two grounds: the battlefield and the 
minds of the people via propaganda. The “good guys” and the “bad guys” can often both be 
guilty of misleading their people with distortions, exaggerations, subjectivity, inaccuracy 
and even fabrications, in order to receive support and a sense of legitimacy. 
Propaganda can serve to rally people behind a cause, but often at the cost of 
exaggerating, misrepresenting, or even lying about the issues in order to gain that support. 
In order to achieve its goals, propaganda and propagandists resort to: 
• Using selective stories that come over as wide-covering and objective;  
                                                           
4  Twain, M.  The Mysterious Stranger: http://etext.virginia.edu/toc/modeng/public/TwaMyst.html 
5 PR – Public Relations 
6  The Rendon Group is a secretive public relations firm that has assisted a number of U.S. military interventions in 
numerous nations, including Iraq. Rendon's activities include organizing the Iraqi National Congress, a PR front group 
designed to foment the overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. 
7 Rampton, S. and Stauber, J. (August 4, 2003) ,  How To Sell a War, In These Times : http://www.inthesetimes.com 
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• Partial facts, or historical context; 
• Reinforcing reasons and motivations to act due to threats on the security of the 
individual;  
• Narrow sources of “experts” to provide insights in to the situation. (For example, 
the mainstream media typically interview retired military personnel for many 
conflict-related issues, or treat official government sources as fact, rather than just 
one perspective that needs to be verified and researched); 
• Demonizing the “enemy” who does not fit the picture of what is “right”; 
• Using a narrow range of discourse, whereby judgments are often made while the 
boundary of discourse itself, or the framework within which the opinions are 
formed, are often not discussed. The narrow focus then helps to serve the interests 
of the propagandists. 
 However, we cannot dismiss the fact that propaganda is more than “a pack of lies”. 
The analysis of it demands more from its observer than a simple observation or 
comparison with reality. Propagandists are individuals that approach several areas of 
knowledge, sometimes in a non-conscientious way. They are able to manipulate language 
in a way that many writers cannot.  In a somewhat promiscuous way we can say that 
propaganda and education are similar in one of its aspects: they both try to change what 
we believe is true.   
 The fact is that propaganda makes a systematic and extensive use of influence 
techniques. The “bugs” of the human brain (like our pre-existing biases) are exploited by 
these techniques. 
 Related to the area of cultural knowledge is the question of subjectivity. A text is 
not itself amenable to an absolutely definitive interpretation, and it is an illusion to believe 
that a reader can understand a text in the same way as the author or the intended audience 
does. Every human being has a horizon, a certain knowledge and a pre-understanding that 
colours the interpretation of a text. To understand a text is to partake in a fusion of 
horizons, where every new text extends the interpreter’s horizon (Lindkvist 1981:32)8. 
                                                           
8 Lindkvist, K. (1981), Advances in Content Analysis, SAGE Publications: Beverly Hills and London 
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Additionally, the understanding of a text changes as the process of interpretation uncovers 
new aspects of the text’s meaning. 
As we can see, the Media can be a factor of policy outcome. In this situation, media 
coverage can influence the Policy Making process through the mechanisms inherent to 
itself. Nevertheless if we find low levels of empathy towards news coverage, media 
coverage is unlikely to cause any effect at all on “Policy Makers”. Another situation on 
which media coverage may not have any effects at all in the Policy Making process is when 
Policy Makers work on high levels of certainty. When Policy Makers act this way they 
cannot be influenced by the Media as they already expect a certain reaction from the 
general public. In this situation the reverse happens and the Policy Makers are the ones 
who will try to “manipulate” the Media. The news coverage is now the reactive element of 
the equation and they can do it in two ways. The first one consists of a supportive and 
empathetic coverage of the decision which will support the Policy Maker and the second 
one consists of the critical coverage of the decision which will provoke the opposite 
reaction towards the Policy Maker. In this scenario not even this critical news coverage 
will be sufficient to influence the Policy Maker.  
 This way, a message does not have to be untrue to qualify as propaganda. In fact, 
the message in modern propaganda is often not blatantly untrue. But even when a message 
conveys "true" information, it will generally contain partisan bias and fail to present a 
complete and balanced consideration of the issue. 
 On the other hand a more “Blatant” type of propaganda is often used in wars. In 
this case its aim is usually to dehumanize and create hatred toward a supposed enemy. 
The objective is to create a false image in the mind of the average person. This can be done 
by using special words, special avoidance of words or by saying that the enemy is 
responsible for certain things he never did. Most propaganda wars require the home 
population to feel the enemy has inflicted an injustice, which may be fictitious or may be 
based on facts. The home population must also decide that the cause of their nation is just. 
To achieve these objectives very often lies are used. We are no longer in the presence of a 
“manipulated reality” which although biased provides some true information and that 
with a cold analysis can be dismantled, but before a blatant lie. 
1.1.2. Good Journalism vs Bad journalism 
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It is worth noting a contrast, and highlighting some good journalism. Not 
everything in communication is bad. As an example, on November 17, 2002, a lunch time 
Sunday political program on the U.K's ITV channel had an interview with Iraqi Deputy 
Prime Minister, Tariq Aziz. The interview was conducted by Jonathan Dimbleby, well 
known in the UK, who went to Baghdad. 
• It was noticeable how well Dimbleby interviewed Aziz, being both polite and 
disrespectful of authority at the same time; 
• He questioned many of Aziz's assertions and followed up many points made by 
Aziz; 
• We would surely expect this quality from journalists all the time. Yet, conversely, 
we rarely see such challenging efforts on our own political leaders.  
Referring to Professor Galtung, Danny Schachter laid out 12 points of concern 
where journalism often goes wrong when dealing with violence. Each implicitly suggests 
more explicit remedies9: 
1. Decontextualizing violence: focusing on the irrational without looking at the reasons 
for unresolved conflicts and polarization.  
2. Dualism: reducing the number of parties in a conflict to two, when often more are 
involved. Stories that just focus on internal developments often ignore such outside or 
“external” forces as foreign governments and transnational companies.  
3. Manicheanism: portraying one side as good and demonizing the other as “evil.”  
4. Armageddon: presenting violence as inevitable, omitting alternatives.  
5. Focusing on individual acts of violence while avoiding structural causes, like 
poverty, government neglect and military or police repression.  
6. Confusion: focusing only on the conflict arena (i.e., the battlefield or location of 
violent incidents) but not on the forces and factors that influence the violence.  
                                                           
9 Danny Schechter, D. (July 18, 2001),  Covering Violence: How Should Media Handle Conflict: 
Http://www.mediachannel.org/viws/dissector/coveringviolence.shtml 
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7. Excluding and omitting the bereaved, thus never explaining why there are acts of 
revenge and spirals of violence.  
8. Failure to explore the causes of escalation and the impact of media coverage itself.  
9. Failure to explore the goals of outside interventionists, especially big powers.  
10. Failure to explore peace proposals and offer images of peaceful outcomes.  
11. Confusing cease-fires and negotiations with actual peace.  
12. Omitting reconciliation: conflicts tend to re-emerge if attention is not paid to efforts 
to heal fractured societies. When news about attempts to resolve conflicts are absent, 
fatalism is reinforced. That can help engender even more violence, when people have 
no images or information about possible peaceful outcomes and the promise of healing. 
This is why sometimes the media's role is questionable. On the one hand they 
attempt to be "objective" by reporting what leaders are saying. But, concentrating on such 
angles without appropriate time for other views from other segments of society itself 
repeats the official line, and for this reason promotes a line of propaganda.  
 BBC news managers reply austerely that "it is absolutely the BBC's role to be the objective 
and calm voice, reporting what we know to be fact and exploring the various viewpoints involved." (email 
from Richard Sambrook, BBC director of news to a Media Lens10 , 10 January, 2003) and 
that the BBC will "air a full range of views" (email from Sambrook to Media Lens11, January 23, 
2003). The BBC's relentless mirroring of government statements about the supposed 
threat of Iraq is, presumably, "reporting what we know to be fact." The very few dissident words 
broadcast by Tony Benn,12 George Galloway13 or the occasional peace activist, are all but 
drowned out in the vast amounts of air-time devoted to the warmongering “deceptions” of 
                                                           
10 Media Lens is a media analysis website based in the United Kingdom. It was established in 2001 to highlight "serious 
examples of bias, omission or deception in British mainstream media", with a strong focus on media generally thought of 
as objective or left-wing (BBC, Channel 4 News, The Guardian, et al.), and to encourage members of the public to 
challenge the relevant journalist, editor, newspaper or broadcaster. It is run by editors David Cromwell and David 
Edwards : http://www.medialens.org 
11 Ibid. 
12 Anthony "Tony" Neil Wedgwood Benn (born 3 April 1925), formerly 2nd Viscount Stansgate, is a British socialist 
politician. 
13 George Galloway (born 16 August 1954 in Dundee) is a Scottish politician, author and talk show host noted for his 
left-wing views, confrontational style, and rhetorical skill. He has been a Member of Parliament (MP) since 1987 and 
currently represents Respect for the Bethnal Green and Bow constituency. He was previously a Labour Party MP for 
Glasgow Hillhead and for Glasgow Kelvin. 
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Tony Blair, Donald Rumsfeld or Jack Straw. This gross imbalance constitutes "airing a full 
range of views." Broadcasting a tiny handful of “debates”, or news “analysis” programmes 
such as Panorama, represents "exploring the various viewpoints involved."”14 
 But as well as  subsumed propaganda, mentioned earlier in section 1.1 , there have 
been opportunities and occasions to push forth what many have described as blatant or 
overt-propaganda also as mentioned in section 1.1. Oftentimes, experts who support war 
go on television and make claims that are rarely challenged in depth. Other times, debate 
shows make it look like active debate, but rarely are there any experts that are against 
war. Instead, the sceptical audience gets to challenge the expert panel, often supporting 
war, who make various claims that are hard to challenge unless expert and detailed 
knowledge is available. In addition, the media are sometimes afraid to question power and 
authority too much. 
 The problem is not that TV reporting is merely dumbed down and has had almost 
all meaning processed out of it. There is often no attempt to explore the key issues behind 
key problems. Politicians, for example, can claim that the threat of force is required to 
convince Saddam to disarm only because the public is largely unaware of what was 
achieved by Unscom15 inspectors between 1991-98. Politicians can claim that Saddam 
might pass on his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to terrorists only because people 
don't know how quickly any hidden WMD would have become useless sludge. 
Scott Ritter16 in a CNN interview with Fionnuala Sweeney, about his own 
experience in Iraq, said: “Well, look: As of December 1998 we had accounted for 90 to 95 percent of 
Iraq's weapons of mass destruction capability -- "we" being the weapons inspectors. We destroyed all the 
factories, all of the means of production and we couldn't account for some of the weaponry, but chemical 
weapons have a shelf-life of five years. Biological weapons have a shelf-life of three years. To have weapons 
today, they would have had to rebuild the factories and start the process of producing these weapons since 
December 1998.17 
                                                           
14 Cromwel, D, (January 31, 2003), %aked Power: How 'benign' Western Politicians And 'objective' Media Lead Whole 
%ations Into War, ZMagazine, at: http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2003-01/31cromwell.cfm 
15 The United ations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UMOVIC) was created through the 
adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 1284 of 17 December 1999. UNMOVIC was to replace the 
former United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) and continue with the latter's mandate to disarm Iraq of its 
weapons of mass destruction, and to operate a system of ongoing monitoring and verification to check Iraq's compliance 
with its obligations not to reacquire the same weapons prohibited to it by the Security Council. 
16 William Scott Ritter, Jr. Had a role as a chief United Nations weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 to 1998 
17 http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/meast/07/17/saddam.ritter.cnna/ 
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This is the same as saying that as of 1998, all Saddam's WMD and the means for 
producing them had been destroyed. Whatever was not destroyed would by now be 
harmless sludge, because the shelf-life for the weapons that Saddam possessed was five 
years or less." 
  Politicians can claim that an attack on Iraq is about liberating its people, rather 
than its oil, because the public is unaware of what the US/UK did to Iraq's neighbour, 
Iran, and why, from 1953 onwards. As a matter fact, in 1953, under orders from President 
Eisenhower, the CIA organized a military intervention escort that overthrew Iran's 
democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. The U.S and U.K. 
governments were not happy with his decision to nationalize Iran’s oil industry. In 2000, 
U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright admitted: “In 1953 the United States played a 
significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of Iran's popular Prime Minister, Mohammed Mossadeqh. 
The Eisenhower Administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons; but the coup was 
clearly a setback for Iran's political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to 
resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs.”18  
 
Here is the summary of some of the main events  that took place afterwards19: 
 
1953 -1979 – Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi was conducted to power with U.S. support. 
The democracy that existed in Iran was crushed. The Shah led 25 years of tyrannical rule 
(supported by the U.S.) During this period thousands of Iranians who opposed the U.S. 
puppet government were killed. The Shah denationalized Iran’s oil industry and about 
60% of it went to American firms. 
 
1979 - Islamic religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini returns from exile and takes effective 
power. Sixty-six hostages are taken by students at the U.S. embassy in Tehran as 
retaliation for the admission of the Shah into the U.S. These students and demanded Shah 
to be returned to Iran for a trial. 
 
1980 – Iran is invaded by its neighbour Iraq. This invasion had the approval and assistance  
                                                           
18 http://www.asiasociety.org/speeches/albright4.html 
19 http://stpeteforpeace.org/us.iran.timeline.html  and  http://www.cfr.org/publication/12806/timeline.html 
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of the United States of America. This war lasted for eight years. Thousands of Iraqis and 
Iranians died during this period. Whenever Iranian forces gained advantage on the 
battlefield, the U.S. re-armed and aided Saddam.  
 
 1986 – 1989 - Bacterial cultures to make anthrax weapons, advanced computers, and 
equipment to repair jet engines and rockets were sent to Iraq; U.S. forces engage in a series 
of encounters with Iranian naval forces, including strikes on Gulf oil platforms; By 
mistake, while patrolling the Persian Gulf, the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian 
passenger jet. It was confused with a hostile Iranian fighter aircraft. 290 people aboard the 
commercial Airbus died;  
1995 - President Clinton imposed oil and trade sanctions on Iran for alleged sponsorship of 
"terrorism" (These charges were denied by Iran). 
 
2002 - U.S. President George W Bush, in his State of the Union address, included Iran as 
being part of an "axis of evil".  The U.S. accuses Iran of developing secret nuclear weapons. 
 
2005 - The United States budget $3 million for various Iranian groups in order to 
"promote democracy" in Iran.  Iran's ambassador to the United Nations called the plan "a 
clear violation" of a 1981 U.S-Iranian agreement in which the U.S. pledged "not to intervene 
directly or indirectly, politically or militarily in Iran's internal affairs." 
 
2007 - In January, U.S. troops were authorized to kill Iranian "operatives" in Iraq 
 
  This list of events clearly shows a hidden “Oil –agenda” described as for “strategic 
reasons” that is not obvious to the “average audience” most of the time. Decontextualized 
facts can lead to wrong conclusions and allow cynicism. 
The general establishment sympathies of the media may mean that while there is 
an eagerness to gently challenge power, there is a deep unwillingness to publicly 
embarrass power. Politicians subtly indicate when journalists are getting out of bounds by 
suggesting that a certain line of argument is “silly”, “nonsense”, or “a conspiracy theory”.  
Thus, all discussion of oil as a motive for war on Iraq is followed by: “I'm sorry but 
this is just ridiculous”. The clear warning was that journalists who pursued this line of 
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thinking were being unprofessional and risk losing credibility. Because the leading 
political parties have the same interest in avoiding the same issues, they all reinforce this 
same diffusion of journalistic integrity in the same way. According to Medialens, many 
editors are part of the establishment themselves and were educated at the same (private) 
schools and universities. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1. The History and Definition of Propaganda  
 
 Wikipedia describes Propaganda as a specific type of message presentation directly aimed 
at influencing the opinions of people, rather than impartially providing information20.   This is a very 
good definition as it incorporates the most important items about propaganda: message, 
influence, people and non-impartial information. But it emphasises the idea that propaganda is 
biased and therefore not seen as positive. 
In some cultures the term is neutral or even positive, while in others the term has 
acquired a strong negative connotation. Its connotations can also vary over time. For 
instance, in English, "propaganda" was originally a neutral term used to describe the 
dissemination of information in favour of a certain cause. Over time, however, the term 
acquired the negative connotation of disseminating false or misleading information in favour 
of a certain cause. Strictly speaking, a message does not have to be untrue to qualify as 
propaganda, but it may omit so many pertinent truths that it becomes highly misleading. 
In propaganda we have a force that can persuade in such an extraordinary way that 
even the most brilliant writers or speakers cannot. Persuasion is an inherent feature of 
every “common speech”; however, a deliberate propagandistic speech takes this 
assumption one step further. The natural persuasive aspect of every speech is carefully 
refined by propagandists in such a way that it becomes itself a powerful “weapon” capable 
of “mass destruction”. It is a method that can handle any type of information and a force 
with unlimited potentiality. The propaganda industries have grown to such proportions 
and in such varied directions that it is now hard to categorize. 
Propaganda is often confused with advertising. This is understandable since both 
use similar methods and have a similar end - to persuade someone. The main difference is 
that advertising always intends to promote some kind of goods while propaganda intends 
to promote some kind of ideologies. In the modern world, propaganda is used to refer to 
some kind of malicious persuasion or to the dissemination of half-truths by obscure 
methods. So, "truth" in this context, becomes some article designed to be put on sale in the 
market. 
                                                           
20  Http: www.wikipedia.org (February, 15 2006) 
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Historically, according to the Wikipedia,21 the most common use of the term 
propaganda is in political contexts, particularly to refer to certain dubious efforts sponsored 
by governments, political groups, and other often covert interests.  The Propaganda 
“genre” was firstly recognizable in Herodotus writings that made him become known as 
the first person to write a patriotic history, in Virgil’s  Aeneid  that is a patriotic myth and 
in Plato’s The Republic due to his ruthlessness in proposing thought-control. After these 
writings, propaganda is only recognizable in some aspects of the Christian Counter-
Reformation22, in the beginnings of the XVII century. 
 Propaganda, in its most neutral sense, means to disseminate or promote particular 
ideas. In Latin, it means to propagate or to sow.  The term can be found as early as the 17
th 
Century, when it was used to denote the committee of Catholic cardinals, Sacra Congregatio 
de Propaganda Fide, who were appointed by Gregory XV to oversee foreign missions of the 
Church. Because the Roman Catholic Church intended to spread the faith to the New 
World as well to oppose Protestantism, the word propaganda lost its neutrality and 
subsequent usage has rendered the term pejorative.  
Most propaganda theories have been developed in the West. Propaganda activities 
expanded greatly during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, and the widespread use of 
propaganda during the First World War became a watershed in the history of propaganda 
studies (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999:105)23. Since then, propaganda studies have been the 
meeting place for different disciplines, for instance history, political science and 
psychology.  
Some scholars, notably Leonard Doob (1989:378)24, argue that no systematic or 
clear-cut definition of propaganda is possible. Doob claims that the complexity of the 
subject and the wide range of cultural values in the world make such a definition 
impossible (Ibid.:378).
 
Besides a reluctance to define the term in any systematic way, some 
scholars have also been prone to include everything from advertising to the leaflets 
dropped by the military behind enemy lines to persuade enemy soldiers to give up fighting. 
                                                           
21 Ibid. 
22 Counter-reformation :Middle Age Christian movement concerning the propagation of the Christian faith 
23 Jowett, Garth S. and  O’Donnell, V. (1999): Propaganda and Persuasion, Sage Publications: Newbury Park, London, 
New Delhi 
24
 Doob, Leonard, W. (1989): Propaganda in International Encyclopedia of Communication, Volume 3, Oxford 
University Press: p. 378, New York 
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One of the most influential propaganda scholars, Harold D. Lasswell (1927:9)25, 
presented in his classic work, Propaganda techniques in World War I, one of the first attempts 
to define propaganda: “It refers solely to the control of opinion by significant symbols, or, to speak more 
concretely and less accurately, by stories, rumours, reports, pictures and other”. 
 Another famous scholar in the field of propaganda, Jacques Ellul (1973:61)26, 
emphasizes that “propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring 
about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified 
through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organization”. This definition includes 
the notion of propaganda as a mass phenomenon perpetrated by an ‘organised group’, but 
neglects the fact that propaganda can sometimes have a passive and sedating effect, and 
that it can be an effective way to prevent undesirable action.  
 This thesis is based on the definition of propaganda applied by Jowett and 
O’Donnell (1999:269) in Propaganda and Persuasion: 
“Propaganda is a deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate 
cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the 
propagandist”. 
 In contrast with the definitions above, this stresses that propaganda promotes the 
interests of the propagandist which is obviously the case with the Bush administration. 
The word deliberate implies a sense of careful consideration of all possibilities. 
Jowett and O’Donnell chose the word because it means that propaganda is carefully 
thought out ahead of time in order to select what will be the most effective strategy to 
promote an ideology or to maintain an advantageous position. This was obviously the case 
in the USA with the recruitment of the military ‘consultants’ to advise the media about the 
war. 
 The word systematic complements deliberate because it means carrying out 
something with organized regularity. For instance, some governments or corporations 
establish departments or agencies specifically to create systematic propaganda. The 
shaping of perceptions is usually attempted through language and images, which is why 
                                                           
25 Lasswell, H. D. (1927): Propaganda Techniques in  World War 1, The M.I.T. Press: Cambridge and London 
26 Ellul, J. (1973): Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, Vintage Books A Division of Random House: New 
York.  
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slogans, posters and symbols develop during wartime. In this case the ‘consultants’ did not 
always appear but their information was presented as ‘news’ on television. 
 The word propaganda is now used to demonstrate any kind of overt persuasion, 
whereas it previously implied a sincere advancement of sectional interests, it is now 
denoted with the dissemination of half-truths by suspicious methods. In this century it 
has become so powerful that it is the best way to mobilize mass scale populations around 
an ideology. It is as open in its methods as it is frightening in its achievements.  It can 
virtually be found in any kind of public statement, whether it is “black radio”27 or a 
journalistic article. What separates propaganda from "normal" communication is in the 
subtle, often insidious, ways that the message attempts to shape opinion. Propaganda can 
be as “noisy” as a swastika or as subtle as a joke. Its persuasive techniques are regularly 
applied by politicians, advertisers, journalists, radio personalities, and others who are 
interested in influencing human behaviour. Propagandistic messages can be used to 
accomplish positive social ends, as in campaigns to reduce drunk driving, but they are also 
used to win elections and to sell beer. History studies the past, journalism analyses the 
present but propaganda moulds the future … 
2.2. Analysing Propaganda 
 
Analyzing propaganda is a complex task. Jowett & O’Donnell (1999:12) describe 
propaganda as “white, grey or black, in relationship to an acknowledgment of its source 
and its accuracy of information.” These three variables for making a typology have been in 
use for some time now; also Ellul (1973:15) discusses them, with emphasis on covert and 
overt propaganda. 
“White” propaganda comes from a source that is identified correctly, and the 
information in the message tends to be factually accurate. Nevertheless, white propaganda 
messages are characterized by biased “reasoning”, and are often aimed at improving the 
credibility of the source. Such credibility can be used at a later stage when influencing and 
manipulating may be more important than when the white propaganda message was 
conveyed. It is white propaganda that overlaps the most with related terms such as public 
diplomacy, information, rhetoric and persuasion. 
                                                           
27 One technique used in warfare technique of disinformation. It involves the simulation of a radio station in 
order to feed their listeners propaganda 
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One of the best examples to illustrate “white propaganda” is the V.O.A (Voice of 
America) that is the official radio and television broadcasting station of the United States 
Federal Government. Although not directly related to the military, it was used during the 
war to transmit testimonials from happy Iraqi prisoners of war along with prayers from 
the Koran and the location of U.S. bomb targets for the next day. These pieces of 
information could have not been categorized as a lie because in fact they were not lies. 
They fit in the “white propaganda” category because they were an attempt to pass 
credibility into the audience by convincing them of the good intentions of the sender.  
“Black” propaganda applies stealth and is credited to a false source. It spreads lies 
and fabrications. Black propagandists have no concern for the truth: deception is actively 
sought. Moreover, black propagandists will not hesitate to apply any techniques to 
achieve persuasion.  
Blatant lies are very frequently used during wars. The Second World War 
generated masses of “black propaganda”, distortions, disinformation and lies. One of these 
cases was mastered by Germany and was "The New England Broadcasting Station." This 
station, supposedly run by British subjects, began sending radio transmissions of war 
news on the eve of the planned invasion of England by Germany. The station came out to 
be an undercover German operation that aimed to reduce the morale of the British people 
by spreading fear and demoralizing news.  
“Grey” propaganda is placed in the middle of an imagined continuum between 
black and white propaganda. The correctness of the information and the identity of the 
source may be known or unknown. Logically, propaganda will never be “black” if its 
original source can be determined, and if that source acknowledges its involvement. No 
matter how manipulative or deceptive a statement is, it should be classified as grey if the 
source can be correctly identified. Similarly, a message may be veracious and accurate, but 
nevertheless grey, because the source is unknown. 
 “To analyse propaganda is not an easy task as it involves a deliberate and systematic 
attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response that 
furthers the desired intent of the propagandist. Its systematic nature requires longitudinal study of its 
progress. "28 
                                                           
28
 Jowett, Garth S. and  O’Donnell, V. (1999): Propaganda and Persuasion, Sage Publications: Newbury Park, London, New 
Delhi p.269 
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This is the reason why these two authors created a 10-step analysis plan for 
propaganda that recognizes the following stages of propaganda:  
 1. The ideology and purpose of the propaganda campaign;  
 2. The context in which the propaganda occurs;  
 3. Identification of the propagandist;  
 4. The structure of the propaganda organization;  
 5. The target audience;  
 6. Media utilization techniques;  
 7. Special various techniques;  
 8. Audience reaction to various techniques;  
 9. Counterpropaganda, if present;  
 10. Effects and evaluation.  
 
These ten steps take into account toward what ends, in the context of the times, a 
propaganda agent working through an organization, reaches an audience through the 
media by using special techniques to obtain a desired reaction (Ibid.:280).  
Jowett and O’Donnell (1999:23), based on Halliday’s work, define communication 
as a process in which a sender transmits a message to a receiver through a channel. This 
process has been represented by both linear and transactional models. Contrary to the 
linear versions the transactional models also stress that the sender and the receiver of a 
message create and share information in order to reach mutual understanding (Ibid.:23).  
Six basic elements can be found in communication: A source or sender, an encoding 
process which results in a message, a channel of transmission, a detector or recipient of the 
message, and a decoding process. These elements are reflected in a classic definition of the 
communication process: Who says what, to whom, how, and with what effect? 
According to Jowett and O’Donnell this model has been the paradigm of American 
communication research (Jowett and O’Donnell:172). 
Holsti29 (1969:24) also adds “why?” and he presents the communication process in a 
figure similar to the following (Ibid.:25).  
Sender  Encoding Process Channel  Message  Decoding Process  Recipient 
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Who? Why? How? What? With what effect? To whom? How? 
Jowett and O’Donnell’s ten-step method reflects this figure: Identification of the 
propagandist (who?), the ideology and purposes of the propaganda (why?), the structure 
of the organization (how?), media utilization techniques (what?), special various 
techniques (what?), audience reaction to various techniques (with what effect?), effects 
and evaluation (with what effect?) and the target audience (to whom?).  
This dissertation analyzes some of George Bush’s administration speeches and its 
allies (parts of speeches to be more accurate). Using a simplified and limited version of 
their method, (the limitation is based on the fact that this dissertation does not answer the 
question “With what effect?” exhaustively. As a result, steps eight and ten are delegated to 
second place. Assessment of these steps would have required in-depth interviews with the 
people involved, listeners, and such a reception analysis is beyond what is possible to do in 
this study.)  I want to stress that a mere analysis of propaganda messages is insufficient if 
we are to gain an understanding of propaganda disseminated via the media. To achieve 
that, we must also understand the surroundings in which the propaganda occurs. 
However, it is possible to use empirical analyses and comparison with other infamous 
propaganda users to see what and how far certain language and propaganda techniques 
are used.  
 According to Holsti30 (1969:61), the most evident weakness of propaganda 
analyses is the absence of systematic research to relate categories of appeal, techniques, 
and dimensions to effects.  To measure the effect of the media is a highly complex 
endeavour and the methodological difficulties are immense it is for this reason that 
recourse has been made to analysing corpora.  
However, the starting point for this dissertation is that the propaganda from 
Bush’s administration did have an effect. To further limit the scope of this thesis, steps 
three and four, and steps five and six, are combined as they contain many of the same 
elements.  
What Holsti31 (1969) does not take into consideration is the context of the communication 
process. A mere analysis of propaganda messages is insufficient if we areto gain an 
understanding of propaganda disseminated via the media. To achieve that, we must also 
                                                                                                                                                                                
29 Holsti, Ole R. (1969): Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company: Massachusetts 
30  Ibid. 
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understand the environment in which the propaganda is formulated. This aspect will be 
highlighted in the thesis. Consequently, the following six steps from Jowett and 
O’Donnell’s ten-step method will be the focus of this thesis: 
1. Identification of the propagandist and the structure of the   organization.  
2. The ideology and purpose  
3. The target audience and the media utilization techniques  
4. The counterpropaganda  
5. The context  
6. The propaganda techniques used 
Step six will receive a lot of attention, in order to understand the role of 
propaganda in the Media Campaign. We must understand the focus of the propaganda 
used by President Bush. Generally, in order not to fear, but to fight, propaganda, we must 
first understand what it is and how it is composed (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999:ix). This 
also necessitates a deeper understanding of the context in which the propaganda occurred. 
Thus, step five will be highlighted. When discussing step one, the institutional framework 
of Bush’s Administration will be analyzed. When examining step two, the aim is to 
understand why Bush’s administration propaganda campaign was instituted, while the 
discussion of step three focuses on the audience. The discussion of step four focuses on 
Iraqi propaganda.  
2.3. Identification of the Propagandist and the structure of the 
propaganda organisation;  
 
 
The owners of the media exercise control over the communication message (Jowett 
and O’Donnell 1999:284). The source of the propaganda message is often an institution or 
an organization with the propagandist as its leader or agent. The agents are those who 
facilitate messages directly and through the media for an institution. Sometimes there will 
be complete openness about the identity of the organization behind the propaganda, while 
                                                                                                                                                                                
31  Ibid. 
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at other times the organization will conceal itself in order to achieve its goals (Ibid.:283). 
Additionally, successful propaganda campaigns tend to originate from a strong, 
centralized decision-making authority that produces a consistent message throughout its 
structure (Ibid.:283).  
 With the election of George W. Bush as U.S. President in 2000, the U.S. moved 
towards a more active policy of “regime change” in Iraq. The Republican Party's campaign 
platform in the 2000 election called for "full implementation" of the Iraq Liberation Act 
and removal of Saddam Hussein, and key Bush advisors, including Vice President Dick 
Cheney, Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and Rumsfeld’s Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, 
were longstanding advocates of invading Iraq. After leaving the administration, former 
Bush treasury secretary Paul O'Neill said that an attack on Iraq was planned since the 
inauguration and that the first National Security Council meeting involved discussion of 
an invasion. O'Neill later backtracked, saying that these discussions were part of a 
continuation of foreign policy first put into place by the Clinton Administration. 
 Despite the Bush Administration’s stated interest in invading Iraq, little formal 
movement towards an invasion occurred until the September 11, 2001 attacks. 
 Shortly after September 11, 2001, on September 20, Bush in his address to a joint 
session of Congress and American People32 announced the War on Terrorism, 
accompanied by the widely criticized doctrine of “pre-emptive”33 military action, later 
termed the Bush doctrine. Some Bush advisors favoured an immediate invasion of Iraq, 
while others advocated building an international coalition and obtaining United Nations 
authorization. Bush eventually decided to seek U.N. authorization, while still holding out 
the possibility of invading unilaterally. 
 While there had been some earlier talk of action against Iraq, the Bush 
administration waited until September 2002 to call for action, with White House Chief of 
Staff Andrew Card saying ``From a marketing point of view, you don't introduce new 
products in August”34. 
                                                           
32 Http://www.whitehouse.gov 
33 This phrase is used to describe the policy adopted by President Bush ( later termed the Bush Doctrine) that  the United 
States had the right to treat countries that  shelter or give aid to terrorist groups as terrorists themselves. Later it  included 
additional elements which held that the United States should depose foreign regimes that represented a threat to the 
security of the United States, even if that threat was not immediate. This argument was used to justify the invasion of 
Iraq. It also advocated  a policy of supporting democracy around the world, especially in the Middle East, as a strategy 
for combating the spread of terrorism, and a willingness to pursue U.S.  interests, even in a unilateral way. 
34  Http://www.whitehouse.gov 
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 Bush began formally making the case to the international community for an 
invasion of Iraq in his September 12, 2002 address to the U.N. Security Council. Key U.S. 
allies in NATO, including France and Germany, were critical of plans to invade Iraq, 
arguing instead for continued diplomacy and weapons inspections. After considerable 
debate, the U.N. Security Council adopted a compromise resolution 
(U.N_Security_Council_Resolution_144135), which authorized the resumption of weapons 
inspections and promised "serious consequences" for noncompliance. Security Council 
members France and Russia made clear that they did not believe these consequences to 
include the use of force to overthrow the Iraqi government. 
 Both the U.S. ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte, and the UK ambassador 
Jeremy Greenstock publicly36 confirmed this reading of the resolution, assuring that 
Resolution 1441 provided no "automaticity" or "hidden triggers" for an invasion without 
further consultation of the Security Council. 
 Paralleling its efforts in the U.N., the Bush Administration also sought internal 
authorization for an invasion, which it was granted on October 2002 when the U.S. 
Congress passed a "Joint Resolution to Authorize the Use of United States Armed Forces 
Against Iraq". While the resolution authorized the President to "use any means necessary" 
against Iraq, Americans polled in January 2003 widely favoured further diplomacy over an 
invasion. 
 In February 2003, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the United 
Nations General Assembly, continuing U.S. efforts to gain U.N. authorization for an 
invasion37. Powell presented evidence alleging that Iraq was actively producing chemical 
and biological weapons and had ties to Iraq and al-Qaeda, claims that have since been 
widely discredited. As a consequence to Powell’s presentation, the United States, United 
Kingdom, and Spain proposed a UN Resolution to authorize the use of force in Iraq, but 
U.S. NATO allies Canada, France, and Germany, together with Russia, strongly urged 
diplomacy campaigns. Facing a losing vote as well as a likely veto from France and Russia, 
the U.S. eventually withdrew its resolution. 
                                                           
35 United ations Security Council Resolution 1441 is a resolution by the UN Security Council, passed unanimously 
on November 8, 2002, offering Iraq "a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations" that had been set 
out in several previous resolutions (Resolution 660, Resolution 661, Resolution 678, Resolution 686, Resolution 687, 
Resolution 688, Resolution 707, Resolution 715, Resolution 986, and Resolution 1284). 
36http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2002/1108usstat.htm   
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june03/greenstock_2-24.html 
37 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html 
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Bush meets with his top advisors on March 19, 2003 just before the invasion began. 
With the failure of its resolution, the U.S. and UK abandoned the Security Council 
procedures and decided to start the invasion without U.N. authorization, a decision of 
questionable legality under international and U.N laws.  This decision was unpopular 
worldwide, and the opposition to the invasion coalesced on February 15 in a worldwide 
anti-war protest that attracted between six and ten million people in more than 800 cities, 
the largest such protest in human history according to the Guinness Book of World 
Records. 
 In March 2003, the United States began preparing for the invasion of Iraq, with a 
host of public relations, and military moves. In his March 17, 2003 address to the nation, 
Bush demanded that Hussein and his two sons Uday and Qusay surrender and leave Iraq, 
giving them a 48-hour deadline. Iraq rejected this demand, maintaining that it had already 
disarmed as required. On March 20, 2003, the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its 
allies began, without UN support, unlike the first Gulf War or the invasion of 
Afghanistan. 
 
2.3.1 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: CLINTON’S STYLE  VS  BUSH’S 
STYLE 
 
A frequent complaint about the Clinton administration was that it tried too hard 
to "spin" everything in its own favour. Clinton's spin doctors had a variety of individual 
styles but shared an irritating habit of relentlessly colouring the news to support their side 
in any argument. George Stephanopoulos38, with whom the technique was closely 
identified, once defined spin as "a hope dressed up as an observation." In practice, Clinton-
era spinning meant that officials seldom conceded the obvious or acknowledged losing, 
failing, or being wrong about anything.  
George W. Bush arrived in Washington vowing an end to all that. He promised he 
would never parse, shade, or play nice with the truth the way that Clinton had. Although 
Bush apparently rejected spinning, his administration was in favour of something far more 
insidious. If the Clintonites were inveterate spinners, the Bushes deliberate propagandists.  
                                                           
38 George Robert Stephanopoulos (born February 10, 1961) is an American broadcaster and political adviser. He is 
currently ABC News's Chief Washington Correspondent and the host of ABC's Sunday morning news show This Week. 
Prior to joining ABC News, he was a senior political adviser to the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign of Bill Clinton and 
later became Clinton's communications director. 
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 Though propaganda and spin exist on a continuum, they are different in essence. 
To spin is to offer a contention, usually specious, in response to a critical argument or a 
negative news story. It does not necessarily involve lying or misleading anyone about 
factual matters. Take the case of Clinton’s insistence that he had “not had sex with that 
woman” he was applying his own definition of what sex is and could therefore argue that 
this had not taken place. Habitual spin is irritating, especially to the journalists upon 
whom it is practiced, but it does not threaten democracy. Propaganda is far more 
malignant. A calculated and systematic effort to manage public opinion, it transcends 
mere lying and routine political dishonesty. When the Bush administration manufactures 
fake “news” suppresses real news, disguises the former as the latter, and challenges the 
legitimacy of the independent press, it corrodes trust in leaders, institutions, and, to the 
rest of the world, the United States as a whole. 
In the Iraq “cash-for-flacks” scheme39, on the other hand, the Pentagon did 
something simply dishonest and wrong by hiring a propaganda-making firm called the 
Lincoln Group to cultivate the impression that the U.S had full support from the “average 
Iraqi” person for the occupation of Iraq. American operatives paid Iraqi journalistic 
mercenaries to publish a series of ‘stories’ including outright misrepresentation of the 
situation. The Los Angeles Times40 published an article on Nov. 30 that exposed this practice: 
"Zaki [an Iraqi newspaper editor] said that if his cash-strapped paper had known that 
these stories were from the U.S. government, he would have “charged much, much more' 
to publish them.”  
 According to a report in the British press41, Bush proposed to Tony Blair that they 
should bomb Al Jazeera's headquarters. This may or may not have been a joke, but given 
the military's record of accidental assaults on journalists in Iraq, it's not impossible to 
imagine that the president thinks smart-bombing would be a good way to respond to 
hostile coverage. In America the policy is more that of eliminating newspapers, such as the 
New York Times, that are considered unfriendly, while promulgating his own, dubious 
version of reality. The administration's domestic disinformation efforts includes 
propaganda on a number of different issues; the Department of Education paying 
                                                           
39 I am referring to efforts that were made by the U.S in order to plant “positive” stories in the Iraqi press by paying 
people to act like journalists or by paying journalists to write lies that would favour the U.S and its image. 
40 Http://www.latimes.com/news/printedition/la-fg-infowar30nov,1,4797092.story 
41Http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/topstories/tm_objectid=16401707%26method=full%26siteid=94762%26headline=law-
chief-gags-the-mirror-on-bush-leak-name_page.html 
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Armstrong Williams to defend the No Child Left Behind Act, the Department of Health 
and Human Services hiring Maggie Gallagher to promote its "marriage initiative," and both 
Departments   sending local TV stations pre-packaged pseudo-news videos advocating 
administration policies. In combination and accompanied by various presidential 
comments about not reading the newspaper, preferring to get his news from aides, and so 
on, they suggest a propaganda ethic42.  
 For the Bush team, creating their own news has the further advantage of 
supporting the poor conservative welfare state that has flourished in five years of 
expanding, undivided government. The administration got its propaganda written by an 
outside agency so that if necessary it could be denied rather than because this was more 
efficient and this has caused of a new kind of “PR-industrial complex” to emerge in 
Washington. Organisations such as the Ketchum's Washington Group, the Lincoln 
Group, and the even more important and less transparent Rendon Group are all involved 
in this new “industrial complex”. 
 According to the Washington Post, what is most troubling about the Bush's 
administration's information war is not its cynicism but its naiveté. At meetings, Bush's 
audiences are hand-picked to prevent any possibility of spontaneous challenge. At fake 
forums, invited guests ask the president to pursue his previously announced policies. New 
initiatives are unveiled on platforms festooned with meaningless slogans, mindlessly 
repeated ("Plan for Victory"). Anyone on the inside who doubts the party line is shown the 
door. In this environment, where the truth is not spoken privately or publicly, the 
suspicion grows that Bush, in his righteous cocoon, has committed the final, fatal sin of 
the propagandist. He is not just spreading BS but has come to believe it himself43. 
2.4. The ideology and purpose of the propaganda campaign 
 
 The function of propaganda within an ideological framework is to provide “the 
audience with a comprehensive conceptual framework for dealing with a social and 
political reality” (Kecskemeti 1973:849-850)44. In locating the ideology of the propaganda, 
                                                           
42 Assertions based on an Washington Post article: 
Http://www.Washingtonpost.com/wp.dyn/content/blog/2005/12/02/bl2005120200961.html 
43 Ibid 
44 Kecskemeti, P.(1973), Propaganda in de Sola Pool, Ithiel, Wilbur Schramm, Nathan Maccoby and Edwin B. Parker 
(ed.): Handbook of Communication, Rand McNally College Publishing Company: Chicago, p. 844-870. 
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Jowett and O’Donnell (1999:281) advise the researcher to look for a set of beliefs, values, 
attitudes, and behaviours, as well as ways of perceiving and thinking that constitute a set 
of norms that dictate what is desirable and what should be done.  
  The “FreeonlineDictionary” describes ideology as being: 
  
“1. The body of ideas reflecting the social needs and aspirations of an individual, group, class, or 
culture.” 
“2. A set of doctrines or beliefs that form the basis of a political, economic, or other system.” 
 
According to the Wikipedia, “An ideology is an organized collection of ideas.(...) The main 
purpose behind an ideology is to offer change in society through a normative thought process. Ideologies are 
systems of abstract thought (as opposed to mere ideation) applied to public matters and thus make this 
concept central to politics. Implicitly every political tendency entails an ideology whether or not it is 
propounded as an explicit system of thought.”45 
The doctrines mentioned above are usually thought of as being explicit 
philosophical systems (Evans and Newnham 1990:236)46.  
The main purpose of propaganda is to achieve acceptance of the propagandist’s 
ideology by the people (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999:282). The intention of propaganda may 
be to influence people to adopt attitudes that correspond to those of the propagandist (in 
other words his/her ideology) or to engage in certain patterns of behaviour. “To furnish the 
collective ideological motivations driving man to action is propaganda’s exact task”, Ellul 
(1973:141)47 states. Because the essence of propaganda is its deliberateness of purpose, 
considerable investigation is required to discover what the purpose is (Jowett and 
O’Donnell 1999:279). Ellul (1973:70-75) divides between the propaganda of integration and 
the propaganda of agitation. 
 Lasswell (1927:195)48 claims that there are four major objectives when using 
propaganda: Firstly to mobilize hatred against the enemy, second, to preserve the 
friendship of allies, third, to preserve the friendship and, if possible, procure the co-
                                                           
45 Http://www.wikipedia.org 
46 Evans, Graham and Jeffery Newnham (1998): The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations, Penguin Books, 
London. 
47 Ellul, Jacques (1973): Propaganda: The Formation of Men’s Attitudes, Vintage Books A Division of Random House, 
New York. 
48 Lasswell, Harold D. (1927): Propaganda Techniques in the World War 1, The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge and London 
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operation of neutrals and fourth to demoralize the enemy. The first and last objectives 
resemble what Ellul (1973:72-75) defines as propaganda of agitation, the other two are 
related to the propaganda of integration.  
 Integration propaganda is propaganda of conformity, aiming to stabilize, unify and 
reinforce the social body. Additionally, it attempts to maintain the positions and interests 
represented by those who sponsor the propaganda message (Jowett and O’Donnell 
1999:282).  
 Agitation propaganda aims to get people to participate in or support a cause (Ellul 
1973:72). Agitation consists of stimulating mass action by hammering home one prominent 
feature of the situation that is threatening, iniquitous, or outrageous (Kecskemeti 
1973:849).  Bush’s speeches fall into both of these categories. 
 According to Ellul (1973:37), agitation propaganda is the easiest propaganda to 
make. In order to succeed, it only needs to be addressed to the most simple and violent 
sentiments through elementary means (Ibid.:37). Hate is generally the most profitable 
resource of agitation propaganda, and hatred is probably the most spontaneous and 
common sentiment. Hate consists of attributing one’s misfortunes and sins to others who 
must be killed in order to alleviate such misfortunes (Ibid.:73). Agitation propaganda 
succeeds each time it designates someone as the source of all misery, provided that he/she 
is not too powerful. The less educated and informed the people to whom agitation 
propaganda is addressed, the easier it is to make. The analogy here has to be made with the 
Jews being the scapegoats for Hitler’s problems in Germany. Despite not being the least 
educated, they were a group that could be designated the root of all misery and hence 
suffered violence and reprisals at the hands of the public. 
2.5. The target audience; 
 
 All communication must take its audience into consideration, and propaganda is 
considered to be more effective if it is in line with the audience’s existing opinions, beliefs 
and dispositions (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999:290, Evans and Newnham 1998:453). A 
target audience is selected by a propagandist for its potential effectiveness. The 
propaganda is aimed at the audience most likely to be useful to the propagandist if it 
responds favourably (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999:286). Radio stations can, among other 
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things, reach their audience through the style of programme or choice of presenter (Street 
2001:55)49.   
It is important to examine which media are being used by the propagandist 
(Jowett and O’Donnell 1999:287). Propaganda must be total; it will not succeed if it is used 
in a sporadic fashion. The propaganda agent utilizes all of the technical means at his/her 
disposal – the press, radio, TV, movies, posters and meetings (Ellul 1973:9). The various 
messages provided by the same source through the various media outlets should also be 
compared to see if there is a consistency of apparent purpose (Jowett and O’Donnell 
1999:288). The analyst should examine the flow of communication from one medium to 
another and the relationship between the media themselves. The focus should be on how 
the media are used. The propagandist might show a film and hand out leaflets afterward. 
This type of practice maximizes the potential of the media (Ibid.:288). In the case of Hitler 
he managed to have his rallies filmed and stage managed by famous film directors and also 
played on the radio. 
 According to Traugott, Michael50,  Brader, Ted et al  in which they considered the 
reaction of the entire population to the 9/11 incident: 
 “The incident itself represented an assault on national principles and ideals and was expected to 
affect the national psyche; and the news coverage, some of which provided a live, real-time view of events as 
they unfolded, was graphic and available to a large national audience, including children.51 
 As a consequence of these events the Americans lost their sense of personal safety 
and security. However, the stage management of this event came later with numerous 
speeches taking place at ‘ground zero’ as it became known.  
 Another consequence was the “Civic Engagement”. The question was, as Traugott, 
Michael,  Brader, Ted et al  put it:  
  "Thinking about the past month, have you spent any time participating in any sort of volunteer or 
charitable activity in your community?" 
This served to show a profound difference between the activities of the terrorists 
flying planes into the towers and the American public’s community support system. 
                                                           
49 Street, John (2001): Mass Media, Politics, and Democracy, Palgrave, Hampshire. 
50 Michael W. Traugott is an American political scientist, communication studies researcher, and political pundit. As of 
2008, he is a professor at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor and a researcher at UM's Institute for Social Research. 
  
43
2.5.1 Media utilization techniques 
 
George Walker Bush won the elections but lost the popular vote. In order to 
change this situation and to erase the weakness of his mandate he perceived that he could 
use the 9/11 situation and his reaction to it to change his popularity rating.  
 However, when preparing for or justifying war, several techniques must be 
employed in order to guarantee the propagandist’s success. 
  Ottosen52 identifies several key stages of a military campaign to ameliorate the 
public opinion through the media in preparation for an armed conflict. Those four stages 
are: 
The Preliminary Stage—    during which the country concerned goes to the Media and 
portrays its cause as a cause of “general and major concern” because of the 
poverty/threat/dictatorship/anarchy imposed on a People by a an oppressive force; 
The Justification Stage—during which big news is produced to generate and justify the 
urgency of an armed intervention to bring about a rapid restitution of “normality”; 
The Implementation Stage— after reaching this point, a certain degree of censorship will 
provide the necessary control of the coverage; 
The Aftermath— a period in which normality is portrayed as returning to the region, 
before it once again drops out of the news. 
  This is the way in which the Mass Media are used to easily manipulate the masses 
only by using different language approaches to a particular subject. 
 The following example show how partial news can be. Intentionally or not, the 
following extract shows how manipulation can appear in front of our eyes without us 
noticing it. The following texts show how important news can be in moulding our opinion 
about something: 
 “The air was filled with anguished cries as the Bosnian Serbs loaded the first 3000 
women,  children and elderly refugees on to buses at Potocari, the United Nations base overrun today 
outside Srebrenica, which was captured on Tuesday. The refugees were dropped off outside Kladanj, 
                                                                                                                                                                                
51 Traugott, Michael,  Brader, Ted et al , How Americans Responded: A Study of Public Reactions to 9/11/01 
52Ottosen, R.  Ottosen/Luostarinen - Challenges for Journalism in Restricted Conflicts after the Second World War. Paper 
presented to the conference, War, Nationalism, Racism and the Media, University of Konstanz, June 1997: 
http://www.crnetwork.ca/programs/peacejournalism.htm 
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about 25 miles away, where they were forced to walk the last six miles across the front lines to the 
government-held town.”53 
 This emotive language is enough to make us feel empathy for the refugees and to a 
certain extent it also makes us critics of the “western”54 policies applied in the former 
Yugoslavia. But this is only one type of Media Manipulation… 
 We must consider that as Policy-Makers use Media, so Media use Policy-Makers 
to achieve a certain goal. 
 So, to the next consideration let’s imagine that we are talking about general 
“effects” on Policy –Makers that, at least, would need to have a front page of a newspaper 
as catalysers of the same “Effects”. 
 The first effect “a front-page of a newspaper or a ten minute period in the “Evening 
News” can produce in a decision maker is the “acceleration effect”. An “acceleration effect” 
can occur when the Media speed up the decision of a “Policy-Maker”. More important to 
this effect than newspapers is Television and real-time communication means. When a 
“Policy Maker” is faced live in an unexpected way to an unexpected event he will have to 
take immediate actions not to lose his face. Later his decisions may be reconsidered but 
the first action was speeded up by the Media and will always have to be taken under 
consideration as its impact was certainly great. News channels “Breaking News” or “Live 
at the Moment” news are the catalysers of this reality. 
 On the other hand we have the “Impediment Effect”. This effect is the reverse of the 
“Acceleration Effect” and could also be named the “body-bag effect”. It is related to the fear 
that policy-makers have of losing public support once casualties are taken. As soon as the 
Media inform the general public that there have been victims (and once there are victims, 
they will inevitably appear), the public will start to reconsider their supporting position of 
the event that caused those casualties. In this way, when a decision-maker has to take a 
decision that he knows will sooner or later involve “body-bags” he will prefer it to happen 
sooner rather than later in order to maintain public support for as long as possible.    
 Policy-Maker’s decisions may also be affected by the “Potential Effect”. That is to 
say that a Policy-Maker will take into consideration the potential news coverage his 
decision will have. A specific military campaign may be delayed due to the fear of the 
potential negative news media coverage of casualties. In this case, more than the fear of the 
                                                           
53  Chris Edges in  %ew York Times “Serbs Start Moving Muslims out of Captured Territory, 13 July 1995, section A, p.1 
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casualties is the fear of the public exposition of the same in a newspaper or in the Evening 
News and the consequent potentially negative reaction of the public to it which then 
forms the basis to take the decision or not. 
 Another means by which media coverage might affect the policy making process is 
that of enabling Policy-Makers to pursue a certain course of action. This way the 
“Enabling Effect” can give solid grounds to justify certain paths that are taken by Policy 
Makers. The news coverage of a humanitarian crisis cannot force Policy-Makers to 
intervene, however it can enable Policy-Makers to act by creating a background for 
intervention: 
 
 “By ignoring conflicts during the pre- and post-violence phases and by being highly 
selective in its coverage of conflicts in the violence phase, the media helps to shift focus and funds from 
more cost effective long- term efforts, directed at preventing violent conflict and rebuilding war-torn 
societies, to short-term emergency relief. It also creates a situation where the provision of emergency 
relief to a large extent is determined by factors that have nothing to do with humanitarian need.”55 
 
 As we can see the Media can be a factor in policy outcome. In this situation, media 
coverage can influence the Policy Making process through the mechanisms mentioned 
above. Nevertheless if we find low levels of empathy towards the news coverage, media 
coverage is unlikely to cause any effect at all on “Policy Makers”. Another situation in 
which media coverage may not have any effect at all in the Policy Making process is when 
Policy Makers work on high levels of certainty. When Policy Makers act this way they 
cannot be influenced by the Media as they already expect a certain reaction from the 
general public. In this situation the reverse happens and the Policy Makers are the ones 
who will try to “manipulate” the Media. The news coverage is now the reactive element of 
the equation and they can do it in two ways. The first one consists of a supportive and 
empathetic coverage of the decision which will support the Policy Maker and the second 
one consists of the critical coverage of the decision which will provoke the opposite 
reaction towards the Policy Maker. In this scenario not even this critical news coverage 
will be sufficient to influence the Policy Maker.  
                                                                                                                                                                                
54 By mentioning “Western” I am referring to the external policies of Western counters or institutions related to them 
such as the UK, US, EU, UN and NATO 
55  Robinson, P. (2002) The C%% Effect, London: Routledge  
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 On the other hand a more overt type of propaganda is often used in wars. In this 
case its aim is usually to dehumanize and create hatred toward a supposed enemy as 
mentioned earlier. The technique is to create a false image in the mind of the average 
person. This can be done by using special words, special avoidance of words or by saying 
that the enemy is responsible for certain things they never did. Most propaganda wars 
require the home population to feel the enemy has inflicted an injustice, which may be 
fictitious or may be based on facts. The home population must also decide that the cause 
of their nation is just.  
 “In our time, Political Speech and writings are largely the defence of the indefensible. 
Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the (…) dropping of the Atom bombs on Japan, can 
indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do 
not square with the professional aims of political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely 
of euphemisms, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless villages are bombarded from 
the air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire, 
with incendiary bullets; this is called pacification. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and 
sent trudging along the roads with no more they can carry; this is called transfer of population or 
rectification of frontiers. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the 
neck or sent to die of scurvy in Arctic lumber camps: this is called elimination of unreliable 
elements (…) .” 56  
 As was already highlighted, propaganda occurs on both sides. Iraqi propaganda is 
well reported and it would seem needless to reiterate the poor level of media, the 
dictatorial propaganda and so forth. What is perhaps worth highlighting here though, is 
propaganda that comes from “our” side as well. Throughout this section, claims of the 
links to terrorism, of certain types of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) , of imminent 
threat, and exaggerating other claims are all examples of propaganda, too. However, the 
following are just a few examples of other types of propaganda. 
2.6. The context in which Propaganda occurs; 
 
Research on context is crucial as media messages have little meaning apart from 
their cultural and political-economic origins (Kellow and Steeves 1998:111)57. The media do 
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not exist outside the political and social world they describe (Allen and Seaton58 1999:4), 
and “perhaps the most fundamental defect of most studies made on the subject [propaganda] is their 
attempt to analyze propaganda as an isolated phenomenon” (Ellul 1973:xvii)59. Successful 
propaganda incorporates the prevailing mood of the times, and that is why it is essential to 
understand the socio-political context in which propaganda occurs (Jowett and O’Donnell 
1999:282). Nevertheless, to identify all possible contextual factors surrounding a message 
is an impossible task. A context is to be seen as open, as the contextual factors are infinite 
(Lindkvist 1981:27).  
Messages have greater impact when they are in agreement with existing opinions 
and beliefs. Propaganda cannot create something out of nothing, it must build on a 
foundation already present in the individual (Ellul 1973:36)60. Consequently, action cannot 
be obtained unless it responds to a group of already established tendencies or attitudes 
stemming from the regime, the churches and the schools. Propaganda is confined to 
utilizing existing material; it does not create it (Ibid.:36).
  
However the propagandist’s need to base himself on what already exists does not 
prevent him from going further. What exists is only the raw material from which the 
propagandist can create something strictly new, which in all probability would not have 
sprung up spontaneously.  
Propaganda must be familiar with collective sociological presuppositions, myths 
and ideologies of a particular country. The propagandist uses the predispositions of the 
audience to reinforce an ideology or in some cases to create new attitudes and behaviours. 
Rather than attempting to change political loyalties, racial and religious attitudes or other 
deeply held beliefs, a propagandist that supports commonly held views is more likely to be 
effective (Jowett and O’Donnell 1999:290).  
When trying to understand the context in which the propaganda exists, one needs 
to be aware of the important historical events that have occurred and the propagandist’s 
interpretation of these events. Propaganda is like a packet of seeds dropped on fertile soil, 
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and to understand how seeds can grow and spread, analysis of the soil, that is, the times 
and events, is necessary (Ibid.:282). Included in this task is the need to understand the 
historical background of the conflict. History is powerful, it can be used and misused. The 
analyst must understand the events that occurred prior to the propaganda, including the 
beliefs and values of the population. Likewise, it is important to understand the myths61 of 
a culture (Ibid.:282). As Churchill famously said, ‘those that fail to learn from history are 
doomed to repeat it’. In this case it is the deliberate intention of the propaganda to use 
historical facts to achieve a certain reaction from the audience. 
Iraq had been listed as a State Sponsor of Terror by the United States since 1990, 
and maintained poor relations with the United States since the Gulf War. Tensions were 
high throughout the 1990s, with the United States launching Operation Desert Fox 
against Iraq in 1998 after it failed to meet demands of "unconditional cooperation" in 
weapons inspections. After the September 11 attacks, the U.S. government claimed that 
Iraq was a threat to the United States because Iraq could begin to use its alleged Weapons 
of Mass Destruction to aid terrorist groups. 
The George W. Bush administration called for the United Nations Security 
Council to send weapons inspectors to Iraq to find and destroy alleged weapons of mass 
destruction and for a UNSC62 resolution. Resolution 1441 did not authorize the use of 
force by member states, thus Resolution 1441 had no effect on the U.N .Charter's 
prohibition on the use of force by member states against fellow member states. Saddam 
Hussein subsequently allowed UN inspectors to access Iraqi sites, while the U.S. 
government continued to assert that Iraq was being obstructionist.  In October 2002, the 
United States Congress authorized the president to use force if necessary to disarm Iraq in 
order to "prosecute the war on terrorism." After failing to overcome opposition from 
France, Russia, and China against a UNSC resolution that would sanction the use of force 
against Iraq, and before the UN weapons inspectors had completed their inspections 
which were deemed to be fruitless by the U.S. because of Iraq's alleged deception, the 
United States assembled a “Coalition of the Willing” composed of nations who pledged 
support for a war against Iraq. On March 20th, 2003, the invasion of Iraq was launched in 
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what the Bush Administration said were the “serious consequences” spoken of in UNSC 
Resolution 1441. 
Saddam Hussein's regime was quickly toppled and on May 1, 2003, George W. 
Bush stated major combat operations in Iraq had ended and claimed victory.  But the war 
continued on as an insurgency against the U.S.-led coalition forces and the Iraqi police 
units and governing structures they installed. Elements of the insurgency are led by Sunni 
loyalists, who are Iraqi nationalists and pan-Arabists. Some insurgency leaders are 
Islamists and see themselves as fighting a religious war to liberate Iraq from foreign non-
Muslim occupiers and their Iraqi collaborators.  
2.6.1 The International Community 
 
 The Media often report that the "international community" feels this way or that 
way. Yet, the countries that make up the "international community" in the context of the 
Iraq crisis, are often assumed to be other influential and powerful countries, such as 
France, Russia and occasionally China (the other three permanent members of the U.N. 
Security Council), plus occasionally other European countries, Japan and other key allies. 
 Public dispute in parts of that "international community" were always growing. 
For example, it appears that mass protests throughout Europe contributed to a number of 
key nations also indicating that they opposed military action, or highlighted the need to go 
the route of the United Nations. For example, summarizing a Chicago Tribune article 
(January 21, 2003) commenting on the impact the mass protests around the world on the 
weekend of January 18 had: 
• German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder said in a speech that "We will not take part 
in a military intervention in Iraq, and that is exactly how our voting behaviour will 
be in all international bodies." (Germany just recently began a rotating seat at the 
United Nations Security Council, as one of the non-permanent members.) 
• France concurred. The article adds that, "In Paris, senior French officials said that 
France will use its seat on the Security Council and all of its influence to restrain 
U.S. militarism."  
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• In countries such as Britain, Spain, France, Germany, Italy and Japan, there are 
extremely large percentages of the population against military action, in some 
cases even if there is a U.N. backing for such action.  
• Even in Britain, Tony Blair suffered a major revolt, mostly from his own Labour 
Party, in what is the biggest revolt in recent times by the leader's own party.  
 The positions of France, Germany, Russia, Belgium, China and others, in opposing 
immediate war have, to some extent, annoyed the U.S. and Britain, and have even led to 
rifts in NATO, where there was disagreement on whether NATO should agree to defend 
Turkey if there is a war on Iraq. 
 Around the world, governments raised concerns. So too had many ordinary 
citizens. In some cases, (for example, Britain and Italy), while the government may openly 
be supporting the Bush position, a large majority of people had been openly critical of their 
government and the U.S. war agenda. Applying this to the War on Terrorism in different 
countries we find: 
• Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim nation, has expressed concerns and 
doubts and has stated that it opposes possible war with Iraq (as reported by 
Associated Press, January 9, 2003)63.  
• Malaysia, another predominantly Muslim nation also expressed concerns of the 
implications of war and the reaction in Muslim countries, as reported by the Gulf 
Daily News, Bahrain64 (January 9, 2003).  
• Some African countries have also said they are against a unilateral military strike. 
For example, The Namibian reports (January 8, 2003)65 that, "Namibia has said it is 
against military action against Iraq."  
• The Financial Times also reports (February 4, 2003)66 that after a summit of the 
African Union, the 53-nation union stated that it was firmly opposed to war.  
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• Reuters reports (January 9, 2003)67 that even Iran, the longtime antagonist and 
neighbour of Iraq, feels that war with Iraq is unnecessary.  
• The above-mentioned Reuters report also highlights that Greece and other 
European countries are against war, saying that "Greek Foreign Minister George 
Papandreou, whose country currently holds the rotating EU presidency, is 
planning to lead an EU mission to Arab states including Iran in the next few weeks 
in a bid to avoid war."  
• Reuters also reports (January 7, 2003)68 that the large, non-aligned group of nations 
want a more open debate, rather than a closed-door debate on the Iraq crisis at the 
United Nations, and that a number of countries are in opposition to any military 
action.  
• The Hindu (February 4, 2003)69 reports that Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari 
Vajpayee has said that India does not favour an attack on India.  
• United Press International (UPI) reports (February 4, 2003)70 that the secretary-
general of the 22-member Arab League raises concerns about great instability in 
the region if the U.S. starts a war.  
• Jordan is Iraq's largest trading partner, while also being an American ally. It also 
has fears ranging from economic consequences to domestic political problems and 
refugee influx concerns if war erupts.  
• In Italy, opposition senators have denounced their government's support of Bush, 
as reported by the Los Angeles Times (January 30, 2003)71  
• As the previous LA Times link highlights, reactions to George Bush's 2003 State of 
the Union Speech was met with much resentment around the world.  
• In Japan, while the government has been strongly in favour of war and supporting 
the U.S., some polls suggest that around 80% are against war. The BBC suggests 
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(March 14, 2003)72 while it has a pacifist constitution, in reality it has long relied 
on the U.S. for military protection. North Korean tensions and need for continued 
support from the U.S. against it has contributed to the unpopular stance of the 
Japanese govt.  
It is interesting to note how much Asia in general has been against the war, and 
how so many Asian nations view the U.S./British projection of power.  
2.7. Propaganda techniques 
 
Propaganda techniques can be divided (and sub-divided) into many different 
aspects. This section will look at nineteen different techniques which will serve as the 
basis for research into the speeches of Hitler and Bush. One division of propaganda, and I 
would like to stress this point, it is one possible division, a division created by me 
according to my experiences, is the following: 
 
1 – Emotional Appeals category; 
2 – Dishonesty category;  
3 - Demonization of the enemy category 
2.7.1. Emotional appeals  
 
 
Propagandists typically appeal to the heart, not to the mind. An appeal to emotion 
is a type of argument that tries to arouse the emotions of an audience in order to gain its 
support. There are no doubts that strong emotions can subvert rational thought and that 
playing upon emotions in an argument is often misleading. 
Scholars often claim that propaganda manipulates emotion more readily than 
reason. Propaganda is associated with emotional language and presentations, and arousal of 
emotion is defined as a propaganda principle by Jowett and O’Donnell (1999:295). Quite 
often the propagandist attempts to arouse strong emotions of hatred or approval for or 
against another group for motives of expediency, strategy or plain greed. Emotional 
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pressure, whether it takes the form of arousing positive or negative collective feelings, or 
simply that of presenting emotionally biased views, is not just something added to 
propaganda to make it more acceptable. It is fundamental to the whole process. Rational 
and dispassionate arguments employ a totally different technique. The propagandist does 
not engage in genuine argument because his/her answers are determined in advance For 
instance, Nazi propaganda mobilized the Germans by appealing to their emotions rather 
than their capacity for rational arguments. Since all the basic motives in human beings are 
emotionally conditioned, a propagandist makes ample use of love, anger, fear, hope, guilt, 
and other feelings and sentiments to manipulate the public. Both fear and logical fallacies 
in argumentation will be focused on under separate headings  
 The techniques that fall very clearly into the emotional appeals category are Plain 
folks and  Bandwagon but there is another category that falls between this and dishonesty 
called Transfer and Associations.  
 
2.7.1.1. Plain folks 
 
 By using the Plain-Folks technique, speakers attempt to convince their audience 
that they, and their ideas, are "of the people." The device is used by advertisers and 
politicians alike. America's recent presidents have all been millionaires, but they have tried 
hard to present themselves as ordinary citizens. Bill Clinton ate at McDonald's and 
confessed a fondness for trashy spy novels. George Bush Sr. hated broccoli, and loved to 
fish. Ronald Reagan was often photographed chopping wood, and Jimmy Carter presented 
himself as a humble peanut farmer from Georgia. We all are familiar with candidates who 
campaign as political outsiders, promising to "clean out the barn" and set things straight. 
The political landscape is dotted with politicians who challenge a mythical "cultural elite," 
presumably aligning themselves with "ordinary people." We are no longer shocked by the 
sight of politicians in shorts who listen to rock and roll, play the saxophone and admit to 
having experienced drugs in their youth. In all of these examples, the plain-folks device is 
at work. The idea is to establish a relation of proximity between politicians and people. 
This way they expect people to lower their defences and accept a stranger as one of their 
own.  
 This technique is more efficient the more the propagandist establishes 
identification with the society’s cultural values. 
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2.7.1.2. Bandwagon 
 
 The basic theme of the Band Wagon appeal is: “Everyone else is doing it, and so 
should you”. Since few of us want to be left behind, this technique can be quite successful. 
The propagandist appeals to a desire that is common to most of us, the desire to follow the 
crowd, to fit in, so that one can feel part of something bigger than ourselves and not 
excluded from society. In this situation the appeal is not made to an individual, instead it 
is made to an entire community and to its most popular common beliefs such as: religion, 
country, race, sex or vocation. During a campaign the propagandist will address the crowd 
as Catholics, Europeans, farmers, school teachers or any other designation that is able to 
establish a common tie between the politician and their audience. 
 
2.7.1.3. Transfer and Associations 
 
 
 Closely connected to the previous technique, propagandists resort to Transfer. 
Transfer is a device by which the propagandist carries over the authority and prestige of 
something the audience respects, admires and submits it to something he wants us accept. 
For example, most of us respect and revere our church and our nation. If the propagandist 
succeeds in getting church and/or nation to approve a campaign on behalf of some 
programme, he thereby transfers its authority and prestige to that programme. Thus, we 
may accept something which otherwise we might reject if it already has the approval of 
“something” we revere, submit to and give enough prestige to be considered better than 
ourselves. The individual is no longer alone as he is only a drop of water in an ocean that 
has already blessed the propagandist’s ideas. 
In the Transfer device, symbols are constantly used. The cross represents the 
Christian Church, the flag represents the nation and cartoons like Uncle Sam in America 
represent public opinion.  They are used as decoys to pass on an idea and give credibility 
to it. Symbols have the power to transfer something from the plan of abstraction to the 
plan of reality. When a political activist closes his speech with a public prayer, he is 
attempting to transfer religious prestige to the ideas that he is advocating. In a similar 
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way, propagandists may attempt to transfer the reputation of "Science" or "Medicine" that 
are two of the most respected subjects in the world, to a particular project or set of beliefs.    
The point is that an idea or programme should not be accepted or rejected simply 
because it has been linked to symbols such as Medicine, Science, Democracy, or 
Christianity, however they usually are … 
Associations were extensively studied in the mid 20th century when the 
Behaviourist school of thought (followers of Pavlov and Skinner) were in vogue in 
psychology. Although Behaviourism73 is dismissed by many modern psychologists, this 
“old school” of psychology unearthed powerful influential techniques, many of which are 
still apparent in modern advertising. The most basic behaviourist principle is association: 
Present two objects together a sufficient number of times and one will automatically recall 
the other. This explains why we see so many beer commercials with beautiful women in 
them! The beer advertisers are trying to get people (young men, mostly) to associate beer 
with beautiful women in the hopes that the men will develop a bond with their brand of 
beer. 
 
2.7.2. Dishonesty and Blatant Lies 
 
 Dishonesty is inherent to propaganda. There is no propaganda without some kind 
of dishonesty and, as was mentioned earlier (section 2.2), when there is a war there are 
often blatant lies.. The categories discussed here are; .Glittering generalities, Euphemisms, 
Logical fallacies, Testimonial, Omissions, Cynicism, Traps, Manipulating cause and effect, 
Pacing and distraction, Numeric Deceptions  
 
2.7.2.1. Glittering generalities 
 
 
 The Glittering Generality is, in short, Name Calling in reverse. While Name 
Calling seeks to make us form a judgment to reject and condemn without examining the 
evidence, the Glittering Generality device seeks to make us approve and accept without 
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examining the evidence. In acquainting ourselves with the Glittering Generality Device, 
therefore, all that has been said regarding Name Calling must be kept in mind... 
When someone talks to us about democracy, we immediately think of our own 
definite ideas about democracy, the ideas we learned at home, at school, and so on. In 
other words that is to say our own culturally developed notion of democracy. This need 
not and often is not shared by any other culture that calls itself democratic. The 
definitions are many and varied. 
However, when the word is used our first and natural reaction is to assume that 
the speaker is using the word in our sense and that he has the same beliefs we do on this 
particular subject. This lowers our defences and makes us far less suspicious than we 
ought to be when we hear the speech. Words about which we have previously-set ideas 
such as civilization, Christianity, good, proper, right, democracy, patriotism, motherhood, fatherhood, 
science, medicine, health, and love have the particular effect identifying us with the speaker. As 
with “Name Calling” words, “Glittering generalities” also have the power to exploit values 
that are in a latent status inside us but that at the same time are ready and available to be 
expanded by propaganda. Once again what the word that is being used really means is not 
questioned, although the concepts referred to above can obviously mean different things in 
different contexts 
2.7.2.2. Euphemisms 
 
 
When propagandists use glittering generalities and name-calling words, they are 
using emotionally suggestive words in order to appeal to the audience’s feelings and 
emotions. In this way a greater degree of identification and participation will be 
established between the propagandist and the target audience. In certain situations, 
however, when the propagandist has to make an unpleasant reality less cruel, he is only 
able to do that by using words that are euphemistic and therefore will not damage the 
audience’s emotions. 
Since war is particularly unpleasant, military discourse is full of euphemisms. In 
the 1940's, America changed the name of the War Department to the Department of 
Defense. Under the Reagan Administration, the MX-Missile was renamed “The 
Peacekeeper.” During war-time, civilian casualties are referred to as "collateral damage," 
and the word “liquidation” is used as a synonym for “murder.” Collins and Glover 
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(eds.2002) have actually produced a book about this phenomenon entitled Collateral 
Language: a user’s guide to America’s new war, New York: University Press in which they discuss 
the American renaming of events in a war situation. 
 
2.7.2.3. Logical fallacies  
 
 Logic is the process of drawing a conclusion from one or more premises. A 
statement of fact, by itself, is neither logical nor illogical (although it can be true or false). 
Let’s take the following premises: 
 Premise 1 - 1 is a number 
 Premise 2 – 2 is a number 
 Conclusion: 1 = 2 
 As we can see both premises are true and the conclusion however logical is false. 
Let’s now transfer this logical fallacy to the “culture world” and use Religion as an 
example: 
 Premise 1 – All Christians believe in God; 
 Premise 2 – All Muslims believe in God; 
 Conclusion: All Christians are Muslims! 
 These are extreme examples that show how logic is abused but for sure no more 
words are needed to clarify what a Logical fallacy is. However, an example of this in use 
will serve to illustrate the use of this technique…… 
 
2.7.2.4. Testimonial 
 
There is nothing wrong with citing a qualified source, and the testimonial 
technique can be used to construct a fair and well-balanced argument. However, it is often 
used in ways that are unfair and misleading. The most common misuse of the testimonial 
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involves citing individuals who are not qualified to make judgements about a particular 
issue. It is very good for a politician’s image to appear on TV side by side with Luis Figo, 
Eusébio or David Beckham. It is even better when those world famous superstars support 
that politician’s policies. However, what do they understand about Foreign Affairs, about 
Budget Cuts and Inflation Causes or merely about Law? It doesn’t matter. To the audience 
the only thing that matters is what they say, and what they say is prepared to meet 
society’s beliefs and anxieties.     
 When a Testimonial is made by someone we respect it becomes very difficult to 
dissociate what is real and what is not. We tend to give credibility to someone’s 
statements in a particular area just because we admire that person. The fact that the 
person we are dealing with is talking about a subject of field X but their expertise belongs 
to Y field is of no importance. The admiration we have for them is enough to obliterate our 
capacity to make this distinction.  
2.7.2.5. Omissions 
 
 
One of the most used techniques is the usage of “omissions”. Parts of relevant or 
truthful information are set aside on purpose just because they work against the 
propagandist thesis. These kinds of omissions may be a form of deception because most of 
the time they would have an effect if revealed. An omission can be used to transmit a 
wrong impression. Omissions are extremely useful and very hard to detect because the 
audience does not recognize that anything is missing. As an example let’s imagine that 
three kinds of soap that kill bacteria brands X, Y and Z were subjected to rigorous 
laboratory tests and that the results were that their efficiency was the same.   
When faced with these results the General Manager of  Company X decided to 
create the following ad: “No brand of soap can get you cleaner than X”. This ad omits on 
purpose that the other brands are equally as effective as X. However the information that 
none of the other brands is more effective than X is true. One brand is in fact as effective as 
the next one. This information is the omission in this process. 
The power of this ad comes from the simplification process of human memory. This 
way, by making a simplification of this information, human memory will probably encode 
this information as “X washes the cleanest”. Relying in this type of simplification there 
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will be a significant distortion between what the “propagandist” says and what the 
audience hears, believes and remembers. 
 This way, a message does not have to be untrue to qualify as propaganda. In fact, 
the message in modern propaganda is often not blatantly untrue. But even when a message 
conveys “true” information, it will generally contain partisan bias and fail to present a 
complete and balanced consideration of the issue. 
Professor James Stiff 74 found that humans do not pay much attention to the 
validity of an argument. According to him Human Beings pay more attention to the 
argument’s claim or conclusion and how closely that claim or conclusion matches their 
prejudices or beliefs than to the validity of the same. A poorly supported argument that 
coincides with what a person believes is true will be more easily accepted than the most 
powerfully reasoned argument that does not match what the listener wants to hear. If the 
claim or conclusion matches the listener biases, it does not matter how this was achieved. 
We could say that we hear what we want to hear. 
The “Omission Technique” can also be found on a larger scale. The Mass Media 
often resort to choosing very specific vocabulary when they want to convey a certain 
message. In order to convey a certain scenario, the Mass Media use a “large” quantity of 
words from the semantic field of that scenario to convey it and decrease the quantity of 
words from the opposite scenario in order to diminish its relevance and exposure. In this 
situation there is not a “real” omission, instead there is the reinforcement of a specific 
“semantic set” and the delegation to a secondary plane of another one. 
 Robinson shows us how news was written in 1995 in the Bosnian conflict in  order 
to manipulate its viewers opinions as can be seen in the following  tables75. The intention 
is to show how the newspapers Washington Post, New York Times and the TV networks CNN 
and CBS approached “Western Policies” in Bosnia. He suggests there are two possible 
scenarios: a “Failure Scenario” and a “Non-Failure Scenario”. Through the analysis of  the 
words used during the week 11-18 July 1995 in the coverage of the policy mentioned above 
one can clearly see (through the discrepancy between the number of words used to convey 
each scenario) how partial the position of those Media Instruments were. We can see a 
tone that tends to emphasize the failure of “Western Policies” in Bosnia. The contrast 
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between the number of times the word “Fail” and the number of times “Succeed” was used 
provides a clear view of this situation. 
 
Table 1 – Words that convey Failure and Non-Failure Scenarios extracted from the Newspapers Washington Post 
and New York Times and TV Networks CNN and CBS (11-18 July, 1985) 
 
Failure Scenario Non-Failure Scenario 
Keyword Frequency Keyword Frequency 
-Fail 62 -Succeed 5 
-Withdraw 107 -Protect 56 
-End 11 -Continue 10 
Total 180 Total 71 
   
A similar study was made about the news that covered the population expelled 
from Srebrenica. The same period and the same sources were used only the scenarios are 
now of Empathy towards the population and of Distance/Neutrality. Here are the results: 
 
Table 2 – Empathy and Distance/Neutrality words 
Empathy Distance/Neutrality 
Keyword Frequency Keyword Frequency 
-          Refugees 236 -          Muslim 83 
-          People 148 -          Bosnian 29 
-          Women 68 -          Men 66 
-          Children 52 -          Soldier 15 
-          Elderly 13 -          Fighter 2 
Total 517 Total 195 
 
 Through a brief analysis of the two charts we can see that the news media coverage 
tended to highlight the plight of the refugees from Srebrenica in a tone that empathised 
with their suffering.  
 The influence of this news was so important that the US Policy Makers were 
unsure whether or not the violation of other security areas should be responded to with 
force. This was probably the reason why the decision was made to defend Goradze, 
another UN safety area, using all possible means because the US government could not 
suffer another “Media” defeat. By maintaining the city under the UN control, the US Policy 
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Makers would never be pressured to respond to the media coverage or, if they were but 
didn’t answer, they wouldn’t face negative publicity. 
 This may be considered speculation, but, on the 18th July 1995 Vice President Gore 
declared: 
 “The worst solution would be to acquiesce to genocide … and allow the rape of 
another city  (Goradze) and more refugees, At the same time we can’t be driven by images because 
there’s plenty of other places that aren’t being photographed where terrible things are going on. But 
we can’t ignore the images either …”76 
 
 We can now ask the following question: To what extent does Media Coverage 
have the power to persuade policy makers to pursue a particular path?  
 Well, while discussing this question we must notice that the Media may not 
always be a necessary or strong enough factor to force Policy-Makers to follow or to take a 
particular path or course of action and that perhaps more important than making Policy-
Makers follow a specific path is to make them follow a path of any kind at all. 
 It is also important to discuss the amount of coverage necessary to create the effect 
referred to above. I am sure that a couple of reporters writing on the back pages of a 
newspaper would be unlikely to produce any kind of reaction from a Policy-Maker. In this 
case the Media Role would only be marginal. However the situation changes when we are 
talking about the front-page of a newspaper or a ten minute slot in the “Evening News” on 
an important TV Network. This would probably, at least, make policy-makers ponder 
their conduct or actions. 
 
2.7.2.6. Cynicism 
 
 
 This technique plays with Human Bias.  Cynicism is behind the supposition that 
other people’s actions are motivated by selfish reasons in opposition to our altruistic 
motivation. 
The necessity that people have to be right in guessing the motivation of the other 
feeds Cynicism. Negative motivations are always an option.  
                                                           
76  Robinson, P. (2002) The C%% Effect; London Routledge 
  
62
 Lets imagine the following situation: every Saturday a businessman visits several 
old people that are shut up  inside an asylum and stays with them for several hours.  
 He seems like an altruistic person at first sight; however, have we could just as 
soon find a lot of negative motivations for his actions. For example : 
- “He is just trying to impress people”; 
- “Why doesn’t he spend more time with homeless people? Old people are more 
lucrative. One day he may be remembered in someone’s will”; 
- “He is trying to compensate for his not looking after his mother while she was still 
alive”; 
- “He would rather do that than spend time with his own family;” 
- “He is preparing to run for political office and this is just to enhance his 
reputation”; 
- “He’s fixated on death”; 
 Propagandists call this situation “Fudding” or spreading F.U.D (Fear, Uncertainty 
and Doubt) about a persons’ motivation. Any gesture, act or interaction between two 
people can always have at least two interpretations: spontaneous vs impulsive; consistent 
vs rigid; soft-hearted vs weak; intense vs overemotional and so on.77  
 The creative capability that the human mind has to generate and impute negative 
motivations onto other people’s acts is of extreme importance for propagandists.  This is 
particularly easy to exploit in ambiguous situations. It can also be used for “face-saving”: 
“Those bastards cannot fool me, they are serving their interests at the expense of mine”.  The “conspiracy 
theory” now enters the world of propaganda. Since we are talking about hidden emotions, 
most of the time they cannot be proved wrong. That is a strong weapon to be used against 
a political leader. 
 People’s biases are so basic and powerful that they can be used to forward an 
argument in the absence of supporting evidence. This way, even the weakest evidence can 
be interpreted as documented proof. 
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 When the 9/11 events happened, George Bush was reading a book to some children 
in a school. He was then informed by one of his security guards of the tragic events. He  
kept on reading the book for about seven minutes. No one can know for sure what was 
going through his mind during that period; however, this does not stop other people from 
imputing motives to him. A variety of attributions can be ascribed to these seven minutes. 
- Bush was confused; 
- Bush didn’t know what to ; 
- Bush was waiting for more information; 
- Bush was waiting for someone to tell him what to do; 
- Bush shut down under pressure; 
- Bush was wondering who to blame; 
- Bush was thinking how to save his relations with the Middle-East; 
 These are only some examples of the cynical attribution of motives. However, the 
best thing about this cynical attribution of motives for a propagandist is that one person 
can always attribute negative motives to the outergroup, whatever it says or does. Let’s 
now think about the previous Bush situation and imagine he had immediately jumped into 
action: 
- Bush overreacted in front of a group of small children; 
- Bush showed panic; 
- Bush is acting like a cowboy; 
- Bush already knew about the attack; 
- Bush is rushing off to ask Cheney  what to do; 
 Lee Hamilton, the vice - Chairman of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) went on to defend Bush by saying: 
“Bush made the right decision in remaining calm, in nor rushing out of the classroom.”78 
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2.7.2.7. Traps 
 
 
 This is a propaganda strategy that is used to embarrass the target and put him in a 
Lose-Lose situation. 
 Most actions can be arranged on a continuum of time that will allow several 
different answers to the same question. By “Trapping” his target, the propagandist always 
points towards a different point from the one the “target” has chosen and claims, in the 
absence of proof, that it would have been a better solution. A social consensus is then 
manufactured in order to ensure that the answer which was not chosen is seen as the best. 
The objective of the propagandist is then to place the “target” in a no-win situation. 
 For example, Bush’s opponents have the chance to place him and his 
administration in a situation like this regarding a future terrorist attacks on the U.S.A. If 
the U.S.A is attacked gain, Bush’s opponents can use the “War on Terror” as a failure and 
use it to punish the government for its lack of effectiveness in securing the country. On the 
other hand, if the U.S.A is not terrorized in the future, the importance of terrorism can be 
minimized and the “War on Terror” can be used to show an extreme overreaction to 9/11 
and to accuse Bush’s administration of spending money against an imaginary threat. 
 Since any position on terrorism is filled with risk and unknown variables, any 
position taken can be sharply criticized. As a consequence, any sort of response to terror 
provides grounds for criticism and opportunities for propaganda. These criticisms can be 
absolutely correct, however the use of “Traps” gives the propagandist an advantage in any 
direction. 
2.7.2.8. Manipulating cause and effect 
 
 
 Cause and effect can generate another human mind “bug”.  People tend to think 
that co-occurrence implies causation. When two events happen in the same period of 
time, they are correlated, however one may not be the consequence of the other. If we 
throw Virgins into a volcano and the volcano stops erupting, this is undoubtedly a co-
occurrence. If we say that the volcano stopped because of the Virgins that were thrown 
inside this is an imputation of cause and a stupidity. However, this will not stop people 
implying there is such a consequence between these events. 
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 A similar analogy can be made on the level of politics.  If one president begins his 
residence in the White House just a couple days before the economy goes bad, then that 
president is seen to have caused the economy to go bad – the events that occurred 
previously and that probably caused that economic situation will be disregarded. As Bush 
was in the Presidency when the 9/11 events happened, then he was responsible for and 
caused them.  
 Another big problem humans have in understanding the cause-effect situations is 
the difficulty in understanding that one effect may be caused by more than one cause. 
Humans like to simplify and are much more comfortable in pointing out one cause than 
pointing out several causes. So, this confusion generated in the human mind opens several 
doors to the propagandist.  
2.7.2.9. Pacing and distraction 
 
 
 The human mind is a serial processor; it does one thing at a time. If we were able to 
see inside the human brain we would see that it works in an old serial fashion way rather 
than performing several parallel tasks. Even what appears to be multitasking is not, and 
can only be performed with learned behaviours that take little oversight.  It is impossible 
to do our taxes and a logic test at the same time and have decent results on either.79  
 Distraction disables our mind’s ability to process information and that is why 
distraction and persuasion are so close.  
 The pioneer researchers of distraction and persuasion found these results when 
they faced two groups of boys who belonged to University Fraternities with anti-
fraternity arguments. These arguments were the same for both groups. While being 
exposed to these arguments an anti-fraternity movie was shown to one of the groups. 
However, cartoons were shown to the other group while they were listening to the same 
anti-fraternity persuasive arguments. 
 Not surprisingly the boys from the first group did not find the arguments to be 
very persuasive because they were able to defend themselves and generate defensive 
arguments. However, the boys from the second group found the same arguments to be 
very persuasive. That was due to the fact that their minds were distracted by the cartoons 
                                                           
79 Langer, E. 1989,  Mindfulness  ,Cambridge,  Perseus Books 
  
66
and they were unable to mentally defend themselves during the offensive onslaught. This 
is how distraction works—it prevents us from thinking, which can either help or hurt the 
persuader, depending on the type of arguments used. 
  The researchers went on to discover this vital distinction that distraction can do 
completely opposite things, depending on the quality of the persuasive arguments being 
used. If the arguments are weak, distraction will make them seem stronger and more 
persuasive. That’s because we’re not really processing the quality of the argument. We are 
just aware there are arguments. “They’ve got a number of arguments, there,” our overtaxed 
brains tell us. “They must be right.” On the other hand, if we’re distracted while hearing 
strong arguments, they don’t seem nearly as strong if we can’t concentrate on them, and 
recognize how sound they really are. So distraction factors —such as music, animation or 
posters— is a boon to the propagandist who is using weak arguments to make his case. 
Clever propagandists will, however, drop all those distracting elements when they get to 
their strongest arguments. 
  
2.7.2.10. Numeric Deceptions  
 
 
 Numeric deceptions are regularly employed by propagandists for several good 
reasons. First, quotations backed up by numbers sound like solid evidence. They conjure 
up images of scientists engaged in laudable scrutiny and the pursuit of unbiased truth. 
Second, the checking of numerical data entails effort, skill, and motivation on the part of the 
target audience. The propagandist relies on all three quite effectively. Most humans are 
content to “satisfy,” to be content with good-ish, good sounding, or good enough, if not 
really good arguments, particularly if they support a person’s pre-existing prejudices. 
Thirdly, numbers can be combined and parsed in infinite variety to support a favoured 
theme. Thus they provide excellent material for the propagandist: they sound good, and 
most people are unable or unwilling (lacking time or energy) to refute them.  
 In conclusion what do these techniques have in common? In first place all these 
techniques dissimulate a pernicious desire to manipule, in second place all of them prey 
upon society’s beliefs, values, fears, in a word, culture, and use them against itself. Last, 
but not least, one common aspect is the tremendous efficiency they have in achieving the 
propagandists’ ends. 
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2.7.3. Demonization of the enemy category 
 While the primary purpose of war propaganda is to manufacture public 
commitment to wars and their inevitable crimes, George Bush’s psychological warfare that 
was designed to manufacture political and public support to launch a state of war against 
Iraq that would provide him the necessary means to invade it. In order to achieve this goal, 
Saddam Hussein’s image had to be depleted and Iraq had to be demonized.  
As mentioned above some of the techniques used to demonize the enemy can also 
be included in other categories this is the case with the first category that will be 
discussed, Fear which appeals to emotion as well as being a demonization technique. The 
other techniques discussed in this category are;  Name calling  Contextualization, 
Inclusion and Exclusion / Ingroup vs Outgroup Information, Modelling the convert 
communicator, The Other/Enemy Images. 
2.7.3.1. Fear 
 
 In a similar we can explain the use of “Fear”. When a propagandist warns members 
of his audience that disaster will result if they do not follow a particular course of action, 
he is using the fear appeal. By playing on the audience's deep-seated fears, practitioners of 
this technique hope to redirect attention away from the merits of a particular proposal and 
toward steps that can be taken to reduce the audience’s fear. 
 "The streets of our country are in turmoil. The universities are filled with students 
rebelling and rioting. Communists are seeking to destroy our country. Russia is threatening us with her 
might and the Republic is in danger. Yes - danger from within and without. We need law and order! 
Without it our nation cannot survive."80   
 This is another very effective strategy, however it is not only used by “Fascist 
Dictators” or politicians when they want to achieve their ends. Advertisers often use fear 
in advertising when they want to show the benefits of the use of the safety belt and show a 
terrible car accident, when an insurance company displays images of destroyed houses, 
floods or house fires and other situations like these. The more an event frightens people, 
                                                           
80 Adolf Hitler - 1932 
  
68
the more precautions they will take to prevent that situation. That is the point that is 
exploited by propagandists. The process can be summarized in four points: 
 1 – A threat is conveyed to an audience; 
 2 – A specific recommendation of how the audience should behave is made; 
 3- The audience gets the perception that the recommendation will be effective; 
 4- The audience perceives that is able to perform the recommendation; 
 This is how an audience is deceived. Taking the  “War on Terror” as an example in 
these points and simulating the voice of a “Bush Administration Member”: 
1- (Propagandist) “We are under constant threat. Al-Qaeda does not let us sleep 
in peace. Our security is compromised”; 
2- ( Propagandist) “If you help me I will send them away!”; 
3- (Audience’s minds) “If you send them away, our lives will no longer be in 
danger!”; 
4- (Audience’s minds) “I will stand by your side!” (and be manipulated by you 
too…) 
 Very simple and very effective if the audience does not consider the exaggeration of 
the propagandist’s claims. Usually they don’t because this fear has previously been 
identified and studied. In this way the propagandist also knows the right timing to make 
his intervention. The power that he will effectively have to solve the problem (or not) is 
not faced in a dispassionate way so the propagandist’s merits are not questioned due to 
the identification process that is established with the target audience. Once again society’s 
beliefs and biases, in the format of its  fears, are used against itself. 
2.7.3.2. Name calling 
 
 
This is a technique that links a person, or idea with a negative symbol. The 
propagandist who uses this technique hopes that the audience will reject the person or the 
idea on the basis of the association with the negative symbol, instead of looking at the 
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available evidence. Gangs, tribes, colleges, political parties, neighbourhoods are some words used 
by propagandists with this end in view. 
Inside this technique we can find an “overt” propaganda technique and a more 
“subsumed” one. To illustrate the “overt technique” first, examples such as: Commie, Fascist, 
Pig, Yuppie ,Bum, Queer and Terrorist amongst others can be seen to be overt as these names 
enter on a collision course to the generally accepted values of the target audience. In this 
way they produce a negative effect as no-one would wish to be described by any of these 
labels.  
“Subsumed name calling” is a more subtle form of name-calling that involves words 
or phrases that are selected because they possess a negative emotional charge. In politics, 
those who oppose budget cuts may characterize politicians concerned about the economy 
and spending as "stingy." Supporters might prefer to describe them as "thrifty." Both words 
refer to the same behaviour, but they have very different connotations. Other examples of 
negatively charged words include: Social engineering, radical, cowardly and, counter culture.  In 
different settings these words can have different meanings.  
This technique, although very simple, is tremendously effective. The use of labels is 
a very common habit of “mass-societies”. No one cares about what a name really means. 
Nobody cares if an idea is legitimately attached to the real meaning of the name that was 
attributed to it or bothers to think what the merits of an idea are behind its name. This is 
what makes “Name Calling” a powerful resource of propagandists. 
2.7.3.3. Contextualization 
 
 Contextualization is a technique that obviously works with contexts and 
sequences of contexts or scenarios. Where Omission takes away information, 
Contextualization adds it. With this technique, the propagandist creates a juxtaposition 
of ideas by forcing discordant images into the minds of the audience or by interrupting an 
emotion allowing it to leak over into the next scene. 
 This technique was often used after the 9/11 attack. TV channels often showed the 
grief and the tears of those who lost their loved ones in the World Trade Centre. Those 
people were in such extreme sorrow that we can almost imagine ourselves feeling it too. 
Then, suddenly, in order to maximize the Contextualization effect, this footage is followed 
by images of a happy Osama Bin-Laden, laughing and shooting guns. The audience’s 
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empathetic mood is then violently interrupted. Since nobody could possibly smile at a 
time like that, the audience’s mind that is still connected to the images of sorrow, begins 
to wonder what kind of monster that man must be, a person that smiles in the face of grief 
and sorrow.  
 Probably those two contexts differ by weeks or days in the time line, however, at a 
non-conscientious level, the audience has connected both of them and has made the 
erroneous conclusion that they are closely connected and that the second one derives from 
the first. 
 Carefully setting up a context in which an event is considered can have a powerful 
effect on what we will feel. We like to feel that we can control our emotions; however 
people’s beliefs have a strong role in this situation. Our attitudes do not come unbiased 
from our minds, they are the result of years of social contagion or schooling. 
 
2.7.3.4. Inclusion and Exclusion / Ingroup vs Outgroup 
Information 
 
 
 Humans easily and naturally distinguish group membership based on easily 
recognizable indicators such as gender, race or age. However, in order to establish a group 
preference much less is needed. Social experiences have determined that. One example is 
the following one: several subjects were brought to a lab by scientists and were asked to 
determine the number of dots on a large sheet of paper (an almost impossible task to 
perform accurately). The subjects were then divided into two groups: the ones who 
overestimated the number of dots and the ones who had underestimated the number of 
dots. 
 The subjects were then asked to describe and evaluate the qualities that best 
defined the qualities of the members of those groups. The results of each evaluation by 
each group tended to rate that group substantially higher than the other group in terms of 
intelligence, creativity and competence. All subjects preferred the group they belonged to 
better than the other group and considered it superior. All this Ingroup preference was 
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merely based on whether they had under or over estimated the number of dots on a sheet 
of paper.81 
 The power of this “Mind –Bug” on more important issues like war, racism, 
xenophobia and so on can be seen in the press. As Van Dijk (1996: 93) has pointed out:  
“Differential access of elites and minorities to the media predictably results in differential 
access to the structure of news reports as well. Selection and prominence of news issues and topics are 
those stereotypical and negative ones preferred by the white political, corporate social or scholarly elites 
and their institutions” 
This means that the powerful elite groups get more chance to have their points of 
view expressed and to counteract any criticism of the ‘outgroups’: “Their accusations of the 
host society and its elites, when quoted at all, never go unchallenged.” 
Moreover, the language that is used is often evocative as is the case with 
immigration: 
Thus, the frequent issue of immigration will be primarily defined as an invasion and as essentially 
problematic, and seldom as a welcome contribution to the economy or the culture of the country. 
Lots of these questions demonstrate this Ingroup preference and on the avoidance 
or rejection of other groups. 
 Humans have a strong tendency to view their social structures in terms of groups 
and group rivalries. Van Dijk and Ting-Toomey (1997:144) say 
 “ cultural misunderstanding, ethnic conflict, prejudice, xenophobia, ethnocentrism, anti-Semitism and 
racism frequently characterise relations between groups that are somehow ‘different’ from each other”.  
 By using Ingroup/Outgroup references and manipulation, new groups can be 
created, old groups may be set against each other or split apart into factions and 
boundaries that tie together rival groups can be created.  
 After the 9/11 events, the Bush administration clearly and unambiguously created a 
target scapegoat group that was held responsible for those terrible events – Al-Qaeda and 
its Islamic supporters, mainly Iraq and Afghanistan.  They were the “evil doers”, the 
“conspirators” and the terrorists. In order to reinforce the connection between those two 
countries and the Al-Qaeda the “Contextualization” technique was used. The head 
member of the Al-Qaeda group was placed together with Iraqis and Afghans.  
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 Propaganda is a tool of exclusion and inclusion. It is frequently used to underscore 
the difference between us and them, and it may fuel or create antagonism (Taithe and 
Thornton 1999:4).82 If the focus is on how bad they are, the propaganda is motivated by 
exclusion. If the focus is on how good we are and how important it is for us to unite, then 
the propaganda is inclusive. Both processes operate at the same time as including one 
group implies the exclusion of another (Ibid.:4). This opposition between us and them is 
required in all propaganda and assumes a hierarchical hostility between groups. The term 
us is given superiority over the term them. 
Van Dijk et al. (1997:145-6) say: 
 “Special media emphasis itself is a prominent feature of ‘ingroup’ discourse: they 
create more (serious) problems than we do. The ‘western’ press may even imply (though it will seldom say 
so explicitly) that their ‘ethnic strife’ or ‘tribal wars’ are backward and primitive, while at the same time 
denying or mitigating our (and its own) stereotypes and racism.” 
In the case of the Bosnian conflict they go on to point out 
“No wonder that Bosnia was as much a humanitarian and political catastrophe as it was an ethnic 
embarrassment” 
 
2.7.3.5. Modelling the convert communicator 
 
 
 Modelling and Convert Communicator are in fact two strategies and not one. 
According to the “Modelling” effect, human beings are more likely to perform certain 
behaviour if they see someone else performing it. Psychologists call this process 
“Modelling the Behaviour”. This process explains to a certain extent why we want to walk 
down the street when we see other people doing it, why we want to buy books on 
Amazon when we see other people buying them or why we look in the same direction that 
other people are looking.83 
 Albert Bandura, a famous clinical psychologist created an entire therapy based on 
modelling. In one of his studies he wanted to cure children’s dog phobias. The experience 
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consisted merely in allowing these children to see other kids playing with dogs (slides, 
films and live observation were used) for 20 minutes a day. 
 After four days about two thirds of the children were willing to do something they 
had never done before: stay confined with a pet dog and play with the animal. This is 
remarkable if one considers that four days earlier none of those children would even 
considered the hypothesis of touching a dog.84   
 Other studies show that Suicidal Rates increase when a suicide is reported on the 
front pages of a newspaper. People are often influenced by other people regarding when to 
cross a street, when to be brave, when to have an affair and even when to die.85 This 
modelling behaviour even applies to speaking, we also imitate the style and characteristics 
of the speech of the group we normally interact with.  
 So, it comes without any surprises that the “Modelling” effect is used when it 
comes to votes. Candidates are shown voting, long lines of people waiting for their turn to 
vote are projected into the viewers eyes only to enable the “Modelling” effect and to show 
people how to vote. 
The second part of this “technique” is the Convert Communicator. Convert 
Communicators are generally of a low social class and would not be relevant under normal 
circumstances. However, low-class communicators can achieve a spectacular 
persuasiveness if they can reverse their positions. If someone has changed his position, 
convictions or ideologies dramatically to the opposite and communicates this to a general 
audience, this person becomes a Convert Communicator and gains a credibility that not 
even some of the most distinct personalities have. A former burglar who now uses his 
skills to fight robbery and assist a Police Department is considered to be a highly 
credible/believable person. Researchers have discovered that former intravenous drug 
users that are now clean to be more credible to a general audience than a physician or a 
surgeon.86 
 In his movie Fahrenheit 9/11, Michael Moore uses the footage of Abdul Henderson, 
a Marine Corporal saying that he would prefer to face a dishonourable discharge and go to 
jail than to serve another commission in Iraq.  
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This position is rare and Abdul is only a Corporal, however his words acquire an 
astronomical power when revealed to the public. The general public seems to forget that 
he might be the exception and not the rule. Attached to a public renunciation of values 
there is an exponential multiplication of credibility. 
This tactic works because we tend to attribute a radical change to a great cause or 
a great power. Humans like to consider themselves consistent and believe that only a 
powerful and truthful insight can cause a person to reverse his values and convert himself 
to the opposite point of view. 
 
 
2.7.3.6. The Other/Enemy Images 
 
 
 To designate someone or some group as the Other is similar to stereotyping in terms 
of representing an evaluative form of naming or labelling which defines someone or some 
cultural grouping in reductive terms (Pickering 2001:41)87. To define someone as the 
“Other” is a collective process of judgment which feeds upon and reinforces powerful 
social myths (Jordanova 1998:109)88. Conceptions of the Other and the structures of 
differences and similarities which they mobilize do not exist in any natural form. There is 
no real Other out there, the location of the Other is primarily in language. “It is through 
language that selves and others are mediated and represented” (Pickering 2001:72). The concept of 
the stereotypical Other can be used to support a range of different attitudes, from mild 
condescension to overt hostility. Nevertheless, the Other is always constructed as an 
object for the benefit of the subject who needs an objectified Other in order to achieve a 
masterly self-definition (Ibid.:71). The Other is constructed with the purpose of 
subordination in mind (Ibid.:76) The process of othering begins with the use of derogatory 
terms to refer to the group that is perceived as different, and then elaborates and justifies 
the injurious difference and symbolic distance established. This is a denial of humanity of 
those treated in this way because it divests them of their social and cultural identities by 
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diminishing them to stereotyped characteristics (Ibid.:73). The creation of enemy images 
builds upon a process of de-individualization and denial of humanity. 
 The process of elaborating and allocating characteristics to groups of people defined as the enemy, 
and disseminating a particular view of them, is critical in the internal mobilization of opinion. Depicting the 
enemy as a mad, raving tyrant has always been a propaganda tool, and the media can play a central role in the 
projection of enemy images, a vital prerequisite in war (Allen and Seaton (ed.) 1999:45-46)89. “In the beginning 
we create the enemy. Before the weapon comes the image. We think others to death and then invent the battle-axe or the ballistic 
missiles with which to actually kill them. Propaganda precedes technology”, Sam Keen (1986:10)90 writes in the book 
Faces of the Enemy. It is unlikely that we will have any success in controlling warfare unless we 
understand the logic of political paranoia and the process of creating propaganda that 
justifies our hostility, he adds (Ibid.:11).  
But how do you make a monster out of the man you know personally, who lives 
next door? Such enmification is a process that goes beyond objective and historical 
conditions, and it entails a psychological process (Rieber and Kelly 1991:6)91. It has 
profound roots in the individual psyche and can in some situations be manipulated for the 
purposes of mass mobilization. “When we speak of collective enmity, we are talking about a social-
psychological process that exists on multiple levels” (Ibid.:6). When the organs of propaganda 
come into play with the mass media, the potential for promoting an enmification process 
grows immeasurably (Ibid.:7). 
Spillman and Spillman (1991:57-58)92 identify the following seven characteristics as 
belonging to the syndrome of the enemy image:  
1. Distrust. Everything originating with the enemy is either bad or, if it appears 
reasonable, created for dishonest reasons.  
2. Placing the guilt on the enemy. The enemy is responsible for the tension which exists 
and is to blame for everything that is negative under the current circumstances.  
3. Negative anticipation. Whatever the enemy does is intended to harm us.  
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4. Identification with evil. The enemy embodies the opposite of what we are and what 
we strive for, and wants to destroy what we value most and must therefore be 
destroyed.  
5. Zero-sum thinking. Anything which benefits the enemy harms us and vice versa.  
6. De-individualization. Anyone who belongs to a given group is automatically our 
enemy.  
7. Refusal of empathy. We have nothing in common with our enemy; human feelings 
and ethical criteria towards the enemy are dangerous and ill-advised.  
 
Images of the enemy are thus formed by perception created solely by negative 
assessment (Spillman and Spillman 1991:58)93.  
Control over media and information is a central tool in the maintenance of or 
struggle for power (Eknes and Endresen 1999:12)94. Every conflict is fought on two 
grounds: The battlefield and via propaganda. And “the history of battle is primarily the history of 
radically changing fields of perception” (Virillio 1989:7)95. Propaganda can be used then to create 
enemy images (Luostarinen 2002:35)96. Consequently, in the rest of this dissertation the 
characteristics of the syndrome of the enemy image will be linked to propaganda techniques. 
With each death of a US soldier in Iraq and each report about the absence of Iraqi 
weapons of mass destruction, it became more obvious that the attack on Iraq had 
backfired on the U.S. administration. But the signs of backfire were apparent for a long 
time. 
 Before the invasion there were massive protest rallies, with the largest single-day 
numbers in history on 15 February, including large numbers of people who had never 
joined a rally before. Public opinion in most countries was strongly against the attack. 
Many governments opposed it, most prominently several key members of the UN Security 
Council. Interviews in 20 countries in May 2003 revealed that "in most countries, opinions 
of the U.S. are markedly lower than they were a year ago. The war has widened the rift 
between Americans and Western Europeans, further inflamed the Muslim world, softened 
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support for the war on terrorism, and significantly weakened global public support for the 
pillars of the post-World War II era - the U.N. and the North Atlantic alliance." 
 Attacks of all sorts can backfire, especially when they are perceived as unjust. But 
as well as being a potential outcome of an attack, backfire can be studied as a process. 
Attackers often seek to prevent backfire, whereas opponents of the attack seek to magnify 
it. 
 Backfire is an ongoing struggle, a sort of game. The key is to understand the rules of 
the game. 
 Many attackers realize, consciously or intuitively, that their attacks can backfire, 
and take measures to mitigate this effect. However, it is not necessary to know the 
motivations of attackers in order to analyze backfire dynamics; all that is required is 
observation of actions that do indeed have the potential to inhibit backfire. There are five 
principal ways to inhibit backfire. 
1. The attack is hidden, for example by secrecy, censorship and false reports, to 
minimize awareness of its existence or significance. 
2. The target is devalued, for example by destroying its reputation or even 
dehumanising it, to create the impression that the target deserves being attacked 
or that it doesn’t really matter. 
3. Events are reinterpreted, with the alternative interpretation being that an attack 
didn’t occur or no injustice was involved, for example that the victim was actually 
the aggressor. 
4. Official bodies undertake investigations or make pronouncements that 
legitimate the attack. 
5. The target, witnesses and supporters are intimidated so that concern about the 
attacks is less easily voiced. 
 The 2003 conquest of Iraq generated enormous hostility around the world, a 
popular and political reaction that can be interpreted as an example of how attacks can 
backfire. Much of this hostility can be attributed to the attack being perceived as unjust 
and disproportionate to anything the Iraqi regime had done, or threatened to do, to the 
attackers. 
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 Various measures taken by attackers can inhibit this sort of backfire effect. Five 
key methods are covering up the attack, devaluing the target, reinterpreting events, using 
official channels and intimidating critics. 
 In the case of the attack on Iraq, each of these methods was used, but without great 
success. The impending invasion was announced to the world, so cover-up played a 
limited role, though it was important in limiting awareness of the ongoing attacks from 
1991. 
 The demonization of Saddam Hussein was perhaps the most effective tool in 
inhibiting backfire, convincing many people that attack was justified, but was powerfully 
countered by exposure of double standards such as via the queries "Why Iraq?" and "Why 
now?" 
 Various arguments were advanced for attacking Iraq: to prevent Iraqi aggressive 
use of weapons of mass destruction, to prevent Iraqi government support for terrorists, 
and to liberate the Iraqi people. However, these arguments were not very effective, partly 
because of transparent inconsistencies and partly because of powerful counter-arguments. 
An attempt was made to legitimate the invasion by obtaining UN endorsement, but this 
failed, causing further delegitimation. Finally, there was some intimidation of critics of the 
attack, but this did not appear to significantly reduce the overall volume of criticism. 
 The backfire framework helps to unify understanding of the ways that attacks are 
supported and opposed. To a casual consumer of the media, the lead-up to the invasion of 
Iraq could well have appeared bewildering, with multitudinous claims and counter-claims 
involving Saddam Hussein, weapons of mass destruction, disagreement between 
governments and so forth. The concept of backfire brings some order to this messy picture 
by focusing attention on the struggle over perceptions, specifically the perception of an 
attack as unjust or disproportionate. Attackers use various means that prevent or 
undermine such a perception, or in other words that inhibit backfire: control of 
information (cover-up); rhetoric (devaluation of the target; reinterpretations); official 
channels; and exercise of economic and political power (intimidation). 
 An analysis in terms of backfire sheds light on how to go about opposing unjust 
attacks. Basically, each of the methods used to inhibit backfire can be countered. 
 Exposing cover-ups is crucially important and points to the vital role played by 
investigative journalists, whistleblowers, outspoken advocates, researchers and 
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independent commentators. To expose cover-ups can be very difficult: persistence in both 
gathering and distributing information in a credible fashion is vital. 
 Countering rhetorical means of justifying attack - devaluing the target and 
reinterpreting events - requires knowledge, commitment and eloquence. 
 Commentary about an impending attack, or one that has already occurred, is far 
from irrelevant; instead, it is crucial in shaping attitudes that influence whether an attack 
proceeds or, if it does, how and whether future attacks occur. 
 The role of official channels for legitimating attacks is the most challenging for 
opponents. There are two basic approaches to maximise backfire: to influence the official 
body to refuse to endorse the attack, or to undermine the credibility of the official body or 
its deliberations. The first approach is often more effective in the short term but, for 
official bodies whose appearance of fairness and neutrality is a facade, the second 
approach may be better. Finally, a good way to oppose intimidation is to expose it, thereby 
making it backfire. 
 This analysis of backfire dynamics points to the crucial role of information and 
communication. Attacks backfire because of perceptions of injustice and 
disproportionality. Therefore, secrecy, disinformation, spin-doctoring and public relations 
may be of much greater importance for attackers than normally realised. This may apply in 
repressive regimes as well as in more open societies, as suggested by the role of secrecy and 
state propaganda in the Soviet Union and the secrecy in which the Nazis carried out their 
exterminations. The importance of official channels, even the most transparently 
fraudulent ones, for justifying injustice is suggested by Stalin’s show trials and the facade 
of elections in dictatorial regimes. 
 Backfire analysis can give a new appreciation of the diverse means of opposing 
attacks. Opposition to the attack on Iraq was most obvious in massive rallies throughout 
the world and in resistance by many governments to joining or endorsing an invasion. 
 These forms of resistance cannot easily be separated from an ongoing struggle over 
information and meaning, involving news reports, articles, letters, leaflets, emails and 
everyday conversations. This struggle will continue long after the conquest of Iraq, for 
example in the ongoing debate over the presence or absence of weapons of mass 
destruction. 
  
80
2.8. Counterpropaganda 
 
 
There is no propaganda without counterpropaganda and Saddam Hussein was well 
aware of this.  According to Todd Leventhal, the Chief of the Counter-Misinformation 
Team for the U.S. Department of State Iraq’s counterpropaganda campaigns and its 
disinformation strategies were based on four different broad categories: crafting tragedy, 
exploit suffering, exploiting Islam, and corrupting the public record which will be 
discussed below. 
2.8.1 Crafting Tragedy 
 
To craft tragedy, the regime placed civilians close to military equipment, facilities, 
and troops, which were legitimate targets in an armed conflict. The Iraqi regime openly 
used both Iraqis and foreigners as human shields during the Gulf War.  In this way 
civilians were placed in the line of fire and it was almost impossible for there to be no 
casualties amongst non-combatants which always brings a bad press in the home country. 
This is clearly against the Geneva Convention (1949, Article 51) which states: 
 
“The presence or movements of the civilian population or individual civilians shall not be used 
to render certain points or areas immune from military operations, in particular in attempts to shield 
military objectives from attacks or to shield, favour or impede military operations. The parties to the 
conflict shall not direct the movement of the civilian population or individual civilians in order to shield 
military objectives from attacks or to shield military operations.” 
 
On the other hand, Iraq also placed military equipment next to or inside mosques 
and ancient cultural heritage sites. Finally, it deliberately damaged facilities and attributed 
the damage to coalition bombing and attempted to pass off damage from natural 
catastrophes, such as earthquakes, as the result of bombing. 
During Operation Desert Storm, the coalition claimed to have chosen its targets 
carefully and have had strict rules of engagement that intended to avoid bombing innocent 
civilians, the so-called ‘surgical strike’ that only affected the target without damaging 
anything else. Nevertheless, even with careful targeting, fire discipline, and with the use of 
precision munitions in the campaign, some civilian casualties occurred. Saddam Hussein 
used the deaths of innocent civilians to try to undermine international and domestic 
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support for the American-led coalition, and the Iraqi regime made many claims that 
civilian targets had been hit by coalition air forces, with loss of innocent civilian lives. 
When coalition leaders publicly stated that religious sites would not be targeted, 
Saddam deliberately began using these sites to shield military equipment and units to try 
to disprove the statements made by the coalition leaders. In other cases, dual use facilities 
were exploited for propaganda value. 
On January 21, 1991, coalition bombers hit what the Iraqis claimed was a “baby 
milk factory” in Baghdad. The United States insisted that Iraq was using it as a biological-
weapons development site. It appears the facility had functioned as a “baby milk” factory 
in 1979 and 1980, and then again in the spring and summer of 1990, before the Iraqi regime 
began to use it as a weapons site.  After the Gulf War, UNSCOM inspectors discovered 
that three scientists from the Iraqi regime’s main biological weapons facility had been 
assigned to the “baby milk” factory. 
The Iraqi regime also manipulated the foreign journalists in Iraq. In late 1997, the 
Iraqi regime made sure the world media filmed Iraqi civilians, including women and 
children, at military and industrial sites. The U.S. government later learned that it then 
secretly replaced the civilians with prisoners, who were mostly opposition figures but also 
included some criminals. If the sites had been attacked, the Iraqi regime was then ready to 
claim that any prisoners killed were the Iraqi civilians who had previously been there. 
2.8.2 Exploiting Suffering 
 
To exploit suffering, Saddam blamed starvation and medical crises – often of his 
own making – on the United Nations or the United States and its allies. The sanctions 
applied to Iraq permitted medical supplies to be bought and imported but very often this 
was not done. The suffering caused by the Iraqi regime actually causing or actively 
ignoring poverty and then aggressively exploiting the Iraqi people’s suffering is a very 
effective trick. For years, the Iraqis promoted the false notion that depleted uranium – a 
substance that was used for armour-piercing munitions during the Gulf War – had caused 
cancers and birth defects among Iraqis. Scientific evidence indicates that any elevated 
rates of cancer and birth defects are most likely due to several, other factors. 
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Saddam Hussein’s government used tragic images to influence world opinion, and 
particularly to support the false allegation that the United Nations was killing Iraqis 
through the use of sanctions. Those images included: 
 
• Exploiting sick and malnourished children before international television cameras; 
• Staging mass funerals97; 
• Providing selective tours of empty markets and dilapidated hospitals to journalists 
and other foreign visitors; 
• Showing Iraqis with obvious diseases and blaming the sicknesses on the absence of 
modern medical tools, due to sanctions; and 
• Censoring television footage and restricting the movement of journalists and 
television crews. 
2.8.3 Exploiting Islam 
 
Experts knew that Saddam Hussein was a non-religious man from a secular – even 
atheistic – party. But to exploit Islamic sentiments, he adopted expressions of faith in his 
public pronouncements, and the Iraqi propaganda apparatus erected billboards and 
distributed images showing him praying. The regime also made many claims designed to 
incite Muslims against its adversaries. 
According to the  U.S Department of State, “Saddam Hussein, who isn't very religious 
himself, based on third-person accounts, uses Islam to maintain his power and hold over the Iraqi people, 
the report says. To cultivate and exploit the good will of pious Iraqis, Hussein's picture is plastered all over  
the country depicting the dictator in devout prayer.”98 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
97 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jun/23/terrorism.iraq .  
98 http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29543 
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                                                       Image 1 – Mural of Saddam Hussein Praying99 
2.8.4 Corrupting the Public Record 
 
To corrupt the public record, the regime used a combination of on-the-record lies, 
covert placements of false news accounts, self-inflicted damage, forgeries, and fake 
interviews.   “The Hussein regime corrupts the public record by planting falsehoods -- the more bogus the 
story, the better, the report says. "Apparatus" notes Iraqi officials' efforts include forging documents, 
creating false atrocity scenes for television viewers, and planting disinformation in newspapers and 
periodicals.”100  Iraqi disinformation campaigns also included restricting journalists' 
movements; false man-in-the-street interviews; self-inflicted damage; on-the-record lies; 
covert dissemination of false stories; censorship; edited or old television footage and 
images; and fabricated documents.  
2.8.5   Large Anti-war Protests 
 
 In various parts of the world, many people have protested on the streets against the 
war in Iraq. This in itself can be used as a counterpropaganda technique to show that not 
                                                           
99 http://www.whitehouse.gov/ogc/apparatus/islam.html 
100 http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=29543 
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all of the people agree with their government’s or administration’s views of the situation 
and the need for war, despite the propaganda used. For example (and these are very 
limited examples): 
• A very large number of protestors, estimated from 150,000 (police estimates) to 
350,000 (organizer estimates) marched in London in September 2002 (and at that 
time was considered one of the biggest peace demonstrations in UK in recent 
times).   
• Some 1.5 million in Rome101 took to the streets, October 5, 2002.  
• A march in Florence, Italy on November 9, 2002 saw some 300,000 protestors as 
well.  
• On the weekend of 18th January, 2003, hundreds of thousands of people protested 
around the world, in various cities, including throughout the U.S., Europe, Asia 
and the Middle East.  
• February 15, 2003 saw a day of global protests, with some of the biggest protests to 
date for some nations (at time of writing):  
o The BBC reported (News 24 broadcast, February 15, 2003) that some 10 
million protestors took part in demonstrations in 600 cities around the 
world.  
o In London, UK, estimates ranged from "in excess of" 750,000 protestors 
(police estimates) to over some 1.5 to 2 million (organizer's estimates). 
Whichever it was, the BBC highlighted that this made it the "biggest 
demonstration in British history" for/against anything.  
o An estimated 1 million turned up in various cities in Spain, another country 
behind the U.S. in supporting a war (about 200,000 in Seville, 600,000 in 
Madrid).  
                                                           
101 http://www.foodfirst.org/progs/eshr/wafb/vol11.html#2 
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o Sydney, Australia (another country that supports the U.S. for war on Iraq) 
saw some 250,000 people protest, described as the largest since the days of 
the Vietnam War. Melbourne saw about 150,000.  
o In New York, near the United Nations, some 100,000 (police estimates) to 
400,000 (organizer's estimates) people turned up, despite what news site, 
alternet.org described as "draconian restrictions". With some 200,000 in 
San Francisco, up to 100,000 in Los Angeles, and with large protests in 
Canada and Mexico, there was possibly over a million people throughout 
North America that protested.  
o 3,000 Jews and Arabs marched together in Tel Aviv102, as reported by the 
BBC (which also reports on some of the other protests mentioned here)  
o In Paris, France, 100,000 turned up, and this is in a country which is already 
against war!  
o Germany saw some 500,000 people, also a nation against war on Iraq!  
• Protests have even taken on different dimensions and creativity. For example, 
"virtual demonstrations" whereby people have emailed, phoned and faxed the 
Senate and White House has drawn some 400,000 people, as reported by CNN 
(February 28, 2003)103  
• Since February 15, there have been many other rallies. March 15, 2003, was another 
big global rally, (though not as large as February, with war looking more likely) 
where according to Reuters in the previous link, various cities throughout the 
world often saw tens of thousands often turn up. For example, Washington DC 
alone saw 50,000 people (March 16, 2003)104. 
 These are just a very small sample of the protests that have occurred very 
frequently throughout the crisis. Various peace groups, religious organizations and others 
have held vigils, demonstrations and protests around the world against the idea of war. 
                                                           
102 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2765215.stm 
103 http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/ptech/02/26/virtual.protest/ 
104 http://oneworld.net/ips4/2003/171.shtml 
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 As exemplified by the enormous march in London, on February 15, 2003, and 
constantly seen in the footage and live coverage by the BBC at the time, the diversity of the 
people that turned up was immense. People of all colours, religions, ages and classes had 
turned up. The Sandiego Tribune also highlighted (February 14, 2003)105 that even for the 
U.S. protest movement, not only is there such diversity, but that the "U.S. anti-war 
movement is based in the mainstream".  
3. METHODOLOGY AND QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
3.1. Textual Analysis 
 
 Analyses of texts are often content analysis. Whether such analyses should be 
quantitative or qualitative is often debated. The quantitative requirement has often been 
cited as essential. “There is clearly no reason for content analysis unless the question one 
wants answered is quantitative”, Lasswell et al. (1952:45)106 state. 
 Others stress that a quantitative design constitutes an important and more 
significant form of analysis. The temptation to count things for the sake of counting is 
almost certain to yield findings which are either meaningless or trivial, Ole R. Holsti (1969: 
preface)107 states. He regards the problem of quantity and quality as a quasi-problem. The 
relevant question to ask is not: “Am I being quantitative?” but rather: “What is the 
theoretical relevance of the measures I am using?” . 
Qualitative and quantitative methods should supplement each other. It is by using 
both these approaches that the investigator is most likely to gain insight into the meaning 
of the data. My study will be a qualitative analysis with some quantitative elements.  
There are different forms of content analyses, and a variety of theoretical 
frameworks should be used to enrich a study in its search for answers to the research 
questions.  
 I will also take into consideration one aspect emphasized in the tradition of 
discourse analysis, which acknowledges that the meaning of a single word or phrase not 
                                                           
105 Http://signosandiego.com/news/world/iraq/20030214-999_ini4protest.html 
106 Lasswell, Harold D., Daniel Lerner and Ithie de Sola Pool (1952): The Comparative Study of Symbols: An 
Introduction, Standford Univeristy Press, Standford. 
107 Holsti, Ole R. (1969): Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities, Addison-Wesley Publishing 
Company, Massachusetts. 
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only can be determined by the “direct meaning” of the words used. The social significance 
of language lies in the relationship between linguistic meanings and the wider context, 
such as the cultural, economic and demographic aspects of the situation in which the 
communication takes place. Textual analysis is always performed on the message of a 
communication process having in consideration the context in which it occurs. 
The context of occurrence in this situation will be then “a collective term for all of 
those events which tell the organism among what set of alternatives he must make his 
next choice”.108  This consideration gives context an extra importance. Facts become less 
important than the values and principles of an audience, so, public discourses are more 
about social values and principles than about fact of objective truths. Credibility is the 
key, not facticity. 
3.2. The 9/11 Propagandistic Context of Occurrence 
 
 The war on terrorism is taking place at the centre stage of international politics, 
with ramifications in practically all other fields of international politics. After the 9/11 
events, propaganda became a major feature of the “war on terrorism”.  
Once an actor has decided to launch a propaganda campaign, both in terms of the 
“War on Terrorism” or any other area, a propaganda strategy is required. A “strategy” is 
here understood as a plan for achieving a certain goal. A propaganda strategy will have 
certain linguistic or argumentative characteristics, and will tend to rely on one or more 
propaganda devices – sub-units that make up propaganda strategies. A propaganda device 
is defined as an argument structure – or style– that exceeds the limits of rhetoric. 
I want to be able to demonstrate that something is propaganda by pointing out 
credible textual evidence for such a claim: it is not sufficient merely to say that this speech 
or that paragraph is of a propagandistic nature. 
 The empirical examples that I will analyze later in this dissertation were designed 
to direct people’s behaviour, because they were all adopted in order to generate public 
support for the “War on Terrorism” as it was defined by George Bush’s administration. 
 According to mine understanding of that policy and in terms of the “War on 
Terrorism”, three lines of action are considered to be the most important: the first strategy 
                                                           
108 Nikolaev, Alexanser G. & Porpora, Douglas V. (2006) President Bush’s Pre-War Rhetoric on Iraq: Paranoid Style in 
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intended to quell any debate about the war on terrorism, the second tried to spread the 
perception that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the third was an 
attempt to link together the first phase (Afghanistan) with the second phase (Iraq) of the 
war on terrorism. Like Alexander G. Nikolaev and Douglas V. Porpora put it:  “The 
purpose of these techniques is to nullify voices of opposition and preserve some political 
capital.”109 
3.3. Quelling discussion in the war on terrorism 
 
A qualitative analysis of one quote from each of the Bush administration’s (2001–
05) five top members it will be suggested that propaganda – and not rhetoric – is the 
correct categorization for considerable parts of the Bush administration’s strategic 
communication. The five quotes from the “war on terrorism” also illustrate the propaganda  
strategy which deals with the unfounded certainty about Iraqi possession of WMD. 
Let’s start off with the establishment of the context in which the five quotes 
appeared. George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Colin Powell, and John 
Ashcroft are key elements in an administration that was attacked on September, 11 2001. 
They perceived themselves to be at war with al Qaeda and international terrorism. (We 
should recall that under such circumstances the use of propaganda is quite conventional.) 
Quote 1 is Ashcroft in December 2001, a period when the Bush administration 
could go far and shut-up dissident voices. Opposition to the administration’s policies was 
almost non-existent. Quotes 2 (Cheney) and 3 (Rumsfeld) are from the autumn of 2002. 
At that point the Bush administration had made the case for opening a new front in the 
war on terrorism in Iraq. Quote 4 is from Colin Powell’s speech on Iraq’s possession of 
WMD110 to the UN Security Council, February 2003. 
 Finally, quote 5 is from President Bush’s “ultimatum speech” on 17 March 2003, in 
which he gave Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq. (And indeed, the bombing 
campaign of Iraq started on March 19.) The five quotes appear in chronological order 
below: 
                                                           
109 Nikolaev, Alexanser G. & Porpora, Douglas V. (2006),. President Bush’s Pre-War Rhetoric on Iraq: Paranoid Style    
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1. To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty; my message is this: Your tactics 
only aid terrorists – for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give ammunition 
to America’s enemies (Ashcroft, 6 December 2001). 
2. Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is 
no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us  (Cheney, 26 
August 2002). 
3. There’s no debate in the world as to whether they have those weapons. There’s no debate in the world 
as to whether they're continuing to develop and acquire them [...] We all know that. A trained ape knows 
that. All you have to do is read the newspaper. (Rumsfeld, 13 September 2002). 
4. There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein has biological weapons and the capability to rapidly 
produce more, many more. […] We know that Saddam Hussein is determined to keep his weapons of 
mass destruction; he’s determined to make more (Powell, 5 February 2003). 
5. Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to 
possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. (Bush, 17 March 2003) 
 
A central feature of all five statements is that they are designed to terminate 
discussion – note the phrase “no doubt”, employed by Bush, Powell and Cheney. As the 
story went on, there were in fact several grounds for having doubts about the existence of 
WMD in Iraq. Nevertheless, the Bush administration sought to dismiss any such claims by 
short circuiting the debate. Rumsfeld went so far as to claim that there were not any 
doubts about these matters, even indicating that those who differed with him were below 
the level of trained apes. 
Rumsfeld claimed later that he knew where the WMD were stored: “We know where 
they are. They're in the area around Tikrit and Baghdad and east, west, south and north somewhat” 
(Rumsfeld, 30 March 2003). That statement was a plain lie. The fact that the information 
presented in quotes was incorrect, misleading and false leads to the conclusion that they 
are propaganda. 
At times it seemed that the Bush administration was trying to generate support for 
a war to disarm Iraq in any possible way. In that process they adopted a classic 
propaganda device called “the fallacy of impossible certainty”. This involves stating as fact 
what cannot possibly be known to be true. Did the Bush administration deliberately 
mislead and lie? Not necessarily, and at least not all the time. What its members did do 
was to express unfounded certainty about the existence of WMD in Iraq. They did not 
know, but still claimed they knew. 
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These two propaganda strategies proved quite effective on Americans and the US 
mass media. The highly reputed newspaper Washington Post completely accepted the 
perception that Iraq had WMD, and gave emphasis to the Bush administration’s call for 
war in an editorial titled “Irrefutable”, printed the day after Powell’s UN presentation. The 
impact of the discussion termination is obvious, since many newspapers wrote something 
like: “it is hard to imagine how anyone could doubt that Iraq possesses weapons of mass 
destruction”.  
3.4. From Afghanistan to Iraq’s WMD 
 
The five statements presented above date from different phases of the war on 
terrorism. An important propaganda strategy in the war on terrorism aimed to establish a 
link between these different phases. 
For such purposes, the propaganda device called transfer is particularly useful. It 
involves transferring the attributions and/or connotations of one phenomenon onto 
another phenomenon. To qualify as propaganda, the connection established must be of a 
dubious kind. This dubious connection can be established to promote both benign and 
atrocious purposes. 
The application of transfer was crucial in placing the war in Iraq firmly under the 
“flag” of war on terrorism. Simply by mentioning Iraq and Al Qaeda together in the same 
sentence, over and over, the message got through. Here are some statements that 
contributed to this comprehensive transfer by linking together al-Qaeda, Saddam Hussein 
and Iraq: 
He [Saddam] is a threat because he is dealing with al Qaeda. (Bush, 7 November 2002) 
We know that he [Saddam] has a long-standing relationship with various terrorist groups, including 
the al-Qaeda organization. (Cheney, 16 March 2003) 
 [Iraq] has aided, trained and harbored terrorists, including operatives of al Qaeda. (Bush, 17 March 2003) 
As we fight the war on terror in Iraq and on other fronts... (Bush, 2 June 2004)111 
 
Through a qualitative analysis, we can see that the Bush administration tried to 
“contaminate” Iraq with the established negative representations of al Qaeda and the Taliban. “The aim 
                                                           
111 Available at: Http://www.whitehouse.gov 
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was not to prove an assertion but to conflate Iraq with al Qaeda any way possible” (Corn 2003: 218)112. 
Table 1 shows the entities involved in the quite transfer applied: 
 
 
 
The propaganda of the initial stages of the war on terrorism had successfully 
singled everything in the left column as legitimate targets or courses of action. There had 
been only minor criticism, within the USA and abroad, of the war in Afghanistan. It was 
imperative for the Bush administration that the new adversary should receive a similar 
status, so repetitive use of transfers was a natural choice of propaganda device. This 
approach is very much in accordance with the tenets of schema theory. Selling the war in 
Iraq could be facilitated by the existing schemata represented by the left-hand column. 
The attempt to link these separate phenomena was systematic, yet only partly 
successful. Lots of people, especially outside the USA, started to question whether Iraq 
was in fact a part of the war on terrorism. Was there really any terrorism to worry about 
from Iraq?  
3.5. From Hitler to Bush 
 
 
I have compared and contrasted different variants of strategic political 
communication to propaganda. The definition of propaganda used here has emphasized 
that propaganda, unlike rhetoric, is by nature hostile to discussion. A propagandist has no 
interest in adjusting his views or suggested actions to accommodate the views and needs 
                                                           
112 Corn, David, The Lies of George W. Bush: Mastering the Politics of Deception. New York: Crown Publishers, 2003 
(David Corn is a liberal American political journalist and author.) 
Table 3 – Entities that have undergone the Transfer Strategy 
First phase Second phase 
War on Terrorism War in Iraq 
Osama Bin Laden Saddam Hussein 
Afghanistan Iraq 
Taliban Baath Party 
al Qaeda, terrorism Iraq as a terrorizing state 
Response to attack Pre-emptive (preventive) warfare 
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of others. By contrast, rhetoric has the potential for such deliberative exchanges – but this 
is a potential. Rhetoric need not always have such dimensions, and rhetoric and 
propaganda overlap to some extent. 
Propaganda is best understood as a technique, but it is most easily recognizable 
when its content represents deception or disinformation. Between propagandist and 
propagandee there is most often an asymmetry of interest, but this aspect should be kept 
out of a definition of propaganda. 
Specifying that propaganda is a form of mass communication is more fruitful as an 
academic approach. 
 Communication is here defined as social interaction through messages, and 
politics without communication is unthinkable. Consequently, heavy reliance on 
communication experts and spin-doctors is unavoidable for politicians. This is all part of 
what has become the permanent campaign of governing. Propaganda is a diverse 
phenomenon, which may well admit of further categorization and specification. A 
typology that distinguishes between white, grey and black propaganda is one way of doing 
that. Relating those categories to public diplomacy, we see that the similarities between 
public diplomacy and white propaganda are great. However, it would be imprecise to 
brand all PD as propaganda, as it is not necessarily a one-way, pushdown form of mass 
communication. 
Key members of the Bush administration sought to generate support for the war in 
Iraq through quashing debates about it. They spread the perception that Iraq possessed 
WMD. They expressed unfounded certainty on the WMD-issue. This propaganda 
strategy backfired on the administration when their bluff – rather than a large stock of 
WMD – was exposed in Iraq. 
Transfer was the primary propaganda device employed for linking together 
different phases of the war on terrorism but as it is easily noticeable, other strategies were 
used.  
Attempts were made to capitalize on the substantial public support for the war in 
Afghanistan in order to generate support for war against Iraq. However, the connection 
between these two wars was not as obvious as the Bush administration claimed. You do 
not have to be a analyst for 20 years to put it in the following terms: You’re left to just hear the 
nouns, and put them together. 
  
93
In the early stages, it was very hard to voice opposition to the war on terrorism. 
Then, as the costs of the war in Iraq unfolded, and the administration’s propaganda 
strategies were increasingly exposed and more critical voices gained strength in the 
United States. 
By November 2005 Dick Cheney had to acknowledge that there was indeed a 
debate about important aspects of the war on terrorism. Whether his comments are a 
necessary rhetorical manoeuvre forced by pressure and criticism, or an indication of a 
more deliberative stance on attitudes to the war on terrorism is a secret only kept by him.  
Cheney’s later speech at the American Enterprise Institute does, however, represent a shift 
in the strategic communication of the Bush administration: 
 
“I do not believe it is wrong to criticize the war on terror or any aspect thereof. 
Disagreement, argument, and debate are the essence of democracy, and none of us should want it any 
other way.” 
 (Cheney, 21 November 2005). 
 
 These specific goals were many times hidden inside a broader ideological 
background. The U.S.A’s dominant ideology is based on the ideas of free enterprise and 
democratic political structures. The key ideological term is freedom and freedom was used 
and abused to justify the means to some ends. 
American propaganda is very much clever. American propaganda relies mostly on 
emotional appeals. It doesn’t depend on a rational theory that can be disproved: it appeals 
to things no one can object to. 
American propaganda had its birth, so far as I can tell, in the advertising industry. 
The pioneers of advertising learned early on that people would respond to purely 
emotional appeals. A man walking down the street with beautiful women hanging on his 
arms is not a logical argument, but it sure sells after-shave. A woman in a business suit 
with a briefcase, strolling along with swaying hips, assuring us she can "bring home the 
bacon, fry it up in a pan, but never let you forget you’re a man" really sells the perfume. 
American advertising and propaganda has been refined over the years into a 
malevolent science, based on the assumption that most people react, not to ideas, but to 
naked emotion. Successful agencies know how to appeal to emotions: the stronger and 
baser, the better. The seven deadly sins, ad agency wags often say, are the key to selling 
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products. Fear, envy, greed, hatred, and lust: these are the basic tools for good propaganda 
and effective advertising. By far, the most powerful motivating emotion—the top, most-
sought-after copy writers will tell you, in an unguarded moment—is fear, followed closely 
by greed. 
Good propaganda appeals to neither logic nor morality. Morality and ethics are the 
death of sales. This is why communist propaganda actually hastened the collapse of 
communism: the creatures running the Commie Empire thought they should appeal to 
morality by calling for people to engage in sacrifice for the greater good. They gave endless, 
droning speeches about the inevitably of communist triumph, based on the Hegelian 
dialectic. Not only were they wrong: their approach to selling their theory was not clever 
enough. American propagandists would have been able to maintain communism a little 
longer. They would have scrapped all the theory and focused on appealing images. Though 
the Communists tried to do this through huge, flag-waving rallies, the disparity between 
their alleged ideals and the reality they created was just too great. 
The credibility of the speaker and the audience’s attitude towards the message are 
influenced negatively if a message is categorized as propaganda, so most people are averse 
to being branded as propagandists. Consequently, more desirable labels are constructed 
by those who in fact produce propaganda. It is normally very poor propaganda if the 
source itself acknowledges that it is in fact disseminating propaganda. In recent decades, 
“spin” has become a common term in civil society, especially in politics. Spin involves 
manipulation of political information and is frequently applied by political figures and 
parties. Spin has to do with “selling” politics. It operates in a grey zone between rhetoric 
and propaganda. The term “spin doctor” refers to communication experts and advisors 
who specialize in “spinning” information about their clients. The intrusion of public 
relations into politics means that governing now includes conducting a permanent 
“spinning” campaign. 
One tyrant who did take American propaganda to heart was Adolph Hitler. Hitler 
learned to admire American propaganda through a young American expatriate who 
described to him, in glowing detail, how Americans enjoyed the atmosphere at football 
games. This American expatriate, with the memorable name of Ernst "Putzi" 
Hanfstängl113, told the Führer how Americans could be whipped up into frenzy through 
                                                           
113 Ernst Franz Sedgwick Hanfstaengl (Munich, February 2, 1887 - November 6, 1975) worked for both Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt and Adolf Hitler. 
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blaring music, group cheers, and chants against the enemy. Hitler, genius of evil as he was, 
immediately saw the value in this form of propaganda and incorporated it into his own 
rise to power. Prior to Hitler, German political rhetoric was dry, intellectual, and 
uninspiring. Hitler learned the value of spectacle in whipping up the emotions; the famed 
Nuremberg rallies were really little more than glorified football halftime shows. Rejecting 
boring, intellectual rhetoric, Hitler learned to appeal to deeply emotional but meaningless 
phrases, like the appeal to "blood and soil." The German people bought it wholesale. Hitler 
also called for blind loyalty to the "Fatherland," which eerily echoes our own new cabinet 
level post of "Homeland" Security. 
If you study Nazi propaganda, you will be struck by how well it appeals to gut-
level emotions and images—but not thought. You will see pictures of elderly German 
women hugging fresh-faced young babies, with captions about the bright future the 
Führer has brought to German. In fact, German propaganda borrowed the American 
technique of relying, not so much on words, but on images alone: pictures of handsome 
German soldiers, sturdy peasants in native costume, and the like. Take a look at any 
American car commercial featuring rugged farmers tossing bales of hay into the backs of 
their pickups, and you’ve seen the source from which the Nazis borrowed their 
propaganda techniques. 
The Germans have a well-deserved reputation for producing a lot of really smart 
people, but this did not prevent them from being completely vulnerable to American-style 
propaganda. Amazingly, a nation raised on the greatest classical music, the profoundest 
scientists, the greatest poets, actually fell for propaganda that led them into a hopeless, 
two-front war against most of the world. Being smart is, in itself, no defense against 
skilled American propaganda, unless you know and understand the techniques, so you can 
resist them. 
American politicians learned, early in the twentieth century, that using emotional 
sales techniques won elections. Furthermore, they learned that emotional appeals got 
them what they wanted as they advanced towards their long-term goal of becoming 
Masters of the Universe. From this, we get our modern lexicon of political speech, 
carefully crafted to appeal to powerful emotions, with either no appeal to reason, or 
(better yet) a vague appeal to something that sounds foggily reasonable, but is so obscure 
that no one will bother to dissect it. 
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Franklin Roosevelt understood this, which is why he called for Social Security. 
Security is an emotional appeal: no one is against security, are they? Roosevelt backed up 
his campaign with a masterful appeal to emotions: images of happy, elderly grandparents 
smiling while hugging their grandchildren, with everything in the world going right 
because of Social Security. All kinds of government programs were sold on the basis of 
appealing images and phrases. Roosevelt even appealed to America’s traditional love of 
freedom, spinning that term by multiplying it into new Freedoms, including Freedom from 
Want and Freedom from Fear. Well, what heartless human being could possibly be 
against that? The Freedoms were promoted with images of parents tucking their children 
cozily into bed, and a happy family gathered around a Thanksgiving dinner, obviously free 
from want. The campaign was also based on that most powerful of all selling emotions: 
fear. If you don’t support Social Security, the ads suggested, you will live your last years in 
utter destitution. 
Both German and American politicians carried the use of banners to new heights. 
Flags are impressive emotional symbols, particularly when waved by thousands of 
enthusiastic people: it’s a rare individual who can resist the collective enthusiasm of 
thousands of his fellow human beings, cheering about their collective greatness. Putzi 
Hanfstängl understood this, advising Hitler to fill his public spectacles with not just a few, 
but countless thousands of swastika flags. The swastika, too, was a brilliant stroke of 
advertising and propaganda: it has become, in the public consciousness, the official 
emblem of Nazism, even though it had nothing to do with Germany. In fact, swastikas 
were used by ancient Hindus and American tribes, but I’m not aware of it being used by 
anyone in Germany prior to Hitler.114 
Now observe how Americans during 9/11 crisis have taken to displaying huge flags 
on their cars. Flags are not rational arguments; they are instruments for whipping up the 
Madness of Crowds. Observe how many Americans have, with a straight face, called for a 
constitutional amendment to outlaw flag desecration, oblivious to the obvious 
contradictions such an amendment would have with the rest of the Constitution. But 
                                                           
114 Those skeptical to any kind of propaganda should recall that it was widely employed by both sides in the world wars 
of the 20th century, and it played a crucial role in curbing international Communism during the Cold War. If a nation 
wants to succeed in war, it would be negligent and precarious not to make use of propaganda. (Brown, Roger (1958): 
Words and Things. New York: Free Press of Glencoe). 
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again, if you learn nothing else about propaganda, learn that it must not appeal to 
rationality. 
This brings us to the latest iteration of masterful American Propaganda: the War 
on Terrorism. Any attempt to explain why the terrorists (crazed as they obviously were) 
felt motivated to attack the World Trade Centre is looked on as "siding with the 
terrorists." Indeed, Ashcroft and Bush have said, in so many words, that if you don’t 
support them in everything they do, you stand with the terrorists. Ashcroft and Bush have 
evidently studied their propaganda lessons from World War II, when Roosevelt silenced 
all opposition by accusing anyone who stood against him of undermining the war effort. 
Anyone who suggests we should not risk World War III by invading the Middle East is 
alternately accused of siding with the terrorists, of slandering the memory of those who 
died, or (of course) of not "standing by our boys" in times of great need. It’s easy to feel 
alienated in a nation of flag-wavers singing patriotic hymns. The fact that they are 
marching lockstep to a world in which the government will monitor their e-mail, snoop 
into their bank accounts, and eventually throw them in jail for voicing opposition doesn’t 
seem to bother them one bit. 
4. ANALYTICAL APPROACH 
 
The following speech analysis will focus upon addresses made mainly by the 
President between September 12, 2002 and March 17, 2003. The President’s September 12, 
2002 speech to the United Nations can be seen as the moment at which President Bush 
garnered the complete focus of the world upon the Iraq issue. On the other hand, March 
17, 2003, seemed a fitting place to stop the analysis of the speeches, not because the 
President significantly changed his approach thereafter, but rather because it was on that 
date that the deadline for Saddam Hussein to abdicate power and leave Iraq to avoid war 
was set (and ignored by the Iraqi Leader). 
In addition there are some speeches before that date that were included just to 
establish a contrast. If speeches about Iraq and Saddam Hussein  were very easy to find in 
the period above mentioned, the second period ones were much more difficult to choose as 
the president did not talk that much about Iraq in that period. 
Because the President spoke on the issue nearly every day during the given second 
time period (sometimes multiple times in the same day), and his message and approach 
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remained solidly consistent, it was possible for the purposes of this study to select 
representative speeches for analysis. A total of twenty eight speeches 115 are referenced in 
this study, chosen for their significance, or overall representative nature. The inclusion of 
every speech would have been superfluous as the President spoke on the issue in one form 
or another on a daily basis with each speech mirroring the others.  
Another factor that was used to select this “Linguistic Corpus” was intuition. This 
criterium may seem a bit inadequate for a scientific study, nevertheless, as Bowker and 
Pearson (2002)116 point out, one should “use your intuition to a certain extent; however a 
corpus can provide you with means of backing up this intuition”.  The same authors also 
mention that when we “…Look at the terms in context will help you to learn more about 
their meaning and behaviour.” Biber’s (1988) text analyses looking at differences between 
speech and writing have already shown that specific lexicogrammar is present or absent in 
particular genres and propaganda is no exception to this. Therefore, the occurrence of 
certain language can help us to analyse what is happening in the speeches examined. 
Sinclair117 (2004) gives us a very clear demonstration of how texts can have communicative 
impact through corpus analyses and tells us (2004:117) of Fairclough’s attempt to analyse 
phrases in texts to support his suppositions. As Fairclough is involved most closely with 
the place of language in social relations of power and ideology and has himself analysed 
Blair’s speeches in (2005) Blair’s contribution to elaborating a new ‘doctrine of international 
community’ looking at the various techniques he used, the use of corpora for the analysis of 
propaganda can be seen to be a relevant and significant tool.  
 
As Sinclair says (2004:119): 
“It is difficult to conceive of a communicative process in a speech community whereby a word expressing 
a concept that had unpleasant consequences for the majority of citizens always occurred in benign and 
                                                           
115
 A total of 20 speeches are used from the period between September 12, 2002 and March 17, 2003 and 8 were chosen 
from a period before that date when President Bush did not so incisively “speak” about the Iraq Issue. From October 20, 
2001 to August, 16, 2002 one speech per month is used in the study  (except speeches from January,   February   and  
June ,2001). 
116 Bowker, Lynn & Jennifer Pearson (2002) Working with specialized language: a practical guide to using corpora, 
London: Routledge 
 
117 Sinclair, John McHardy, (2004) Trust the text. Language, corpus and discourse , London: Routledge  
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uplifting contexts, unless the speech community was created by George Orwell, and all communication 
was under strict control.” 
 
Bowker and Pearson defined a “Linguistic Corpus” as being “a body of text”, an  
“example of real ‘live’ language, (…) naturally occurring and has not been created for the express purpose of 
being included in a corpus to demonstrate a particular point, (…) a  text in electronic form (…) processed by 
computer” that  “should not be necessarily be seen as a replacement for all other types of resources. (…) … 
intuition or dictionary use may lead you to come up with a hypothesis that can be further investigated”. 
  
 By joining together the “Jowett and O’Donnell” perspective and the “corpus 
analysis approach as referred to by Bowker and Pearson above, we can more easily identify 
and highlight particular aspects of a speech as they complement each other. On the one 
hand we have a more qualitative approach provided by “Jowett and O’Donnell” and on the 
other hand we can use the corpus perspective in order to quantify some items. Where one 
perspective may lack some effectiveness in providing results, the other may help to clarify 
that situation. 
 Having set this analytical context, there is only one element missing that is the 
element of comparison. In order to be able to compare Bush’s speeches so that the 
techniques he uses are highlighted I have included an element previously referenced in this 
dissertation: Hitler’s speeches. 
 It is well known, and it has been mentioned before that Hitler was a “Master of 
Propaganda”. In order to support this point of view I will use the corpus analysis approach 
to prove it and at the same time to show an alternative to the “Jowett and O’Donnell” 
perspective, previously heavily referenced. 
 A study like this demands the following stages: 
 
1. Choose the Corpus (Hitler’s speeches); 
2. Narrow de Corpus (Limit the time period118); 
3. Make a “Guide Question”; 
4. Search for “key” words while reading the Corpus; 
5. Adapt the chosen “Key” words to the selected  Propaganda techniques; 
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6. Narrow the “key” word number (personal choice/intuition); 
7. Use SCP 4.08 program to search for relevant “key” word collocations and word 
counting; 
8. Make tables with relevant “key” words; 
9. Answer the “Guide Question119” in order to reach a conclusion.  
 
The following table is used to highlight points 1 and 2: 
 
Size 75687 Tokens / 5876 Keys 
Nº of Texts 23 
Medium Written Speeches 
Subject Political Propaganda 
Text Type Public Speeches 
Authorship Adolf Hitler   
Language English (translated from German) 
Date Between 1922 and 1934 
 
The research question demanded by point number 3 is quite clearly: “Did Hitler use 
any propaganda techniques?” 
Stages 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 demand a selective process and the intuition referred to 
above. The choices are my responsibility although the use of pronouns (we/they) has 
already been widely discussed as a technique to include/exclude. These criteria and 
personal experiences resulted in the following list: 
                                                                                                                                                                                
118 The chosen time frame is the period between 1922 and  1934, a time when Hitler used huge propaganda resources in 
order to reach the power. We must never forget that he was democratically elected. 
119 A “Guide Question” is the question that sets up the entire study. Based on it the first hypothesis will be established 
and the rest of the study is used to back-up the hypothesis or to counter it.  
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(In Brackets:  here is the number of times the word appears in the “Linguistic Corpus”) 
 
We have now reached point 9. At this stage we will effectively prove whether 
Propaganda Techniques can or cannot be identified.  Let’s start with two techniques that 
are very closely connected and that are frequently used as one in order to maximize effects: 
“Bandwagon” and “Plain Folks”. 
►Us (213) ►Equal(48)
►We(721) ►Honest*(27)
►Our(551) ►God(18)
►Million(138) ►Democra*(64)
►Thousand(56) ►Victory(25)
►Hundred(22) ►Christ*(33)
►German* (782) ►Justice(17)
►Nation(745) ►Race(59)
►Together(27) ►True/Truth(43/20)
►Rights(41) ►Destiny(25)
►Freedom(44) ►Future(49)
►Supremacy(16) ►Cannot(117)
►Honor(41) ►Renewal(5)
►Principles(28) ►Fate(38)
►Ignorant(2) ►Ruin(38)
►Agitator(11) ►Jew(120)
►Traitor(7) ►Sacrifice(33)
►They(369) ►Parasites(1)
►Them(219) ►Dishonest(2)
►Their(338) ►Coward(11)
►Terrorist(1) ►Group(40)
►Puppet(1) ►Communist(10)
►Struggle(65) ►Great(182)
►Revolution(75)
List of “Key words”
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 Generally “Bandwagon” can be defined as the appeal to one of our most intimate 
desires, the desire “to follow the crowd”. When using this technique, the speaker hires a 
hall, rents radio stations, fills a great stadium, marches a million or at least a lot of men in a 
parade. He employs symbols, colours, music, movement, all the dramatic arts. He gets us 
to write letters, to send telegrams, to contribute to his cause. As I have mentioned 
previously, if “Everyone else is doing it, then so should you”.  
 However the speaker must be astute enough not to create a gap between the 
“crowd” and himself. This is where the “Plain Folks” technique comes in. By using the 
“Plain-folks” strategy, speakers attempt to convince their audience that they, and their 
ideas, are "of the people." Common ties are then created ( of course, many times these are 
fake and artificial bonds).  
 Adolf Hitler used these devices. The following table provides proof of it: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(In Brackets:  here is the number of times the word appears in the "Linguistic Corpus") 
 
 As we can see through a brief analysis of the table, words with a meaning of 
“inclusion” were very frequently used by Hitler in his speeches. “Us”, “We” and “Our” can 
transmit that sense of amalgamation and unanimity. Statistically the set of words above 
mentioned represents 3.8% of the tokens used. 
Us 213 
we 721 
Our 551 
Million (related to German 
people) 
138 
Thousand (related to German 
people) 
53 
Hundred( Related to German 
people) 
22 
German 426 
Nation* 745 
(Al)together 29 
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 That may not seem a lot but in fact it is. Only “Grammar words”, which are in every 
text the most frequently used ones, can compete with that group. The following graph 
provides a clear view of this situation:    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another two techniques very intimately connected are “Euphemisms” and 
“Glittering Generalities”. With the usage of these strategies combined, the speaker 
attempts to pacify the audience in order to make an unpleasant reality more pleasant. 
Since our first and natural reaction is to assume that the speaker is using a particular word 
or concept in our sense, we become more vulnerable and an understanding is created 
between the audience and the speaker. In these situations once again the speaker will have 
to be very careful not to disturb this climate of empathy.  
However some situations are unavoidable and when the propagandist has no other 
way but to approach some potentially unpleasant critical issues, he has to make that 
reality less cruel or risk a fracture in the empathetic mood of the audience. He is only able 
to do that by using words that have been ameliorated and in this way will not scratch the 
audience’s emotions. 
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Hitler did that mainly by using the following set of words: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1% of the words Hitler used in his speeches had an ameliorated usage, conveyed a 
sense of security and trust or contributed to the establishment of an empathetic mood. 
 Following this line of thought, it is quite obvious that words that provide negative 
feelings must be avoided. Sometimes it is better not to use “offensive” words against our  
Great 182 
Rights 40 
Freedom 39 
Honor 52 
Principles 79 
Equal (related to people or 
rights) 
48 
Honesty 27 
God 18 
Democracy 37 
Victory 25 
Supremacy 29 
Christ* 33 
Justice 17 
Race 63 
True/truth 43/20 
Destiny 25 
1,0%
0,0%
0,5%
1,0%
1,5%
%
% of  tokens
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Opponents than use them and risk breaking a compassionate ambiance. If a speaker can 
transmit his ideas without offending his opponents he can only benefit from that situation. 
Our subject certainly did this as these words statistically are not significant. Name Calling 
was not openly used. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0,9%
0,0%
0,0%
0,1%
0,2%
0,3%
0,4%
0,5%
0,6%
0,7%
0,8%
0,9%
1,0%
%
NC1 NC2
% of  tokens
(In brackets: here is the number of times a word was used to offend the “Jews”, who were the main Hitler’s target 
identified in the graph as NC2) 
 
Ignorant 2 (0)
Agitators 11(7)
Traitor 7(5)
Jew (in an offensive 
context)
120
They 369(242)
Them 219(148)
Their 338(221)
Parasites 1
Dishonest 4(3)
Coward 0
Group 40(29)
Communis* (in an 
offensive context)
30(23)
Puppet 1(0)
Terrorist 0
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In contrast to “Name Calling”, “Fear” is always useful if your idea is to direct 
someone’s path. By putting fear into people they will tend to rely on the speaker’s 
warnings in order to feel safe. To avoid  “the disaster  that will result if they do not follow a 
particular course of action”, the speaker is able to input a predisposition in the crowd to 
follow his directions. Nobody wants to face or be held responsible for the consequences or 
actions that may allow someone else to hurt the “motherland”. When someone has been 
“FUDed” that means that that person is full of Fears, Doubts and Uncertainties, 
consequently he or she is in the ideal position to be easily led down a certain path. That is 
the reason why words like the following ones appear in speeches: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(In brackets: here is the number of times the particular word is used in the “Fear” context of occurrence) 
 
 
As we have seen, many times two or more techniques are combined to achieve 
“maximum power”. By analyzing the tables of “Bandwagon” plus “PlainFolks” and “Name 
Calling” we can reach a broader conclusion that at the same time is a Propaganda Strategy: 
Hitler divided the German society into two groups. In the first group “Us”, “We”, “Our” 
and “German” are included. This group excludes the elements of the second group: “Jew”, 
“they”, “them” and “their”. The separation between Ingroup and Outgroup is created in 
this way. At the same time this separation has implicit references to the “Name Calling” 
technique. As I said before it was not openly used. That does not mean it was not used at 
all. It just means that it was used in a non blatant but subsumed way. Hitler said it 
himself: 
Must (suggest course of action) 276(201)
Future 49(38)
Cannot (reject wrong path) 117(99)
Renewal 5
Revolution* 75(43)
Fate 38(21)
Ruin* 38(19)
Jew (as a threat) 120(120)
Sacrifice 33(25)
0,8%
0,0%
0,2%
0,4%
0,6%
0,8%
%
% of  tokens
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“All propaganda must be so popular and on such an intellectual level, that even the most 
stupid of those towards whom it is directed will understand it…Through clever and constant application 
of propaganda, people can be made to see paradise as hell, and also the other way around…” 
 
To delegate someone or some group to ostracism is similar to stereotyping and 
reductive terms of society. To define someone as the “Other” is a process of exclusion and 
demonizing the enemy.  
This is the point where I will stop with the analysis of Hitler’s speeches. The last 
conclusion I draw is based on “numbers” but they started to include other factors beyond 
“number of words”. This is the where the “Jowett and O’Donnell” approach begins to be 
useful. As I have shown before it is a method that is prepared to deal with other types of 
information. Numbers are essential, no doubt about that, however some Propaganda 
Techniques are difficult to analyze just by counting words or word collocation. The 
following graph is very useful to draw conclusions, however it is not enough… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Bandwagon, Plain Folks, Euphemisms, Glittering Generalities, Fear, Inclusion and 
Exclusion and Subsumed Name Calling were techniques frequently used by Hitler as can 
be seen from these results.  
 “The size of a lie is a definite factor in causing it to be believed, for the vast masses of 
a nation are in depths of their hearts more easily deceived than they are consciously bad.” 
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 Does anyone doubt that he also used Logical Fallacies, Emotional Appeals, 
Numeric Deceptions, Transfer or any other techniques ? I don’t think so, that is why when 
analyzing Bush’s speeches I will use “Bowker and Pearson” for a more quantitative 
approach and the “Jowett and O’Donnell” model for a more qualitative one. 
 The first stage of this analysis must be based on “Bowker and Pearson”. It is 
necessary to establish the initial stages and steps. Once again I need to: 
 
1. Choose the Corpus (Bush’s speeches); 
2. Narrow de Corpus (Limit the time period120); 
3. Make a “Guide Question”: “Which techniques did Bush use?”; 
4. Search for “key” words while reading the Corpus; 
5. Adapt the chosen “Key” words to the selected  Propaganda techniques; 
6. Narrow the “key” word number; 
7. Use SCP 4.08 program to search for relevant “key” word collocations and word 
counting; 
8. Make tables with relevant “key” words; 
9. Answer the “Guide Question” in order to reach a conclusion. 
4.1.  The chosen Narrowed Corpus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
120
 Previously mentioned 
Size 44245 Tokens /4684 Keys
Nº of Texts 28
Medium Written Speeches
Subject Political Propaganda
Text Type Public Speeches
Authorship George Walker Bush
Language U.S English 
Date Between 20 October. 2001 and 17 March, 2003
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4.2. The Guide Question 
 
 
 “Which techniques did Bush use?” 
4.3. The chosen key words and their frequency 
 
List of “Key words” 
Can (142) America*(319) 
Must(161) Iraq(305) 
Should(33) We (576) 
Security(155) Us(94) 
Freedom(66) You(228) 
I(349) They(177) 
Me(30) Them(105) 
Applause(265) Their(154) 
Islam(2) Afghanistan(37) 
Terror(268) Saddam(98) + He(249) 
Threat(132) Dictator(37) 
Kill(39) Osama Bin Laden(0) 
Al Qaeda(28) Free(111) 
Weapons(160) War(116) 
Destruction(52) God(18) 
Securuty Council(51) Know(82) 
Regime(162) Chemical(43) 
Nation(65) Biological(43) 
U.N (61) Will(399) 
United Nations(70) Risk(14) 
 Inspect*(75) Murder*(26) 
World(215) Great(87) 
Right*(45) Our(475) 
Justice(19) People(252) 
Together(35) Future(44) 
Peace (125) Congress(87) 
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4.4.  The analysis 
 
 
  AS was done with Hitler’s speeches, I will start to analyze the usage of 
“Bandwagon” and “Plain Folks” and for the same reasons: they are easy to identify, easy to 
use, frequently used and extremely effective. 
 Like Hitler, George Bush promoted the inclusion and unanimity of Americans 
against someone else.  
 
Us 94
we 576
Our 475
America* 34
Together 35
You 228
I 349
Applause 245
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The first results of this analysis are impressive. 4.6 % of the words used in these 
speeches can be used to create the “Bandwagon” and “Plain Folks” effects. I am talking 
about a real number of 2036 words in a total of 44245. I have included the word “applause” 
because the number of times there is “applause” is important in a speech. Applause is not a 
“spoken” word but in this case it works as an interactive element of communion between 
the speaker and his audience. It is also relevant to notice that the empathetic link is 
established. There is applause 245 times in 28 speeches. Bush was applauded almost 10 
times per speech. That is significant especially as the speeches are not very long. 
Compared to Hitler’s speeches, they can be considered small. The biggest difference 
between Hitler and Bush while using Bandwagon and Plain Folks is in the integration of 
the words “I” and “You”. Hitler preferred “Us”, “We” and “Our” but Bush takes the 
technique one step further and personalizes the question by including himself with “I” in 
the middle of the crowd referenced as making in this way a stronger “You” “We” and 
“Our”. Patriotic references are not as heavily used as Hitler did either. At this time no 
Patriotic Appeals were necessary as the U.S were completely united against terror due to 
the 9/11 events and the President had full support from all sectors of American society. 
 In order to reinforce this strategy, some “Numeric Deceptions” were used. On the 
eve of war, just two days after the last speech analyzed, the U.S. announced that it had 
about 30 nations supporting it, in a "coalition of the willing" offering various means of 
support. Yet, the radio show Democracy Now! (March 19, 2003) highlighted some strange 
factors in this support: 
• The list (of nations making up the coalition) included Britain, Spain and Australia, 
as well as Turkey, Afghanistan, South Korea, Japan, Colombia, Italy and others. 
- Of these nations, only two, Britain and Australia had planned to supply troops; 
- The Washington Post reported that some of the countries were surprised by their 
inclusion. A senior diplomat at Colombia's embassy was unaware that his nation 
had been listed; 
 - Turkey had voted against allowing US troops to be deployed there; 
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 - 95% of the Spanish population was against a US invasion of Iraq, despite its 
 government's support; 
  - The list didn’t include any governments in the Arab world; 
Texas Democrat Lloyd Doggett criticized the so-called coalition: He said "the posse 
announced today is mighty weak. It includes such military powerhouses as Eritrea and 
Estonia and pariahs like Uzbekistan with a human rights record as difficult to defend as 
Saddam Hussein's."121 The Congressman added, "This list is an embarrassing indication of 
the administration's foreign policy failure."122 
Later, this number increased to 50. However, some nations wanted to remain 
anonymous, while others did not wish to be on it at all… 
 In addition, as Jan Oberg123 of the Swedish research organization, Transnational 
Foundation for Peace and Future Research, says that given that 95.8% of the troops come 
from four countries (U.S., U.K., Australia and Poland), "It would be more appropriate to 
call the aggressors the Gang of Four." And while polls can always be questioned, there 
were large numbers of people turning out in protests, vigils and demonstrations in various 
places. Falsehoods ranging from exaggeration to plain dishonesty were used to make the 
case for war. 
Hitler used the Fear technique as did Bush.  George Bush often resorted to the use 
of the Fear technique as his entire case against Iraq was made upon the assumption that 
Iraq possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction that could threaten almost everyone, 
anywhere in the world. This threat was made even worse when it was implied that 
together with WMD, Iraq possessed Biological and Chemical weapons.  I don’t think there 
is anything scarier than being threatened by Biological or Chemical devices. Just the mere 
usage of these two terms is enough to make the bravest soldier Fear for his own life. Since 
their large scale use in the First World War by Germany against the allies to the horrible 
images gathered of the Kurdish villagers killed by biological weapons everyone has feared 
their use. More than death, these weapons can cause suffering. Images of suffering have a 
more demoralizing effect than an image of a dead body. 
                                                           
121 As U.S. names 30 countries supposedly supporting war, protests intensify, Democracy Now!, March 19, 2003 
122 As U.S. names 30 countries supposedly supporting war, protests intensify, Democracy Now!, March 19, 2003 
123 Oberg, Jan, (2003) “Coalition of Willing” or  Gang of Four”, Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future 
Research, March 
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Most research on the effects of emotional appeals in persuasion has focused on fear 
arousal. This technique is one of the most commonly used in attempts to change attitudes. 
Does fear arousal work? It all depends on “the extent to which fear influences people’s ability to pay 
attention to and process the arguments in a message.”124 Studies by Petty and Rogers found that, “If 
a moderate amount of fear is created and people believe that listening to the message will 
teach them how to reduce this fear, they will be motivated to analyze the message 
carefully, changing their attitudes via the central route.”125 However, if the audience is not 
given specific recommendations to help them reduce the fear, the message will be 
ineffective because the audience will tune it out. 
Researchers also found that fear-arousing appeals will fail if “they are so strong as to make 
people feel very threatened.”126 The persuadees will become defensive and will deny the 
importance of the threat, therefore becoming unable to think rationally about the issue.127 
Here is how Bush used Fear: 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
124 Simons, Herbert W. et al (2001), Persuasion in Society;  London, Sage , p 35 
125 Simons, Herbert W. et al (2001), Persuasion in Society;  London, Sage , p 35 
126 Simons, Herbert W. et al (2001), Persuasion in Society;  London, Sage , p 36 
Must (suggest course of action) 161 
Future 44 
Weapons 160 
Chemical 43 
Biological 43 
Terror* 268 
Threat 132 
Will 399 
War 116 
Destruction 52 
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Once again a significant percentage of words is used to maximize effects. 3.2% of 
Bush’s words are used to input Fear into his audience and then to suggest a course of 
action. “Terror” and its derivatives are most frequent (there was no other possible word to 
place in first place) and are only passed by the words that are used to convey a course of 
action “Will” and “Must”. 
 George Bush in this way tried to demonize the enemy. As we have seen before, he 
was able, by using a “Transfer Strategy” to transfer these fears towards Saddam Hussein 
and Iraq. Iraq was held responsible for the 9/11 events and not Osama Bin Laden.  He did it 
like this: 
 
Iraq 305 Afghanistan 37 
Saddam 98 Osama Bin Laden 0 
He (referring to Saddam) 249 Al Qaeda 28 
Dictator (Referring to 
Saddam) 37    
Total 689 Total 65 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                
127 Simons, Herbert W. et al (2001), Persuasion in Society;  London, Sage , p 36 
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Iraq and Saddam clearly beat Afghanistan and Bin Laden as the following graph 
shows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
In addition, several other strategies were used to demonize Iraq. In a context where 
someone would have to pay the consequences for the 9/11 events, Iraq, the weakest link, 
was the object of a Demonization Campaign. 
 A supposed meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta, leader of the 11 
September hijackers, and an Iraqi intelligence official was the main basis for this claim, but 
Czech intelligence later conceded that the Iraqi's contact could not have been Atta. This 
did not stop the constant stream of assertions that Iraq was involved in 9/11, which was so 
successful that at one stage opinion polls showed that about two-thirds of Americans 
believed the hand of Saddam Hussein was behind the attacks. Almost as many believed 
Iraqi hijackers were aboard the crashed airliners; in fact there were none.  
 The US persistently alleged that Baghdad tried to buy high-strength aluminium 
tubes whose only use could be in gas centrifuges, needed to enrich uranium for nuclear 
weapons. Equally persistently, the International Atomic Energy Agency said the tubes 
were being used for artillery rockets. The head of the IAEA, Mohamed El Baradei, told the 
UN Security Council in January that the tubes were not even suitable for centrifuges.  
 Iraq possessed enough dangerous substances to kill the whole world, it was alleged 
more than once. It had aeroplanes and pilots which could be smuggled into the US and be 
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used to spray chemical and biological toxins. Experts pointed out that apart from mustard 
gas, Iraq never had the technology to produce materials for 12 years, the time between the 
two wars. All such agents would have deteriorated to the point of uselessness years ago.  
In America much was made of substances like ricin that had been detected in letters to the 
Senate and the White House in 2004, despite the fact that there appeared to be no actual 
casualties resulting from these.   
 Iraq retained up to 20 missiles which could carry chemical or biological warheads, 
with a range which would threaten British forces in Cyprus was claimed in a similar way.  
 Apart from the fact that there was no sign of those missiles since the invasion, 
Britain downplayed the risk of there being any such weapons in Iraq once the fighting 
began. It was also revealed that chemical protection equipment was removed from British 
bases in Cyprus, which indicates that the Government did not take its own claims 
seriously.  
 When a Propagandist tries to demonize his enemy and input fear to his audience, 
he generally also uses the other side of the coin. That is, when not referring to his “enemy”, 
he will be tempted to use words with a more favourable tone not to intimidate his 
“target’s” supporters. This is where “Euphemisms” and “Glittering Generalities” come in.  
 The usage of emotionally suggestive words in order to appeal to the audience’s 
feelings and emotions is an essential issue in modern propaganda. Emotional appeals are 
the strongest ones. They do not resort to our brain, instead they come from the heart 
which makes them impulsive and very difficult to fight against.  In the majority of times 
emotion beats reason. 
Great 87 
Right* 45 
Free* 177 
Security 155 
U.N 61 
United Nations 70 
Nation 65 
God 18 
Together 35 
Know 82 
Justice 19 
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President Bush doesn’t invoke the deity. He prefers to trust in the “Great” 
“American” People, in concepts of “Freedom” and in “security”, backed up by the United 
Nations. All of these concepts are substantiated by “Knowledge”. 
He presents himself as someone who personifies a nation on behalf of which acts of 
support, commitment, bravery, and sacrifice have been performed. He thus incarnates all 
the people who have done these things and all of their acts. He also emphasizes the shared 
effort of all the people he acknowledges, displaying the unity of his side. And by thanking 
members of his "team" he displays both his collaborators' unity and their subordination to 
him. Here are some examples of these techniques:  
 
“I appreciate the contributions of time, the contributions of blood to help our fellow 
Americans who have been injured, and I'm proud of the Muslim leaders across America who have risen 
up and who have not only insisted that America be strong, but that America keep the values intact that 
have made us so unique and different, the values of respect, values of freedom to worship the way we see 
fit. And I also appreciate the prayers to the universal god"128 
"Our enemies fear a society which is pluralistic and open to worship an almighty God. Our 
enemies are right to fear open societies because those societies leave no room for bigotry and tyranny. 
The promise of our time has no room for the vision of the Taliban or Al Qaeda"129 
 
In the following quote, he refers to "let’s roll," a phrase often quoted in the 
newspapers, that was expressed by one of the victims that forced the crash of one of the 
hijacked planes on September 11, thus killing himself and the other passengers, but 
perhaps preventing a larger catastrophe: 
 
"I see a great opportunity when I see moms and dads spend more time with their children here 
at home. I see, out of this sadness and grief, an opportunity for America to re-examine our culture, to 
re-examine how we view the need to help people in need whether it be in our own neighbourhood and 
around the world. I see, out of this evil, will come good, not only here at home, as youngsters all of a 
sudden understand the definition of sacrifice, the sacrifice of those brave souls on Flight 93, who after 
the 23rd Psalm said, 'let's roll' to save America" .130  
                                                           
128 Bush, George W. (2002), State of the Union Address. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Bush, George W. (2002), State of the Union Address.  
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 When playing with emotions, Glittering Generalities or Euphemisms are far from 
being alone in the race. Cynicism plays a very important role in this area. This technique 
plays on Human Biases.  Cynicism is behind the theory that other people’s actions are 
motivated by self-interested reasons in opposition to our unselfish motivation. 
 The evidence about Iraq's intent to attack seems to have run something like this: 
Saddam "gassed his own people" in 1988, therefore there is an imminent threat that he will 
attack us in 2003. The imminent threat is not, however, so severe as to keep the US from 
having a full year of warmongering and bellicose rhetoric before they actually attack. 
 This cynically ignores the central fact about Hussein's record of aggression. 
Without exception, his worst crimes were committed with full U.S. support, both 
material and diplomatic. The war on Iran, the massacre of Kurds in the Anfal campaign of 
the late 1980's, even the bloody suppression in 1991 of the "Iraqi intifada" all involved 
explicit measures of support from the United States - providing military intelligence, 
approving export of chemical and biological agents, providing "agricultural" credits, 
disarming rebels, and much more. It is my opinion that the invasion of Kuwait was done in 
the deliberately fostered belief that the United States would not mind. 
 Cynicism is very difficult to quantify in terms of “word number” that is the reason I 
preferred a descriptive approach. 
 In the frontiers of Cynicism is the usage of “Inclusion” and “Exclusion” words. In a 
subsumed way Bush established a target and excluded it from the “goodies” into the 
“baddies”. The following table shows that at the same time that Bush transmitted an 
internal message of union and communion, he clearly highlighted Iraq as his target 
country:   
  
 
 
 
 
 
America* 319 Iraq 305 
We 576 They 177 
Us 94 Them 105 
You 228 Their 154 
I 349 Regime 162 
Me 30 Dictator 37 
Our 475 Saddam 98 
  He 249 
  Afghanistan 37 
  Al Qaeda 28 
Total 2071 Total 1352 
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As I have mentioned previously, after the 9/11 events, the Bush administration 
clearly transferred the guilt for the 9/11 events to a target scape Goat group that was held 
responsible for those terrible events – Al-Qaeda and its supporters, mainly Iraq and 
Afghanistan, later replaced by Saddam Hussein and Iraq.  
The separation between “us” and “them” is already a classic device of propaganda. 
To the term “us” is always given the best attributes, the term “Them” is the “Bad Guy”. By 
clearly demarcating two distinct sides to the global perspective, Bush left no room for 
different interpretations, resorting to his favourite slogan: ‘you are either with us or you 
are with the terrorists’. 
 This simplistic perspective positioned the United States as the bastion of goodness 
and righteousness in the world and as defender of democracy and human rights. American 
leadership emerged then as the only viable option for the world.  
The President used the modal verb “will” 399 times. That is significant in the ears 
of his rebel audiences, as he highlighted the righteousness inherent in an American 
leadership to guide the rest of the world down the correct path and seemed to almost 
benevolently grant UN members the right to decide to side with the United States. “By 
heritage and by choice, the United States of America will make that stand. And, delegates to the United 
Nations, you have the power to make that stand, as well”.131  
                                                           
131 Bush, President George W., President Discusses Growing Danger posed by Saddam Hussein's Regime, Washington, 
DC. 14th September 2002 
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The modal “will” both convey the idea of “willingness” when referring to himself or 
to the U.S or the idea of “I know what they will do next” when used to refer to the “other”.  
This righteousness and willingness is supported by a Transfer strategy and by 
another modal verb: “can”. By transferring the authority and prestige of something the 
audience respects, admires and submits to he wanted us to accept the view of the U.S. as 
the “Chosen One”. Bush used the United Nations as the entity to give credibility to this 
view of America and by frequently using the modal “can” the idea of “being able to” also 
passes on to the audience. Here are the results for these items: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
But George Bush did not stop  here. He went further and personalized the issue.  
By personalization I mean localizing the attention of the listener on the speaker's 
personality. Bush projects himself as the only person capable of producing results. This 
aspect is reflected in the 349 times he used the Word “I”. 
  In his post-9/11 speech to Congress he said, "I will not forget this wound to our country or 
those who inflicted it. I will not yield; I will not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle 
Can 142 
Will 399 
Security Council 51 
U.N 61 
United Nations 70 
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for freedom and security for the American people." He substituted his determination for that 
of the nation's. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
Words Strain 
Crack and sometimes break, under the burden, 
Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, 
Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place 
Will not stay still. 
- T.S. Eliot 
 
 
Everything belongs together in the human understanding; the obscurity of one 
idea spreads over those that surround it. An error throws shadows over neighbouring 
truths, and if happens that there should be men in society interested in forming, as it 
were, centres of shadow, even the people will find itself plunged into a profound 
darkness. 
- Diderot 
 
The President of the United States of America and many of his top advisers wanted 
to invade and overthrow the government of Saddam Hussein for a long time. But they 
knew they couldn’t sell such a war against Iraq to the majority of Americans and to a 
majority in both houses of Congress if they acknowledged just how pathetically weak and 
unthreatening Iraq really was. If, however, the administration could represent Iraq as an 
imminent, mortal threat to the United States — and even a shadowy partner in crime in 
the terrorist attacks of 9-11 — then a majority of the population might come to see an 
invasion of Iraq not as unprovoked U.S. aggression but as a justified response to what Iraq 
did to the US. And they succeeded in doing just that!  
The U.S attack was then expected because US President George W. Bush had 
warned in several speeches that such an attack would come. “Either you are with us or 
with the terrorists” he said in his television speech of September 20 that was the warning 
of a dichotomized global conflict. He divided the world in two groups, “friends” and 
“enemies”. The attack was also the beginning of “the war on terror”. The question was when 
and where the counterattack would come. A deeper study of these aspects would be very 
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interesting, however it is so vast and has so many ramifications that it would itself be 
enough to an entire new dissertation. 
Although Bush presents himself to the world as a plain-spoken, straight-shooting 
friend of the common man, he regularly uses a variety of techniques to deceive people and 
make them more inclined to trust him. I have shown how he has achieved that, however 
there is more to be uncovered, and there are far more examples than I can include here. 
Let´s consider this the tip of an untrustworthy iceberg worth a deeper analysis.  
Out of the  Core Linguistic Bounds here is what Bush did: he stated as facts what 
were allegations — often highly dubious ones, he deliberately misrepresented Iraq and 
invented facts, he  conveyed a message that the risk of doing nothing, the risk of assuming 
the best of Saddam Hussein wasn’t a risk worth taking,  he put the most frightening 
interpretation on a piece of evidence and pretended that no other interpretation existed, 
he placed Iraq as an imminent nuclear, biological and chemical threat creating fear in the 
minds of American people this way, he created a dichotomy between "us" and "them" that  
involved not only the identification of the two general groups, but also "tagging" them 
emotionally as "good" and "evil" respectively and he denied being the aggressor in the eyes 
of his group of reference by claiming that "we" are the victims and for this reason have the 
moral right and duty to be aggressive toward the enemy. Bush went even further, he 
described the conflict between the two sides as not being between two countries, 
cultures, religions or civilizations but a confrontation between “good” and “evil”.  
Hitler often used the concept of motherland. Bush did the same and created a 
homeland (not to use the “Hitlerian” motherland concept) where the inhabitants had been 
attacked.  
“He knows that we are waging this war for a better peace, that we are fighting for the 
happiness of people who have so often been oppressed by their governments.”132 
 
“No power in the world will make us deny our duty, or forget even for a moment our historical task of 
maintaining the freedom of our people.”133 
 
                                                           
132 Joseph Goebbels, chief Nazi Propagandist 
133 Ibid. 
  
124
 These two statements can be used to illustrate the justification Bush used to make 
war. However they do not belong to Bush.  70 years before, Joseph Goebels used them to 
justify another war: the Second World War. Nazi leader Herman Goering once remarked 
that it was easy to lead people into war, regardless of whether they resided within a 
democracy, a fascist dictatorship, a parliament, or a communist dictatorship.  All that was 
required, Goering argued, was for their government to “tell them they are being attacked, 
and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to greater 
danger”. 
Of all the labels attributed to George W. Bush, one of the worst is certainly the 
comparison with Hitler. The clearest similarity between the two men lies in their use of 
emotionally induced “hypnosis” to plant in the masses an image of themselves as 
protectors of their subjects from threats to national survival both inside and outside the 
“motherland”. 
"The efficiency of the truly national leader consists primarily in preventing the division of 
the attention of the people, and always in concentrating it on a single enemy." 
 
Hitler said this in Mein Kampf. Bush could just as easily have said it. Having lost 
public focus on Osama bin Laden due to his incapacity to capture the 9/11 bombers, he 
found it not just convenient, but also necessary, to select Saddam Hussein as the new 
"single enemy," 
By putting the horror mask on Saddam, by petrifying the U.S. citizens with tales of 
Saddam’s torture chambers and terrorist connections, Bush revitalized and refined an old 
Hitler trick also referred in Mein Kampf. 
"The one means that wins the easiest victory over reason: terror and force."  
Putting his own “spin” on Hitler’s formula, Bush induced fear-of-Saddam in 
Americans to set them up against Iraq. "Axis of evil" - weapons of mass destruction, Iraqi 
terrorists, grave and gathering danger,  all gained dominance in the minds of Americans to 
decoy them to Bush’s side against the evil Saddam.  
Bush’s biggest achievement was to make his audience to think of his war making as 
peace makingThe propaganda techniques discussed can be divided into two groups, one 
which focuses on the qualities of the propagandist and another which focuses on the 
deficiencies of the “other”. The first group contains highlighting its own strength, creating 
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a positive self-image and (positive) description of own activities (euphemisms, glittering 
generalities, emotively favourable words). These devices focused on the positive qualities 
and admirable intentions of the American people. Plain Folks and Band-wagon also belong 
to this group because they were directed toward the Western population. The propaganda 
techniques in the other group, using the other part as a scapegoat, the other is lying, 
alleged intentions, (negative) descriptions of activities, use of stereotypes, use of threats, 
fear and exclusions focused on the negative qualities and horrific actions of the “other”. 
 This two-sided use of the propaganda techniques was to be expected. It is more 
effective to praise one’s own truthfulness while stressing that the other is lying, it is more 
effective to highlight one’s own strength while identifying the weakness of the enemy. 
Such a duality is also natural because the U.S at the time of the 9/11 incidents was a very 
divided society.  These “psi-ops”, the sociological study of the American society, its beliefs, 
culture, fears, hopes, and dreams, its reactions and how the culture of a people be used to 
manipulate itself would also be a good study object for a future dissertation. 
 The techniques that centred on the negative aspects of the “Middle East” Target 
Nations, led to more antipathy and aggression toward them, whereas techniques such as 
Band-wagon and Plain folks led to a stronger sense of belonging among the listeners. As 
stated previously, to include someone in a particular group necessitates the exclusion of 
others. It will therefore be wrong to claim that the two groups of techniques represent 
only the inclusion-mechanism or the exclusion-mechanism of propaganda. It was the 
combination of the techniques that resulted in the status of the inclusion-exclusion 
mechanism in the propagandist’s speeches. Additionally, this combination contributed to 
the creation of an enemy image of Saddam. As this brief qualitative analysis has shown, 
most of the language techniques resembled one or more of the characteristics of the 
syndrome of the enemy image.  
Language is one of the primary defining qualities of man. It defines us both in our 
individuality and also in the way we behave socially. It surrounds us, moulding our ways 
of thinking and feeling, from the cry of a new born child to an obituary notice. People 
deprived of language in some way, because they are deaf, dumb, illiterate or unable to 
articulate words are in a certain way handicapped. All kinds of social control, all manners 
of manipulation from the hypnotic media to the most potent subliminal propaganda are 
achieved through it. Those people who are normally politically inert can be mobilized to 
die for a slogan. This is one of the biggest conclusions we can take from what I have 
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written previously: how easily people can be manipulated through a means that defines 
them- Language. 
But not any kind of language, the Language I am talking about is of a particular 
kind. I am referring to Propaganda that is nothing but a particular usage of language. A 
usage that is not only confined to verbal language, but that also extends to the semiotic 
one. Words and symbols joined together can move mountains and generate effects more 
powerful than an atomic bomb. 
The Middle Ages were an Era of Faith. Gigantic cathedrals were built. Today man’s 
greatest achievements are technical, political or commercial. Supermarkets are the new 
Cathedrals and power the new Faith. In this new world, information is power. The more 
you control information the more power you have. On the other hand information has 
gained such an extraordinary power that it is now able to control some of the greatest 
decision makers of the world.  How information can control or is controlled by “policy-
makers” was object of a small analysis, however much is left to be discussed and 
investigated. A good follow-up for this dissertation it would be.  For the moment let’s just 
consider Thomas Carlyle and the following sentence he wrote: “ Burke said that there were 
Three Estates in Parliament; but in the Reporters’ Gallery yonder, there sat a Fourth Estate more 
important far than they all”.  Now if we consider Marshal McLuhan words we can understand 
why: “Well… of course, people don’t actually read newspapers. They get into them every morning like a hot 
bath.”  
As we can see, not even in our inner cultural circle are we protected from 
propaganda. We cannot live without language and language cannot escape propaganda 
and manipulation.  
Language is the distinctive characteristic of human beings. Without language we 
cannot symbolize, rationalize, remember, distort, evoke beliefs and perceptions about 
matters, describe and create realities that take forms with each other or merely live on 
society. 
The processes of manipulation mentioned before cannot be stopped due to the fact 
that they are part of us.  The fable of the scorpion and the frog can  help to explain this. A 
scorpion was standing on one side of a river because we could not cross it. A frog came by 
and started to cross it easily. The scorpion asked the frog for help and promised he 
wouldn’t hurt him. The frog accepted and when they reached the other side of the river the 
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scorpion stung the frog with his deadly tail. The moribund frog asked the scorpion: “Why 
did you do this? I have just helped you cross the river!” The scorpion answered. “I do not 
have anything special against you. It’s just my nature…” 
When it suits us to see rationalization as reason, repression as help, distortion as 
creation, good as good and bad as bad, language and mind smoothly work with each other 
to do that. If it is necessary to solve a complicated mathematical problem, language and 
mind can also work together and solve the problem. When complicated problems involve 
social power and status distortion misperception will certainly occur. 
Common linguistic theories show that language, thought and action shape each 
other. Language is always an intrinsic part of a particular social situation and never an 
independent instrument. Only a naïve conception of language can characterize it as a tool 
for description when it plays an important role in creating social relationships.   
The dichotomy between Media-Power and audience power is a relationship that 
cannot be disregarded and it is also a very interesting basis for a future study. One side of 
the coin calls for a more powerful media, the other side displays a concern about the over-
estimation of media power. One thing is certainly taking place: the proliferation of new 
communication technologies, in particular the Internet, potentially increases the flow of 
information, opening up more doors for inconvenient stories to emerge and unsettle Policy 
Makers. However, the internet can also serve to divulge ideas and attitudes which are less 
than praiseworthy as anyone can publish their ideas, however bizarre. 
In short, policy makers seek to adopt policies that, whilst responding to the 
demand of media coverage, do not draw them into unwanted engagements. The power of 
the Media is in language. So, if language is power, what is propaganda?  
To conclude and as a sort of summary let me quote George Orwell and his essay 
(1946) Politics and the English Language as many of the situations he mentions can be seen to 
be taking place today: 
 
 “In our time, Political Speech and writings are largely the defence of the indefensible. 
Things like the continuance of British rule in India, the (…) dropping of the Atom bombs on Japan, can 
indeed be defended, but only by arguments which are too brutal for most people to face, and which do not 
square with the professional aims of political parties. Thus political language has to consist largely of 
euphemisms, question-begging and sheer cloudy vagueness. Defenceless villages are bombarded from the 
air, the inhabitants driven out into the countryside, the cattle machine-gunned, the huts set on fire, with 
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incendiary bullets; this is called pacification. Millions of peasants are robbed of their farms and sent 
trudging along the roads with no more than they can carry; this is called transfer of population or 
rectification of frontiers. People are imprisoned for years without trial, or shot in the back of the 
neck or sent to die of scurvy in Artic lumber camps: this is called elimination of unreliable 
elements (…) .”  
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